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Introduction
Moore’s law states that the number of transistors on a given area of a microprocessor
will approximately double every two years. While Gorden Moore, one of the founders
of Intel, who made this rather ambitious prediction in the April 1965 edition of Elec-
tronics magazine was referring to the foreseeable future, it is remarkable how accu-
rately the development of technology follows this law even up to this day. To put the
magnitude of this into perspective, at the time it was possible to put less than one thou-
sand transistors on a silicon chip, whereas today the latest CPU and even GPU models
host tens of billions thereof, even without taking into account the possibility of using
many of them in parallel. In addition to this, not only did computers become faster but
also a lot cheaper. Clearly this development has revolutionized many fields of science,
with Econometrics being no exception.
In the earlier days, Applied Economists and Econometricians mostly focused on
identifying parameters of an economic model defined as a single equation or a sys-
tem of multiple equations in combination with a parametric distribution function to
model measurement error or unobserved heterogeneity [Koopmans & Reiersol, 1950;
Hurwicz, 1950; Fisher, 1966; Rothenberg, 1971]. Being less and less restricted by com-
putational capacities due to the aforementioned advancement of computer hardware,
the focus gradually shifted from parametric to nonparametric approaches, which are
concerned with the identification and estimation of functions and distributions not be-
longing to a parametric family. Nonparametric models have the advantage of requir-
ing less assumptions on the structure of an economic model. For example a researcher
might be sympathetic to a rationality assumption imposed on individuals, but at the
same time does not believe that the shape of Engle curves can be globally represented
by a pre-specified parametric function for all prices and income levels, but rather be-
lieves in a more general relationship between demands and endowment. A different
XII
example which is often studied using a nonparametric approach and of fundamental
interest in this thesis is the modelling of unobserved heterogeneity. Coming back to the
previous example, it is widely accepted that individuals are rational utility optimizers,
however, even after controlling for different incomes and a variety of demographic
statistics, researches find a substantial amount of heterogeneity of demands which is
left unexplained [Blundell & Stoker, 2007]. Due to the lack of results on identification
of functions that are non-separable with respect to unobserved preference heterogene-
ity parameters, without substantially restricting utility functions and thus preferences
[Lewbel, 2001] it was difficult to allow for a deeper interpretation of this heterogeneity
in demands other than measurement errors.
Roehrig [1988] was the first to study non-parametric identification of simultaneous
equation models with non-additive error terms based on techniques developed earlier
by Brown [1983]. However, in a comment Benkard & Berry [2006] provide a coun-
terexample showing that the conditions for identification of structural functions they
provide for such a setting are not sufficient. Later on, by exploiting information about
quantiles of the distribution of the non-separable unobserved variable in a single equa-
tion context Matzkin [2003]; Altonji & Matzkin [2005] show how to non-parametrically
identify the structural demand function using a monotonicity assumption. Chesher
[2003] extends this to the context of a system of non-linear and non-additive equations
using a triangularity restriction. While identification and estimation of moments of
the structural functions were studied previously in a semiparametric context Powell
[1994]; Härdle et al. [1991]; Härdle & Stoker [1989] and later in a nonparametric one
by Matzkin [2008]; Imbens & Newey [2009], these approaches made it possible to give
the distribution of preference parameters a meaningful interpretation by being able to
interpret the latter as a range of types which is then mapped to the quantile of the
structural (demand) function. As a consequence, under certain integrability restric-
tions, this allows welfare analysis of a heterogeneous population since it is possible
to link the structural demand function to a cardinalization of utility functions, both
indexed by a vector of preference parameters, the distribution of which is observed.
The first chapter of this thesis builds upon these techniques when considering non-
parametric identification and estimation of structural components of the collective
household consumption model [Chiappori, 1988, 1992] in which household members
bargain over their consumption choices and are assumed to reach a Pareto efficient out-
XIII
come. Particular attention is given to non-separable unobserved heterogeneity in the
reduced form demands that arises from the underlying aggregate decision process. For
this, I derive necessary and sufficient conditions the model’s primitives have to satisfy
in order to ensure nonparametric point-identification of the conditional sharing rule, a
central component of the collective model that determines the allocation of endowment
among household members. A crucial condition is the existence of information on the
intra-household allocation of consumption in the considered dataset. The Dutch LISS
Panel (CentERData) is one example of such a dataset for which this approach is feasi-
ble. In addition to showing nonparametric identification of structural components of
this model, I also develop a nonparametric conditional quantile estimation procedure
[Koenker, 2000, 2005] based on smoothing techniques [Chaudhuri, 1991; Yu & Jones,
1998] and derive its asymptotic properties. In a Monte-Carlo experiment I study both
the finite sample behaviour of the proposed estimation procedure and compare it to a
naive non-parametric estimator. I also specify a collective labour supply model using
the LISS panel and estimate demands and conditional sharing rules for different parts
of the distribution of preference characteristics and find that there is indeed a signifi-
cant amount of heterogeneity even up to the extent that the sign for some elasticities
change with respect to the considered quantile of the taste distribution.
It is not always necessary to recover structural functions. To test implications of a
model and falsify them in the sense of Popper [1934], it is often sufficient to identify
only certain characteristics of the distribution of structural components of an economic
model or functionals thereof. This characteristics could be moments as in Härdle et al.
[1991]; Blundell & Powell [2003]; Imbens & Newey [2009] who consider conditional
means of structural functions and derivatives thereof, Hoderlein [2011] who addition-
ally considers conditional variances and, finally, Hoderlein & Mammen [2007]; Dette
et al. [2016] who exploit information about local averages of conditional quantiles of
structural functions. Another interesting case is the one where relevant characteristics
of the distribution of structural components are only set identified rather than point-
identified (see Chesher & Rosen [2014] for a definition), which leads to the vastly grow-
ing literature of partial identification (see for example Tamer [2010] for a comprehen-
sive survey of the relevant methods). One example is the case in which, for example
due to the lack of more informative datasets, one has to reason via marginal distribu-
tions because the joint distribution is not observed. Fréchet [1951] first studied this
problem by bounding joint probabilities using copulas which was later formalized in
XIV
a more general Econometric setting by Manski [1995, 2003, 2007].
Chapter two considers the so-called collective axiom of revealed preference in the
context of a partial identification setting. Once more I study the collective household
consumption model which assumes individual rationality and Pareto-efficient bar-
gaining within the household. This imposes restrictions on individual and aggregate
demands under different budget situations, which are characterized by prices and en-
dowments. This set of conditions is known as the Collective Axiom of Revealed Prefer-
ence [Cherchye et al., 2007, 2009]. In this chapter I show how one can exploit data from
single households in such a revealed preference context to further open the black box
of intra-household decision making. This approach requires the structural assumption
that preferences are stable with respect to different household compositions. In partic-
ular, I propose a non-parametric test of this assumption which allows for unobserved
heterogeneity both with respect to preferences and intra-household bargaining. Mak-
ing use of a finite-dimensional characterization of hypothetical household types, us-
ing the idea of stochastic revealed preferences [McFadden & Richter, 1991; McFadden,
2005], I show how to construct a test-statistic based on observing only marginal dis-
tributions of consumption choices for single and couple households, respectively, by
partially identifying the joint distribution. Finally a simulation study is conducted pro-
viding evidence that the test has power against the alternative hypothesis of non-stable
preferences and shows that it is correctly sized under different worst-case scenarios.
The third chapter of this thesis is co-authored by Pavel Čížek. It is best classified
as a semiparametric identification approach [Powell, 1994] with elements of nonpara-
metric estimation. Lewbel [2016] defines a semi-parametric model in a way that the
estimation of the parameters requires coping with the nonparametric components of
the model. While methodologically this chapter is positioned well within the broad
topic of nonparametric identification, from a content-related point of view it deviates
from the first two to the extent that it considers a time series framework, rather than
microeconomic data. In particular, we introduce non-linearities to the Conditional Au-
toregressive Value at Risk (CAViaR) model [Engle & Manganelli, 2004]. This is moti-
vated by the fact that financial time series often exhibit asymmetric dynamic behaviour
with respect to past shocks not only in their conditional means but also in their con-
ditional volatilities. The focus is on the latter, in particular if the main interest is not
in the conditional volatility itself but rather in the conditional quantile. We propose
XV
a general autoregressive conditional quantile model that allows for asymmetric be-
haviour and is robust to distributional assumptions. Our model can be viewed as an
extension of the CAViaR model in which we allow for two parameter regimes. We
consider both a threshold and a smooth transition version by using a parametrized
transition function with a location and a scale parameter. We show that this transition
function is nonparametrically identified. Further we propose an estimation procedure
employing a sieve estimator [Chen, 2008], which belongs to the class of nonparametric
estimators, in order to estimate conditional volatilities in a first stage using composite
quantile regression. These estimates are then used in the generalized autoregressive
conditional quantile estimation in the second stage. We show that our estimator is
consistent and asymptotically normal. Our simulations indicate that prediction errors
can be improved over both the smooth transition General Autoregressive Conditional
Heteroskedasticity model (GARCH) and the single regime CAViaR model, which are
considered to be the standard methods. In an empirical application we investigate as-
set returns of USD/GBP and the German equity index (DAX). We find strong evidence




Collective Households with Heterogeneous Agents
Introduction
Since the seminal contribution of Chiappori [1988, 1992] the collective household
model has found increasing popularity in consumption and labour supply settings. It
is argued that one should prefer a model in which each individual acts as a decision
maker, as opposed to the traditional unitary model which assumes that the households
acts as if it would follow one set of goals. Indeed there are many realms of applications,
e.g. female labour supply, welfare economics and family economics, for which the col-
lective model provides additional insight into the household decision making process.
While the micro-economic foundation of the collective model for a representative con-
sumer is well developed, very little is known about how one can incorporate the notion
of unobserved heterogeneity into the model. It is generally accepted that the assump-
tion of homogeneity does not hold in many domains of applications, since group statis-
tics often still exhibit a significant amount of variation [Blundell & Stoker, 2007]. In the
context of the collective model homogeneity would require individual preferences and
the within-household allocation process, to be identical given observed characteristics,
such as prices, endowment and demographic variables. A rather ad-hoc way this issue
is usually dealt with, is to solve the model for a representative consumer, i.e. as if there
was no unobserved heterogeneity, and then include an additive and heteroskedastic
but separable error term in the system of demand equations. From a structural point
of view, such an additive error term can be interpreted as a measurement error. In other
words, representative consumers maximize a common utility function subject to their
budget constraint but observed demands are subject to recording errors or optimiza-
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tion errors. On the other hand, if the error terms are supposed to capture unobserved
preference heterogeneity, an additive structure poses very strong restrictions on the
individuals’ preferences and the aggregation process. Even within the more traceable
unitary setting, in general a stochastic demand system that admits a broad class of un-
derlying utility functions, turns out to be non-separable in the error terms [Brown &
Walker, 1989; Lewbel, 2001]. No such result seems to exist for the collective model. To
the knowledge of the author, the following contributions exist that allow for structural
heterogeneity within the collective model. Chiappori et al. [2012] considers the em-
pirical content of Nash bargaining, which in its essence is a collective model however
differs from the usual collective model in the sense that it incorporates all common bar-
gaining axioms instead of only Pareto efficiency. Chiappori & Kim [2013] use a collec-
tive household setting and show identification of derivatives of the sharing rule with
respect to a distribution factor. This paper considers representative customers when
it comes to taste preferences (up to a measurement error), but allows for a structural
additive error in the sharing rule which can be interpreted as unobserved bargaining
heterogeneity. Matzkin & Perez-Estrada [2011] on the other hand consider additive
sub-utility functions capturing household taste preferences using a scalar household-
wide taste shock. Dunbar et al. [2013b] consider completely random resource shares.
They show that under certain preference restrictions and the existence of a number of
distribution factors, the joint distribution of resource share levels is identified.
In this paper we attempt to take another step towards getting a better understand-
ing of how one can non-parametrically identify and estimate structural components
of the model, if unobserved heterogeneity is introduced not only as an error term in
the demands but in the models primitives. We will allow for taste shocks which cap-
ture individuals’ preferences for each good as well as unobserved heterogeneity in
the members’ bargaining power, which will have an effect on the within-household
allocation process. We do not require an additively or multiplicatively separable er-
ror term, but will rather provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the models
primitives that will ensure invertibility of demands with respect to the error terms.
It is important to note that our approach is fundamentally nonparametric, which al-
lows us to make conclusions about a broad class of utility functions and aggregation
rules rather than a specific parametrization, ruling out the possibility of misspecifica-
tion bias. In addition to this, in order to keep our results as general as possible, we
allow for an arbitrary number of group members, consuming both private and public
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goods. One of the main difficulties within the context of the collective model is to iden-
tify levels of the conditional sharing rule, which captures how household endowment
is distributed among the members. While there exists a whole literature concerned
about strategies to recover the latter from aggregate consumption information, see for
example Browning et al. [2013]; Dunbar et al. [2013a] who impose restrictions on pref-
erences, or Cherchye et al. [2015] who propose a set identification strategy using the
collective axiom of revealed preferences, it is not the purpose of this paper to provide a
new strategy that recovers the sharing rule, but rather to show its identification in the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity, once it is recovered. For this reason this paper
assumes fully assignable consumption information of household members. There ex-
ists a range of datasets, that are feasible for such an identification strategy including the
time-use and consumption module of the Dutch LISS panel [Cherchye et al., 2012], the
Danish Household Expenditure Survey [Bonke & Browning, 2015], a survey of the Italian
International Center of Family studies [Menon et al., 2012] and for time-use data the UK
Time Use Survey 2000 [Browning & Gortz, 2012]. This allows us to separate the endow-
ment allocation problem resulting in the conditional sharing rule and the individual
consumption decision problems, not only when considering the underlying economic
structure but also within our empirical setting in which we will estimate conditional
quantiles of the conditional sharing rule. While conditional quantiles of this quantity
are identified immediately, the main challenge and the main focus of this paper is to
relate them to the distribution of taste and bargaining shocks representing unobserved
heterogeneity which will ultimately allow us to estimate the (causal) effect of a (policy
relevant) impulse on the distribution of the conditional sharing rule, as well as public
and private good consumption. One could think of policies concerning tax transfers
as for example family splitting, in which spouses pool their income for taxation giving
them tax benefits in a progressive tax system or the question who of the spouses re-
ceives child benefit payments. Since one might expect that responses to such policies
might differ across the population, looking at conditional quantiles can provide very
valuable insights to policy makers.
As opposed to the aforementioned contributions of Chiappori et al. [2012]; Chi-
appori & Kim [2013]; Dunbar et al. [2013b] our approach will largely draw from the
existing non-parametric identification literature. The restrictions we will derive on the
models’ structure, will be a consequence of higher level restrictions imposed on the
demand functions that are required for these general non-parametric identification re-
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sults to apply. Functions, both scalar and vector valued, that are non-separable with
respect to error terms have been heavily studied in the econometrics literature. See
for example Brown [1983]; Roehrig [1988] who consider identification of conditional
means, Chesher [2003]; Matzkin [2003]; Altonji & Matzkin [2005]; Imbens & Newey
[2009] who focus on triangular and invertible models considering conditional quan-
tiles or Hoderlein & Mammen [2007, 2009] who provide identification results based on
local average structural derivatives. These results have been applied to the unitary con-
sumption model, but not yet to the collective one. Perhaps the closest paper to this one
for the unitary model is Beckert & Blundell [2008] who provide necessary and sufficient
conditions which marginal rates of substitutions have to satisfy to ensure invertibility
of Walrasian demands. Blundell et al. [2013] and Blundell et al. [2014] propose esti-
mation procedures for non-separable demand functions under Slutsky and Revealed
Preference restrictions, respectively. The main advantage of the latter approaches is
that rationality restrictions are imposed while at the same time the flexibility of non-
parametric estimation is maintained. All the above approaches have in common that
they can be sub-summed under the monotonicity or invertibility paradigm. While this
is a more comprehensive approach that allows for full point-identification of demands,
it requires the researcher to impose more structure on the underlying model. On the
other end of the scale there is identification of (local) averages. These approaches per-
mit very general forms of unobserved heterogeneity and are mostly used for testing
implications of individual rationality. Härdle et al. [1991] for examples investigates the
empirical content of the law of demand imposing the metonymy hypothesis, whereas
Hoderlein [2011]; Haag et al. [2009]; Dette et al. [2016] test the empirical content of Slut-
sky symmetry and negative-definiteness and Hoderlein & Stoye [2014] tests the weak
axiom of revealed preferences in a unitary setting.
The method we follow in this paper will be closer to the invertibility strand of
the literature, although there will be some elements of average derivative estimation.
While we will be able to achieve full point-identification of demand functions with all
its advantages, it is obvious that some assumptions have to be met by the demand sys-
tem in order for them to apply. The challenge is to connect these assumptions to the
models’ primitives to study the restrictions they impose on the underlying structure.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 1.2 we will briefly discuss the eco-
nomic structure of the collective model and derive its key restrictions that we will use
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to link demands to the underlying utilities and aggregation process. Based on these re-
sults, in Section 1.3 we will derive restrictions under which both levels and derivatives
of individual demand functions as well as demands for non-exclusive public goods
and most importantly the conditional sharing rule can be non-parametrically identi-
fied. In Section 1.4 we propose a non-parametric quantile regression procedure that
closely follows this identification strategy and derive its asymptotic properties, which
concludes the theoretical part of the paper. In Sections 1.5 and 1.6 we conduct a sim-
ulation study to investigate the finite sample behaviour of our estimation procedure
before we estimate a simple collective labour supply model for Dutch households us-
ing the LISS panel.
Specification and Economic Restrictions
In this section, we will briefly introduce the collective model setting in its most
general form [Chiappori & Ekeland, 2009] and present its key economic restrictions,
which we will need to derive conditions for our identification strategy. While the
model can be used for different purposes, e.g. labour supply and time-use settings,
we will present the standard consumption-based version, without loss of generality.
To capture heterogeneity at this stage, we index1 households by i ∈ IN := {1, . . . ,N}
with members s ∈ ISi := {1, . . . , Si}. While our approach would allow us to treat house-
holds of different sizes, we will without loss of generality assume that Si = S. We
assume that individual agents can choose from a finite number of consumable goods
L, determining the set of alternatives RL+, with corresponding prices [p0, ps] ∈ RL+ and
endowment w ∈ R. We denote the number of publicly consumed goods by L0 and the
number of privately consumed goods by L1 = L−L0. For given prices and endowment,
each household chooses S + 1 consumption vectors: assignable private consumption
(p0, ps, w) 7→ xsi for each individual s ∈ IS in the household and public household con-
sumption (p0, ps, w) 7→ x0i , which cannot be assigned to any of the members. Then, for
given prices p := [p1, . . . , pS] and income w, we can define the set of feasible consump-
tion bundles as:
B(p, p0, w) :=
{






This budget constraint set is convex, compact and contains the origin. We allow
every individual to have their own set of preferences which we assume can be repre-
1We denote the index set running from 1 to J by IJ := {1, . . . , J}.
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sented by a twice differentiable strictly quasi-concave utility function usi : RL+ → R :
(x0, xs) 7→ usi . Note that the structure of the utility function implies that there are no
consumption externalities for private demands, since xs′ does not enter us for s 6= s′.
The collective choice of a household can then be viewed as an aggregate decision rule,
depending on its member’s utilities for a given consumption vector, paired with their
relative bargaining ’power’ within the household. This decision rule can be modelled
by means of a social choice function Wi : RS+ → R+ that assigns a positive real number
representing the collective utility of the household to a vector of its members’ individ-
ual utilities. Hence, from a household perspective, choosing an optimal consumption






i (x), . . . , u
S
i (x)). (1.2)
As is common in the collective consumption literature, we only impose the follow-
ing restriction on the bargaining structure of the model.
Assumption 1.1. [Intra-Household Pareto Efficiency] Let p, p0 and w be given. If
for any two vectors
(










∈ B(p, p0, w) it holds that us(x01, xs1) >
us(x02, x
s
2) for all s ∈ IS, and us(x01, xs1) > us(x02, xs2) for some s ∈ IS, then the vec-
tor
(




is not a solution of the household decision process. The collection of
remaining points shall be denoted as the Pareto frontier ∂B(ps, p0, w), which is both
non-empty and convex as it corresponds to the boundary of the budget set, by strict
monotonicity of individual preferences (Walras’ law).
It can be shown that any social welfare function Wi that satisfies Pareto efficiency,
can be rewritten as a linear combination of individual utilities with weights (p,w, zµ) 7→
µsi corresponding to the individuals’ bargaining power. These Pareto weights, are func-
tions of prices, endowment and so-called distribution factors zµ ∈ RMµ that enter µ but
do not enter the individuals’ preferences. We include the latter for the sake of com-
pleteness, however their existence is not necessary for our results, since we follow
an identification strategy that requires observing intra-household allocation instead of
distribution factors. Another consequence of Pareto efficiency is that the household
optimization problem as described above can be written by means of an equivalent
two-step procedure, in which the members agree on the sharing of total household in-
come as well as consumption of public goods in the first stage and then, conditional
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upon this outcome, privately optimize individual consumption. In formal terms, this
means that there exists a map (p, p0, w, zµ) 7→ ρsi , the conditional sharing rule, such that
every [x, x0](p, p0, w, zµ) that solves (1.2) is also a solution of the following two-stage
optimization process. In the first stage, using indirect individual utilities vsi from the














with ρ = [ρ1, . . . , ρS] and budget constraint
B0(p0, w) :=
{






In the second stage, all members s ∈ IS of the household individually optimize, con-
ditional upon optimal public consumption x0i = x0i (p, p0, w, zµ) and the conditional
sharing rule ρsi = ρsi
(




s, x0i (p, p
0, w, zµ), ρsi(p, p




xs, x0i (p, p
0, w, zµ)
)
using their individual budget constraint
Bsi
(




x ∈ X : psx 6 ρsi
(
p, p0, w, zµ
)}
.
The value function of the second stage vsi is called the collective indirect utility of
individual (i, s) and is often of main interest. The second main building block, and
arguably the most important feature of the collective model, is the conditional sharing
rule ρs, on which we will focus in this paper. Note that here we follow an approach in
which we assume that the nature of the good (private or public) is known a priori and
private good consumption is assignable, such that we can allow members to simulta-
neously decide upon public good consumption and how the remaining endowment
is allocated among the members, which is captured by the conditional sharing rule ρs
for s ∈ IS2. Thus, the individual shares are defined conditional upon of public good
consumption x0. However, if x0 is invertible with respect to p0 for given (p,w, zµ), we
can also express it in terms of (p, p0, w, zµ). A detailed discussion about this duality
result can be found in [Chiappori & Ekeland, 2009].
2This stands in contrast with an alternative approach (see e.g. Browning et al. [2013]; Cherchye
et al. [2015]) in which in the first stage the household members allocate their budget by choosing the
respective shares. In the second stage individual consumption is then chosen subject to individualized
Lindahl prices. This is equivalent to a model with only public goods with private goods being boundary
cases for which Lindahl prices are equal to market prices.
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In order to identify the latter, we have to link the structural economic model to ob-
served behaviour. Since it is impossible to observe cardinalizations of direct utilities,
it is a common strategy to focus on the solution of the utility maximization problem
which takes the form of an observable demand system, and then use the underlying
structure to derive restrictions these demands have to satisfy in order to be rational-
izable. This is the problem of economic integrability, which has been studied for both
the unitary [Hurwicz & Uzawa, 1971; Afriat, 1967] and the collective setting [Chiap-
pori & Ekeland, 2006, 2009; Cherchye et al., 2007]. We will now briefly present the key
economic restrictions of the collective model which we will use to provide necessary
and sufficient conditions for identification of the conditional sharing rule, and refer the
interested reader to the citations above for a more elaborate treatment of the topic.
For the first stage, using first order conditions we can determine public good con-
sumption and the conditional sharing rule, which individuals decide upon given indi-
rect utility from the second stage. For each household i ∈ IN, a solution (x0, ρ) of this



























where m0 denotes the Lagrange multiplier arising from the budget constraint. Pareto





As for the second stage, where each individual (i, s) ∈ IN × IS optimizes his own
utility conditional upon the solution of the first stage, i.e. the conditional sharing rule
and public consumption, solutions defining private consumption must solve the first




0, w, zµ), xs
)
= msp (1.6)
where ms are Lagrange multiplies for each s ∈ IS. According to Walras’ law the
solution lies on the boundary of the individual budget constraint such that pxs =
ρsi
(
p, p0, w, zµ
)
, which is now defined in terms of the conditional sharing rule and
can be interpreted as the share of endowment after public consumption (in monetary
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terms) that was allocated to member s in the previous stage.
Lemma 1. The key economic restrictions implied by the first order conditions (1.6) of the second












= 0 . (1.7)
Similarly, the first stage restrictions (1.4)-(1.5) implicitly defining the optimal allocation of
public goods and the conditional sharing rule can be rewritten as the (L0 + S− 1)-dimensional
nonlinear system of equations
Ξ0i (x0, ρ) :=Ωi(x0, ρ)µi − c :=








 = 0 . (1.8)
where vi = [v1i , . . . , vsi ]T , ρi = [ρ1i , . . . , ρsi ]T , µi = [1, µ2i/µ1i , . . . , µSi /µ1i ]T and (S − 1) × S-
dimensional projection J0 = δi,j+1 with δ being defined as the Kronecker delta.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.
Lemma 1 defines the first order conditions as systems of partial differential equa-
tions which characterize the economic restrictions imposed by the collective consump-
tion model. If the functions xsi and [x0i , ρsi ], are solutions to these systems for all mem-
bers s ∈ IS of a particular household i ∈ IN, we can conclude that they satisfy the
restrictions imposed by the model and hence the household is rational in a collective
sense. We can define a population to be rational if all individuals are collectively ra-
tional4. So far we have only considered representative consumers. The novelty of this
paper will be the transition from this deterministic setting to a stochastic one in order to
model unobserved heterogeneity. We will assume that all heterogeneity in individuals’
preferences can be represented by a finite number of unobserved random variables and
derive restrictions on how the latter may enter utility functions and Pareto weights by
using the restrictions (1.7) and (1.8), which link these functions to the implicitly defined
demand functions xs, x0 and conditional sharing rules ρs which are in turn functions of
observed variables (p, p0, zµ, w) and the aforementioned unobserved variables which
we will introduce in the next section.
3Subscript j refers to the jth row of a vector, and −j = {j}c to all rows except j
4Note that, while this is not the primary purpose of this paper, in order to conduct welfare analysis
one has to recover the underlying individual utility functions from observed data. Thus, certain inte-
grability conditions known as the SNR(S-1) conditions need to be satisfied, which is a well established
result in the literature [Chiappori & Ekeland, 2006, 2009].
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Identification
Having discussed the economic restrictions of the collective model, in this section
we will address the core question of this paper, namely whether and under which
conditions, we can identify both private and public demands as well as the sharing
rule5 from observed variables. To model heterogeneous individuals we switch from
the deterministic view of the model specified in Section 1.2 that applies to one in-
dividual i ∈ IN to a stochastic one, by introducing population utility functions and
Pareto weights and express unobserved heterogeneity by a random variable entering
these functions. To keep our results as general as possible we will neither specify the
functional form of population utility functions and Pareto weights nor the distribu-
tion of the unobserved random variables, but rather treat the question of identification
non-parametrically. It was already argued that the demand functions resulting from
the two-stage optimization problem in Section 1.2, are in general non-linear and non-
separable in the error terms, which is something we have to take into account. There
exist at least two different strands in the literature considering identification of such
functions, which both exploit information about the whole distribution of unobserv-
ables, instead of just its first or second moments as for example in Brown [1983] or
Roehrig [1988], by using (local averages of) conditional quantiles. The first approach
requires a function to be monotone Matzkin [2003], triangular [Chesher, 2003; Altonji
& Matzkin, 2005; Imbens & Newey, 2009] or invertible Beckert & Blundell [2008] with
respect to the unobserved error terms. A second route to achieve identification, which
is more flexible with respect to excess heterogeneity, is the one proposed by Hoder-
lein & Mammen [2007, 2009]. While the latter allows random variables to be infinite-
dimensional, it comes with the drawback of only applying to scalar functions or linear
combinations of components of vector valued functions [Dette et al., 2016]. This is
often sufficient for testing implications of rationality, however since we are dealing
with a consumption setting with the inherent property of having a system of nonlinear
equations which we want to estimate, we will make use of the first approach but will
discuss a special case under which this approach can be applied. In what follows, we
will provide sufficient conditions on both data availability and individual preferences,
in form of non-parametric restrictions on the functional form of utility functions, that
5Having discussed different concepts of the (conditional) sharing rule in the previous section, we
will from now on make the conditioning on public goods implicit by simply refering to this quantity as
the sharing rule
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ensure that all demand systems are invertible with respect to the unobserved error
terms, exhibit no excess heterogeneity and hence meet the conditions required to be
point identified.







RL1+ × RL0+ = RL+ of which xsi is private and x0i is public. Sharing is characterized by
ρi ∈ RS+, which sums up to total household income wi.
Assumption 1.2. Individual consumption
(




, public consumption x0i and hence
the shares of household endowment ρi =
(




are observed for all i ∈ IN.
This assumption makes the data requirement for our proposed identification strat-
egy explicit. Datasets providing the necessary information on intra-household alloca-
tion are becoming more and more popular, as for example the consumption module
of the Dutch LISS panel [Cherchye et al., 2012], the Danish Household Expenditure Survey
[Bonke & Browning, 2015], a survey of the Italian International Center of Family studies
[Menon et al., 2012] and for time-use data the UK Time Use Survey 2000 [Browning &
Gortz, 2012]. In this general setting we assume there is in fact both public and indi-
vidual private consumption (L0, L1 > 0), which we believe is crucial to capture all be-
haviour that is inherent to a group of people living together as a family or household.
However, there are two special cases which are both nested in our setting. The first one
is a specification in which we only have public goods (L = L0). As one might guess,
the second spacial case is one in which there is only private and assignable consump-
tion (L = L1). In this case the observed sharing rule would immediately allow us to
treat each individual separately in the context of a unitary consumption optimization
setting.
To model heterogeneous individuals we define population utility functions u1, . . . , uS
and allow for individual specific taste-shifters defined as random vectors ε0 and ε. Sim-
ilarly we model unobserved heterogeneity with respect to intra-household bargaining
by random distribution factors εµ entering the Pareto weights µ1, . . . , µS. We could also
allow for observed heterogeneity, taking e.g. demographic variables into account, but
in the interest of readability we will abstract from this. In order to fully recover the
primitives of our model, which allows us to perform welfare analysis on an individual
level, we have to carefully balance the dimension of our random vectors. Thus, let εµ
be a (S − 1)-dimensional random vector that represents heterogeneity in the members
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Pareto weights, which we will refer to as bargaining shocks. Further let ε = [ε1, . . . , εL1−1]
be a sequence of S-vectors capturing taste shocks of each individual for all privately
consumed goods and let
[




characterize the households taste shocks for the
L0 public goods.
Assumption 1.3. (i) Preferences can be represented by means of a utility function
usi = u
s(xs, x0, εs, ε0) which is twice continuously differentiable in all its argu-
ments and for given (ε0, εs) strictly monotone and strictly quasi-concave in (xs, x0).
Every member of a household is exposed to the same taste shock for a public good





us exist and have
full rank for all s ∈ IS.
(ii) Pareto weights can be represented as µsi = µs(p,w, zµ, εµs ), where µs continuously
differentiable in (p,w, zµ), strictly monotone in each element of zµ and εµs , has
range (0,1) for all s ∈ IS and is normalized such that
∑
s∈IS µ
s(p,w, z, εµs ) = 1.
With this notion of taste- and bargaining-shocks, we can now define an individ-
uals unobserved preferences and bargaining power by means of a random variable.
While the general differentiability, and monotonicity assumptions on both utilities and
Pareto weights are fairly standard in the literature, the assumption that members share
a common taste shock for public goods and the rank conditions need further explana-
tion. The former is needed, since we only observe, L0 demands for public goods. If
we would allow one taste shock for each public good and for each individual there
would be excess heterogeneity in the first stage demand system and we would not be
able to identify public good consumption and the sharing rule. The rank conditions
ensure that taste shocks not only affect marginal utilities, but also that they enter in a
non-ambiguous way, meaning that everything else equal, two different realizations of
taste shocks do not induce the same marginal utilities. The one on ∇2xs,εsus is well es-
tablished in the literature for the unitary model [Beckert & Blundell, 2008] and∇2
x0,ε0
us
makes sure that the same holds for public goods and is hence a straightforward exten-
sion thereof.
To simplify notation throughout this section for all s ∈ IS we define πs = ps and
π0 = (p, p0, w, zµ). Using Assumption 1.3 we can now write the first stage optimization
problem, defined in (1.3), as























ρs 6 w (1.9)
It is easy to see, that in general the solution of this program depends on both public[
ε0, εµ
]
and private errors εs, whose dimensions are L0+ S− 1 (Assumption 1.3.(i)) and





Thus, we have excess heterogeneity in the sense that it is not possible to directly find
a one-to-one mapping between a given realization of preference parameters (ε, ε0, εµ)
and observed demands and sharing rules (x0, ρ). To overcome this, we will show under
which conditions we can exploit information from demands for private goods xs for all
s ∈ IS to identify the distribution of ε which we denote as P. It turns out that for given
realization of ε a sufficient condition to achieve point identification of public demands
and the sharing rule is given by















(iii) and ε0 is independent of ε for given π06.
The first part of this assumption states that the effect of a taste shock for good l
on the marginal utility on that good, must exceed the magnitude of aggregated cross-
effects that taste shocks for all other goods have on this particular good l. The second
part ensures that there exists at least one individual whose marginal utility with respect
to income does not depend on the (common) taste shock for public goods.
Remember that Assumption 1.4 is only sufficient for identification for given private
taste shocks εs or consistent predictions thereof. Since, the latter are characterized by
6Formally we define ((ε0, εµ), ε) as an element of the probability space
(




with E0 = RL0+S−1, E = R(L1−1)S and hence σ(E0 × E) = B(RL1S+L0−1) where the latter is the Borel σ-
algebra defined on the respective Eucledian space. Without making it explicit in the notation, we allow
the probability measures P and Pε
0
to depend on exogenous variables.
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individual demands, identification of xs for all s ∈ IS is crucial as well, for which we
require one more structural assumption. We know that in the second stage all members
s ∈ IS of the household conditionally upon optimal (ρs, x0) optimize
xs
(




us(x, x0, εs, ε0) s.t. psTx 6 ρs .
Using the solution of this optimization problem, which characterizes observed de-










πs, ρs, x0, εs, ε0
)
, x0, εs, ε0
)
which enters the first stage program defined in equation (1.9). While individual indi-




, in order to identify





enter the demand system xs for any s ∈ IS, which would cause excess heterogeneity.
Assumption 1.5. For each individual s ∈ IS, the marginal rates of substitution between
private goods does not depend on taste shocks for public goods
∇ε0Ξs(xs, εs, ε0) = 0.
Intuitively, this assumption states that after collectively choosing public consump-
tion, the amount of private goods that is consumed by a member does not depend on
the unobserved taste shock for the public good. A sufficient condition for this would be
for example separability of the form us(xs, x0, εs, ε0) = G(g(xs, εs), x0, ε0), for any two
differentiable, increasing, real-valued functions G and g. This assumption is testable
for observed x0. To see this, note that the choice of xs is conditional upon x0 from the
first stage. Hence xs can be written as a function of either x0 or π0. Using prices and en-
dowment poses restrictions on private demands, whereas using x0 does not. Therefore
under the null, i.e. if Assumption 1.5 holds, xs(πs, x0i ) should be "close to" xs(πs, π0).
Note that Assumptions 1.4 and 1.5 express sufficient conditions for the public de-
mand system to be monotonic in the error terms. Necessary conditions are less eco-
nomically traceable and therefore discussed only in the proof. Theorem 1 formalizes
the main identification result of this section.
Theorem 1 (Identification). Let π = [π1, . . . , πS], Π0ε = [π0, π, ε] and τ ∈ (0,1). Under
assumptions 1.1-1.5, both levels Qτxsj |πs(π
s) and derivatives Q̇τxsj |πs(π
s) of the τth conditional
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quantile7 of each component j ∈ IL1−1 of private demands are identified. In addition to this, for




(Π0ε) and derivatives Q̇τ(x0,ρ)l|Π0ε(Π
0
ε) of
each component l ∈ IL0+S−1 of public demands and the sharing rule are also identified.
Proof. In order to understand the mechanics of the underlying identification strategy it
is instructional to look at the main steps of the proof. Note that under Assumptions 1.2
and 1.5, the second stage private demand problem is equivalent to the unitary model,
for which invertibility is well established [Beckert & Blundell, 2008]. We will there-
fore only focus on the first stage sharing rule and public goods at this point. For the
complete and detailed version of the proof we refer the interested reader to Appendix
1.A.














= Ω(x0,ρ, Π0ε, ε
0)µ(Π0ε, ε
µ) − c
where we define Ω1 and Ω2 to be the first L0 and the remaining S − 1 rows of the
matrix, respectively. Intuitively Ω1 largely refers to the restrictions defining public
good consumption, whereas Ω2 defines sharing rules in terms of Pareto weights.








using the implicit func-
































requires this matrix to be of full rank (L0+S−1).
Note that the inverse of ∇[x0,ρ]Ξ0 exists by construction of the collective model. Hence
it remains to show that ∇[ε0,εµ]Ξ0 has full rank. Writing the latter as a block matrix





















we can now analyze the respective blocks separately. Intuitively, since Ψ11 refers to
the impact of taste shocks for public goods on the equations defining public goods
7The quantile of a r.v. Y conditional on X, with c.d.f. FY|X is defined as Qτy (x) :=
inf
{
y ∈ R : FY|X=x (y) > τ
}
.
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and Ψ22 refers to the impact of bargaining shocks on the sharing rule, we allow (and
require) these matrices to be largely unrestricted and have full rank. Ψ12 and Ψ21 on
the other define the impact of bargaining shocks on public good consumption and that
of taste shocks on the sharing rule, respectively. We will show that the latter is zero,
which follows from the fact that ratios of Pareto weights are inverse ratios of individual
marginal utilities with respect to the sharing rule as defined in equation (1.4) and the
fact that by Assumption 1.3.(ii) the former do not depend on public taste shocks. It than
follows from taking the Schur complement Ψ/Ψ22 that rk (Ψ) = rk (Ψ/Ψ22) + rk (Ψ22) =
rk (Ψ11) + rk (Ψ22) since Ψ/Ψ22 = Ψ/Ψ11 + Ψ12Ψ−122 Ψ21 where the latter term is zero. Ψ11
can be written as a linear combination of second derivatives ∇2
x0,ε0
vs. Assumption
1.3.(i) ensures that each of them has full rank whereas Assumption 1.4 ensures positive
semi-definiteness of each of them such that the linear combination has full rank too.
Assumption 1.3.(ii) immediately implies full rank of Ψ22 since∇εµµ is diagonal with all
elements being non-zero. Thus, rk (Ψ) = dimΨ = L0+S−1 and public demands and the




and are thus identified.
It is important to emphasize that the second identification result regarding public
demands and the sharing rule requires identification of the distribution P of private
taste shocks ε which are unobserved. While, we have shown invertibility of the sys-
tems with respect to error terms which is both necessary and sufficient for identifica-
tion of conditional quantiles of these demands, it is not sufficient (however necessary)
for the identification of P. In this more general setting, all we can identify is the dis-
tribution of a generalized error term for each s ∈ IS : a(πs) = x − Qτx|πs(πs). Without
further restrictions there is no one-to-one mapping between a and ε. This is a known
problem within the identification literature and hence the same logic applies to the
conditions which Beckert & Blundell [2008] provide for the unitary model. For this
reason, we will now provide examples and refinements under which we can identify
not only the distribution of a but also the one of ε.
Collective labour supply model
This model refers to a collective model with two private goods L1 = 2. Labour sup-
ply is modelled as consumption of leisure and one composite consumption good [Chi-
appori, 1992; Fortin & Lacroix, 1997; Blundell et al., 2007; Cherchye et al., 2015]. Using
the budget constraint, the observed demand system reduces to a scalar leisure demand
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function. There is no restriction on the number of public goods L0, due to the observ-
ability of the sharing rule. Invertibility as discussed above for such a function implies
monotonicity with respect to the error term such that, using the invariance property
of conditional quantiles to monotone transforms, the distribution of εs is identified for
each s ∈ IS [Matzkin, 2003]. In fact this will be the model setting that we will employ
in our empirical application in Section 1.6.
General consumption model with triangularity in private demands
This refinement is a generalization of the aforementioned monotonicity approach
and follows the lines of Chesher [2003] and Imbens & Newey [2009]. If, in addition to
the invertibility restrictions we derived we also have triangularity with respect to the
error terms, which means that we can order goods with respect to their error structure
where xsL1 is only affected by ε
s
L1
, xsL1−1 is affected by ε
s
L1
and εsL1−1 and so on, we can
also identify the distribution of each εs for all s ∈ IS. An example for a parametrization
that satisfies this triangularity condition is the data generating process we specify in
our consumption model within the Monte Carlo study in Section 1.5.
The case of two-person households without public goods
This case is somewhat different from the previous two cases, as it does not require
estimation of private taste shocks at all. Assume that all goods are consumed privately
(L0 = 0) and the group consists of only two members (S = 2), as for example a typical
household without children. In such a setting, excess heterogeneity is not an issue
since it is well established [Hoderlein & Mammen, 2007, 2009] that a local polynomial
quantile estimator, as we will propose it in the next section, can in fact be used to
estimate local averages of conditional quantiles and its derivatives of such function.
Since this approach allows for a very general (infinite-dimensional) error structure,
taste shocks for public goods and bargaining shocks can be unrestricted such that one
can drop assumption 1.4. In addition to this, one could allow for member specific taste
shocks for public goods instead of common ones.
Corollary 1.1. If for given πs there exists a one-to-one mapping between ε and general-
ized errors a(πs) = x−Qτx|πs(π
s), then identification of Pa is sufficient for identification
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Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Matzkin [2003] for monotone functions
(first refinement) and Chesher [2003] for triangular systems (second refinement).
In the next section we will study how we can consistently estimate the distribution
of individual private taste shocks using private demands, as well as local averages of
public goods and the sharing rule as defined in Corollary 1.1.
Estimation of Demands and the Sharing Rule
Information on intra-household allocation of goods allows us to follow an empir-
ical strategy that estimates the sharing rule and demands for public goods separately
from the individuals’ demand functions for private goods. However, we have seen
that an individual’s taste-shocks εs for private goods, will in general also influence the
household decision about the sharing rule and public good consumption. This is due
to the fact that they are characterized by a utility maximization problem, that is a com-
bination of the members’ utilities. Taste shocks are unobserved and we do not want
to specify their distribution a priori. Nevertheless, we can approximate them using the
residuals from the private demand estimation. Once we obtain such predictions, we
are able to estimate the demands for public goods and the sharing rule conditional
upon them. Finally, since the effect of private taste shocks has no economic meaning
per se, we are going to take expectations with respect to them in order to obtain a local
average of a conditional quantile.
We have shown in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1.1 under which restrictions condi-
tional quantiles of xsj , [ρ1, . . . , ρS−1, x0]l are identified. For notational simplicity we will
omit superscript s ∈ IS and subscripts j ∈ IL1−1 and l ∈ IL0+S−1 from now on and write
only ρ instead of (ρ, x0)l and x instead of xsj to refer to the respective components. We
define the dimension of the exogenous variables by at K0 = L0 + SL1 + 1 and K = L1
for ρ and x, respectively. Before we present the estimation procedure, which is closely
related to our identification results, we need a weak regularity assumption regarding
the distribution of the data and unobserved variables.
Assumption 1.6. (i) (x, π)i and (ρ, π0)i are i.i.d. sequences and have non-degenerate
distribution functions with Lipschitz-continuous conditional densities fx|π, fρ|π0
and marginal densities fπ, fπ0 , respectively, which are all uniformly bounded by
a finite constant M <∞ and non-zero at F−1x|π(τ) and F−1ρ|π0(τ), respectively.
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(ii) εi and ε0i are i.i.d., have expectation zero, finite second moments and are charac-
terized by their continuous densities fε and fε0 .
(iii) εi and ε0i are independent of πi and π0i respectively





To obtain estimates for the conditional quantile [Koenker & Bassett, 1978] of a pri-
vate demand x and its corresponding gradient vector, in a first stage8 we use a local
linear approximation [Chaudhuri, 1991; Yu & Jones, 1998] of x around some π0 and
minimize(
Q̂τx|π(π0),





xi − γ0 − γ
T







where ρτ is the quantile loss (check-)function u 7→ u(τ−1{u>0}), K is a smooth, symmet-
ric kernel function with compact support [a, b] and variance one, that puts decreasing
weight on observations far from π0 and h a free bandwidth parameter tending to zero
as N → ∞. Since this objective function is not differentiable, we do not have an ex-
plicit solution for our quantities of interest unlike for the local linear mean regression.
Although it constitutes a fairly standard result in the literature, for reasons of self suf-
ficiency of the paper and the fact that it enters the second stage estimates, we provide
the asymptotic distribution for this first stage estimate in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 (First stage asymptotic distribution). LetK() be a symmetric Kernel with bounded










































Proof. See Appendix 1.A.
8Note that first and second stages are now referring to the estimation steps and are not to be confused
with the ones that were defined in Section 1.2.
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As is common in local linear regression, we get a bias of second order. The vari-
ance is determined by τ, the selected kernel, the marginal density of the independent
variables and the sparsity function (i.e. the inverse conditional density function eval-
uated at the true quantile) which can both be estimated given our observed data. It
is noteworthy that the function and its gradient vector are asymptotically indepen-
dent which follows from the block-diagonal nature of B1. This result stems from the
fact that we use a symmetric kernel. Defining â(πi) = xi − Q̂τx|π(πi) as the general-
ized residual that arises from the non-separable nature of the function we estimate,
we get Q̂τx|π(πi) − Q
τ
x|π(πi) = â(πi) − a(πi). These residuals represent estimates for
the generalized error a(πi) = xi − Qτx|π(πi), which constitutes a monotone function of
the underlying taste shock ε and can hence be used as an approximation of the lat-
ter under the refinements provided in the previous section. Since â(π0) is defined by




0(γ̂). This allows us





























Paired with the non-differentiable nature of this second stage objective function,
the dependence on the first stage parameters makes our analysis slightly more compli-
cated. In order to show that the minimum with respect to θ is obtained uniformly with
respect to the value of γ, we employ empirical process techniques to proof consistency
of the second stage estimates. We omit the details here and refer the interested reader
to Lemma 6 (stochastic equicontinuity) and Lemma 7 (consistency) in Appendix 1.A.
In order to obtain an asymptotic distribution for the second stage estimates we use
a Bahadur representation stated in Lemma 3 which, as one might expect, depends on
the approximation error of the first stage estimates.
Lemma 3 (Bahadur representation 2nd stage). Let K() be a symmetric Kernel with bounded
support and finite first derivative K̇(). Under Assumptions 1.1-1.6, as h, h0 → 0 andHN, H0,N →∞:





























































Proof. See Appendix 1.A.





respectively. Due to the higher dimension of π0 compared to πs by construction (K0 and
K respectively) and the fact that they both have finite variances, letting c0, c1, c2 > 0





















2(K0+4)(K+4) converges to zero and
the Bahadur representation converges to a (L0+SL1−1)-dimensional Brownian bridge.
Since our main interest lies not in the conditional quantile itself, but rather in its
local average with respect to private taste shocks, in a final step we will integrate over
our estimates Q̂τ
ρ|π0
(π00, a) with respect the distribution of a. However, as we do not
know their distribution Fa, but only the empirical distribution of â which we denote
as F̂â, some further work needs to be done. In order to be able to draw n realiza-
tions from the empirical distribution function F̂â instead from the unknown true one
Fa and then take the sample average, we have to first show that the corresponding law
√
n(P̂n − Pn) converges to the law
√
n(Pn − P0). This uniformity result with respect to
the underlying measure follows from van der Vaart & Wellner [1996, Theorem 2.8.9]
and Lemma 8 which is again omitted here. Consistency and the asymptotic distri-
bution of the numerically integrated second stage estimator which estimates the local
average conditional quantile of the sharing rule are derived in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 (Asymptotic distribution of local average conditional quantile). Let a∗i ∼ F̂â
for i ∈ In and H0,N = NhL0+SL1+10 where O(HN) = o(n). Then under Assumptions 1.1-1.6,
as h0 → 0 and H0,N →∞,
√
H0,N

























dFa(a) and V(π00) defined in equations (1.24) and
(1.25) at the end the proof.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.
Theorem 2 constitutes the second main contribution of this paper, the asymptotic
properties of our proposed estimation procedure. It can be seen that, although there
is again a second order bias, we can consistently estimate the covariance matrix of the
local average conditional quantile.
To sum up, if there exists information on intra-household allocation of consump-
tion and we are willing to impose the structural assumptions provided in the previous
section regarding the behaviour of preferences with respect to taste shocks, it is possi-
ble to non-parametrically estimate the conditional sharing rule and demands for both
private and public consumption goods.
Monte Carlo Simulations
The purpose of this section is two-fold. Not only will we study the finite sample
behaviour of the estimator proposed in the previous section, the specification of a par-
ticular structure will also serve to give some insight in how the model is solved and
how our identification strategy works.
As is common in the demand estimation literature we will start by specifying a
data-generating process in terms of a conditional indirect utility function constituting
individual preferences as a function of prices for private goods, the individuals’ share
and public consumption. For this, we use the following indirect utility function with
two separable sub-utilities for private and public goods:
vs(ps, ρs, x0, εs, ε0) =




with associated price indices











where p̃s = [logps1, . . . , logpsL1 ] for all s ∈ IS = {1, 2}, and the amount of private goods
is L1 = 3. The first term is the indirect utility function that will generate an almost ideal
demand system [Deaton & Muellbauer, 1980]. The second term constitutes a sub-utility
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function characterizing preferences for the public good, represented by means of a
Cobb-Douglas utility function, in this case with only one public good. Note that these
terms need not be additive; any sufficiently separable function satisfying Assumption
1.5 can be specified. Unobserved heterogeneity with respect to good preferences is
modeled using random coefficients βs(εs) = βs+εs for private taste shocks and ηs(ε0) =
ηs + ε
0 for public taste shocks. Remember that we must not have excess heterogeneity,
i.e. the length of the vector εs cannot exceed the number of freely chosen private goods
L1 − 1 = 2 for any s ∈ IS. In addition to this, public taste shocks ε0 have to be common
among spouses, according to Assumption 1.3(i). Note that in this specification the
last assumption is not restrictive since the random coefficient ηs(ε0) is linear in the
error term. Hence, once we take linear combinations of the individuals’ indirect utility
functions which has an additive sub-utility for the public good, the household taste-
shocks ε0 can be interpreted as a linear combination of individual taste shocks with
respect to public goods with weight determined by the individuals’ bargaining power.
The second main ingredient of the collective model is the aggregation rule. Pareto-
efficient social welfare functions can be written as linear combinations of individual
utilities. For our simulations, we will follow the convention and specify Pareto weights
as the logistic function with an index that is a linear combination of prices, distribution
factors and unobserved heterogeneity in bargaining as an additive error:












It should again be emphasized at this stage that the existence of a distribution factor is
not required for our identification strategy. This gives us the first stage problem:
max
x0,ρ1,ρ2
v1(p1, ρ1, x0, ε1, ε0)µ(w,p, zµ, εµ) + v2(p2, ρ2, x0, ε2, ε0) (1− µ(w,p, zµ, εµ))
s.t. ρ1 + ρ2 + p0x0 6 w,
where we let p = (p1, p2) and drop the subscript s for common or restricted variables.














1, ε1)η(p1, p2, w, zµ, ε0, εµ)
p0µ(p1, p2, w, zµ, εµ)
)
(1.10)
which are functions of both private and public taste shocks where η = µη1+(1−µ)η2+ ε0 and
b = µb1(ε
1) + (1− µ)b2(ε
2).
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This constitutes a non-linear system of L0 + S − 1 = 2 equations with K0 = 9 ex-
ogenous variables (p0, p11, p12, p13, p21, p22, p23, zµ, w) and the predictions for the 4 private
taste shocks (ε11, ε12, ε21, ε22). As for private goods, since their demands are character-
ized by a standard individual utility optimization problem with indirect utility vs, it is
straightforward to solve for Walrasian demands xs using Roy’s identity to get
xs = ρs ˜̃ps
(






where ˜̃ps = diag(1/ps1, . . . , 1/psL1), resulting in a system of L1 − 1 = 2 equations with
K = 4 exogenous variables (ps1, ps2, ps3, ρs) for each s ∈ IS. It can be seen that this system
can be inverted with respect to εs and each component is a monotone function in the
error term, such that the data generating process satisfies our triangularity refinement.
To finalize the specification of the data-generating process, we have to associate
numerical values with the model parameters. Note that we are not after identifying
these parameter values themselves, but only functions thereof, namely private and
public demands as well as the sharing rule. We pick the parameter values that define
the price indices of the almost ideal demand system as and bs in a way, such that the
properties of symmetry, homogeneity of degree zero and adding-up are imposed:






 , β1 =
 .04−.06
−.1





 1. −.3 −.7−.3 .8 −.5
−.7 −.5 1.2
 , Γ2 =
 .8 −.4 −.4−.4 1.1 −.7
−.4 −.7 1.1
 .
The parameters η1 = 0.05 and η2 = .15, define the relative importance of the public
good for each individual. In this case, the wife (s = 2) values the public good more
than the husband (s = 1). As for the aggregation rule, keeping things simple we only
define them as a function of distribution factors by picking γ1,0 = γ1,1 = 0 and γ1,2 = 1.
Exogenous variables are generated independently of each other according to
p1, p2 ∼ U[17,23]L1 , p0 ∼ U[8,12]L0 , w ∼ U[700,1300], zµ ∼ U[−2,2]
and finally unobserved variables are drawn from the distributions







2.5× 10−4 1× 10−4
1× 10−4 2.5× 10−4
))
.
For simplicity and without loss of generality we choose not to include observed
heterogeneity. For each realization we then calculate public good consumption and
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Figure 1.1: Data-Generating Process: Public
Figure 1.1 provides a limited view of the demand for the public good and the shar-
ing rule; the components of the first stage demand system as a function of distribution
factors zµ and total endowment w. All other dimensions are set to a fixed value9. It
is important to note that the function ρ in fact constitutes a local average over private
errors (ε11, ε12, ε21, ε22) as laid out in Section 1.4. As we have seen in equation (1.10), the
sharing rule is a linear increasing function of total endowment w. Hence, the relative
income allocation of the spouses ρh/ρw does not depend on total endowment, which
is what we also see in real data and what is assumed in some identification strategies
(see e.g. Dunbar et al. [2013b]). With respect to the distribution factor zµ, we can see
that the typical logistic shape is transformed into the sharing rule. An often used dis-
tribution factor in empirical work is the relative wage of the spouses. Based on this
example, variation of the sharing rule with respect to this variable can be interpreted
as follows. In case of two equal incomes, the endowment remaining after public con-
sumption would be split equally among the spouses. As the incomes are shifted apart,
this amount increases (decreases) for the spouse with higher (lower) income, although
with decreasing magnitude as income becomes very unequal. Looking at the quantile
curves, we can see that the way in which taste shocks for public goods enter demands
generates heteroskedasticity in both public consumption and the sharing rule as a func-
tion of zµ and w.











3) = (20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20)
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generating process described above. We run 25 simulations and report the most impor-
tant statistics (first and second moments, some quantiles and extrema, as well as bias
and root mean squared errors) of the empirical distribution of the estimates and certain
functions thereof. We do not estimate the parameters that determine the demands and
sharing rule, but rather nonparametrically estimate the functions themselves. Hence
we define a grid on the support of the exogenous variables and evaluate the estimated
functions at each point, comparing them to their true values according to the data gen-
erating process. Functions are evaluated at an equally spaced grid of G = 5 points per




∣∣∣∣ x̂j − xjxj








defining median (absolute) relative error and the root average squared error. The
unique minimum of these functions is zero and is attained if all estimated points are
equal to the true function. In addition to this we calculate point-wise 95%-confidence
bounds based on the true function value and evaluate how often the estimated de-
mands fall within these bounds. Since the estimated demand system is a vector-valued
function we count only those cases for which this is satisfied for all components of the
estimate. We denote the confidence bounds for wife, husband and public as CIw, CIh
andCI0, respectively. For bandwith selection we use Silverman’s rule of thumb making
adjustments for the respective τ as proposed by Yu & Jones [1998]. All our simulations
were executed on an EC2 Amazon Webservice c3.8xlarge instance with 36 virtual
CPU’s and 60 GB of memory.
In the first part of our simulation study we will focus on the estimated conditional
quantiles of demand levels. To study both central tendency and tail behaviour of the
function, we estimate its conditional median (τ = 0.5) and 90th conditional quantile
(τ = 0.9).
Table 1.1 shows the simulation results for the conditional median using our pro-
posed estimation procedure which takes private taste shocks into account when esti-
mating public consumption and the sharing rule. Among the general properties of our
estimator, we also want to investigate how it performs compared to a naive estimator,
which omits these taste shocks. We have seen in the theoretical part that we would
not be able to property identify the system without exploiting information about these
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shocks, using the residuals of private demands. Hence, we expect this naive estimator
to be inconsistent in general.
MedRErr(x11) MedRErr(x12) RASE(x11) RASE(x12) MedRErr(x0)
True Values - - - - -
Mean 0.0995 0.0672 1.7648 1.7252 0.0941
Median 0.0978 0.0675 1.7555 1.7030 0.0949
Std.Dev. 0.0066 0.0049 0.1050 0.1193 0.0067
10th Quantile 0.0924 0.0600 1.6351 1.5805 0.0854
90th Quantile 0.1094 0.0737 1.9096 1.8824 0.1043
Mean Bias 0.0995 0.0672 1.7648 1.7252 0.0941
Median Bias 0.0978 0.0675 1.7555 1.7030 0.0949
RMSE 0.0997 0.0674 1.7679 1.7293 0.0944
MedRErr(ρh) RASE(x0) RASE(ρh) % ∈ CIh % ∈ CI0
True Values - - - 0.9500 0.9500
Mean 0.2159 1.0411 114.6111 0.9708 0.9251
Median 0.2154 1.0283 114.6837 0.9832 0.9320
Std.Dev. 0.0071 0.0482 2.0567 0.0269 0.0373
10th Quantile 0.2068 0.9862 111.8489 0.9335 0.8704
90th Quantile 0.2238 1.1076 116.7745 0.9972 0.9704
Mean Bias 0.2159 1.0411 114.6111 0.0208 -0.0249
Median Bias 0.2154 1.0283 114.6837 0.0332 -0.0180
RMSE 0.2160 1.0422 114.6296 0.0340 0.0449
Table 1.1: Private/Public Almost Ideal Demand Systems, τ = 0.5, with integration
In contrast, Table 1.2 reports aggregate statistics of the naive estimator. In case of the
conditional median, one can see that it actually performs equally well or even slightly
better, if we look at the distance with respect to the true function (MedRErr, RASE).
This stems from the fact that we have specified private taste shocks to be distributed
according to a multivariate Normal with mean zero, which is symmetric, implying
that the median with respect to each component is zero. By not including private taste
shocks, we implicitly restrict them to be zero or in other words, assume that they are
distributed according to a degenerate distribution with all mass at zero. Integrating
with respect to this distribution creates less disturbance than integrating over the esti-
mated (zero-mean) distribution for the residuals, while at the same time the expecta-
tion is not influenced due to (local) linearity.
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MedRErr(x11) MedRErr(x12) RASE(x11) RASE(x12) MedRErr(x0)
True Values - - - - -
Mean 0.0899 0.0594 1.5654 1.5313 0.0763
Median 0.0902 0.0590 1.5539 1.5175 0.0773
Std.Dev. 0.0097 0.0041 0.1558 0.1022 0.0143
10th Quantile 0.0768 0.0543 1.3195 1.4228 0.0591
90th Quantile 0.1032 0.0638 1.7775 1.6783 0.0966
Mean Bias 0.0899 0.0594 1.5654 1.5313 0.0763
Median Bias 0.0902 0.0590 1.5539 1.5175 0.0773
RMSE 0.0904 0.0596 1.5731 1.5347 0.0776
MedRErr(ρh) RASE(x0) RASE(ρh) % ∈ CIh % ∈ CI0
True Values - - - 0.9500 0.9500
Mean 0.1828 0.8892 94.0917 0.9853 0.8586
Median 0.1854 0.9063 94.7524 0.9866 0.8600
Std.Dev. 0.0097 0.1397 3.4284 0.0111 0.0341
10th Quantile 0.1704 0.7158 89.3738 0.9682 0.8120
90th Quantile 0.1941 1.0929 97.6348 0.9985 0.8952
Mean Bias 0.1828 0.8892 94.0917 0.0353 -0.0914
Median Bias 0.1854 0.9063 94.7524 0.0366 -0.0900
RMSE 0.1831 0.9001 94.1542 0.0370 0.0976
Table 1.2: Private/Public Almost Ideal Demand Systems, τ = 0.5, without integration
This result is not specific to our data generating process other than the symmetry
assumption about the distribution of private taste shocks. Thus the naive estimator
can consistently estimate the local expectation of the conditional median if it can be
assumed that private taste shocks follow a symmetric distribution. The situation is
generally different for the variance estimation, which is manifested in the underesti-
mation of the width of the 95% confidence band. One special case, for which it would
not make a difference would be the case where the slope with respect to taste shocks is
one.
Next, we will consider the 90th conditional quantile, to analyze how our estimation
procedure works for estimating the tails of the distributions of taste and bargaining
shocks.
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MedRErr(x11) MedRErr(x12) RASE(x11) RASE(x12) MedRErr(x0)
True Values - - - - -
Mean 0.0801 0.0984 2.0581 3.2167 0.1516
Median 0.0796 0.0954 2.0493 3.2122 0.1535
Std.Dev. 0.0074 0.0117 0.1803 0.2586 0.0128
10th Quantile 0.0714 0.0860 1.8249 2.8603 0.1372
90th Quantile 0.0879 0.1158 2.2595 3.5517 0.1681
Mean Bias 0.0801 0.0984 2.0581 3.2167 0.1516
Median Bias 0.0796 0.0954 2.0493 3.2122 0.1535
RMSE 0.0804 0.0991 2.0660 3.2271 0.1522
MedRErr(ρh) RASE(x0) RASE(ρh) % ∈ CIh % ∈ CI0
True Values - - - 0.9500 0.9500
Mean 0.1019 2.1664 136.1037 0.9865 0.9702
Median 0.1007 2.1647 137.5085 0.9883 0.9760
Std.Dev. 0.0076 0.1436 5.8936 0.0102 0.0193
10th Quantile 0.0945 1.9874 129.6924 0.9724 0.9408
90th Quantile 0.1121 2.3478 143.0271 0.9981 0.9920
Mean Bias 0.1019 2.1664 136.1037 0.0365 0.0202
Median Bias 0.1007 2.1647 137.5085 0.0383 0.0260
RMSE 0.1022 2.1711 136.2312 0.0379 0.0279
Table 1.3: Private/Public Almost Ideal Demand Systems, τ = 0.9, with integration
Table 1.3 again shows the correct estimator according to the theory. We see that this
estimator performs quite well compared to what we have seen when estimating the
conditional median. Naturally we see an increase in median absolute relative deviation
and average squared errors, since estimating tails is more difficult due to the fact that
the data becomes more sparse. While for the correct estimator the magnitude of this
increase is within reasonable bounds, the picture changes drastically if we look at the
results for the estimates of the 90th conditional quantile of the naive estimator, which
are reported in Table 1.4.
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MedRErr(x11) MedRErr(x12) RASE(x11) RASE(x12) MedRErr(x0)
True Values - - - - -
Mean 0.0716 0.0906 1.8744 2.9704 0.3144
Median 0.0721 0.0907 1.8924 3.0274 0.3117
Std.Dev. 0.0054 0.0106 0.1262 0.2374 0.0653
10th Quantile 0.0645 0.0778 1.6929 2.6782 0.2426
90th Quantile 0.0788 0.1025 2.0336 3.2637 0.4106
Mean Bias 0.0716 0.0906 1.8744 2.9704 0.3144
Median Bias 0.0721 0.0907 1.8924 3.0274 0.3117
RMSE 0.0718 0.0912 1.8787 2.9799 0.3211
MedRErr(ρh) RASE(x0) RASE(ρh) % ∈ CIh % ∈ CI0
True Values - - - 0.9500 0.9500
Mean 0.1758 21.5328 245.4561 0.9934 1.0000
Median 0.1676 5.5092 142.6729 0.9958 1.0000
Std.Dev. 0.0481 77.0002 367.6604 0.0061 0.0000
10th Quantile 0.1320 4.2161 117.2577 0.9858 1.0000
90th Quantile 0.2130 7.6631 234.1738 0.9996 1.0000
Mean Bias 0.1758 21.5328 245.4561 0.0434 0.0500
Median Bias 0.1676 5.5092 142.6729 0.0458 0.0500
RMSE 0.1823 79.9543 442.0666 0.0439 0.0500
Table 1.4: Private/Public Almost Ideal Demand Systems, τ = 0.9, without integration
To sum up, compared to what we found for the conditional median estimation,
where not including private taste shocks did not effect consistency, omitting the latter
when estimating the tails, induces a substantial bias. This is not surprising, since pri-
vate taste shocks remain unexplained increasing the variance of the total unobserved
variables and thus shifting the surfaces for conditional quantiles with |τ| > 0.5 further
apart. In addition to this, we see an overestimation of the conditional variance which
is manifested in the too wide confidence bounds and also an immediate consequence
of the inconsistent estimation.
Empirical Application
In order to illustrate our estimation procedure, we will now conduct an empirical
study for which we use a sample of households from the Dutch LISS (Longitudinal
Internet Studies for the Social Sciences) panel. This longitudinal study is collected by
CentERdata and consists of 5000 households and 8000 individuals, which are drawn
from the population register by Statistics Netherlands. Households that have no inter-
net access are provided with the necessary hardware to participate in the study. We
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can thus assume that the sample is representative for the Dutch population. Our study
is based on the Time use and Consumption module [Cherchye et al., 2015] which consists
of two parts. In the time-use part of the study, respondents, consisting of all partici-
pants of the LISS core study that are at least 16 years old, were asked how much time
they spent on a given category (e.g. leisure, labour supply, childcare-related activi-
ties) within the last seven days. The set of consumption-related questions concerns
financial expenditures and is divided between what is defined as public, private and
child-related consumption. In the first subset of consumption-related questions re-
spondents had to allocate expenditures among 12 categories that can be argued to in-
cur on a household level, including for example mortgage payments, rent, family trips
but also formal childcare expenditures and public food consumption. The latter had to
be assigned to the respective members (including children) which allows us to use it as
part of private good consumption for our estimation. Private expenditure categories
(9 in total) include for example expenditures for food and drinks that were consumed
outside home and without family members, clothing and personal care. Child-related
consumption expenditures (excluding food that was provided for and within the fam-
ily) consists of the same categories as private goods for adults. The questions on child
consumption are filled out by the parents if the child is less than 16 years old. For
older children living at home, we take the amount of private consumption from the
questionnaire of the respective child if the latter does not have his or her own funds
arising from labour supply. If children have their own income and still live at home
we do not treat their private consumption as part of the parents decision process, but
rather treat it as an exogenous quantity for the parents and leave it to future research
to consider children as endogenous decision-makers within this setting10. A detailed
overview of the public and private consumption categories can be found in Appendix
1.C.
To complete our dataset we complement the study by data from the LISS core study,
such as wages, age and education and pool all three available waves which were col-
lected in 2010, 2011, 2013. This provides us with a sample of 743 observations, after
dropping households in which at least one partner is not participating in the labour
market as well as childless couples. Although we will sometimes refer to the part-
ners as husband and wife, couples in our sample are not necessarily married, however
they must live in a common household. We therefore define the population we are
10Dunbar et al. [2013a] estimate a collective model with children as decision makers.
32 COLLECTIVE HOUSEHOLDS WITH HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS | CHAPTER 1
interested in as the population of heterosexual couples with children, in which both
partners participate in the labour market.
mean std min 25% 50% 75% max
Private Consumption 270.53 283.28 0.00 131.00 210.00 312.50 3100.00
Working Hours 25.37 11.61 1.00 18.00 24.00 32.00 96.00
Net Income 1116.93 592.33 0.00 750.00 1150.00 1423.50 4000.00
Age 43.16 7.68 22.00 37.00 44.00 49.00 62.00
Education 3.78 1.28 1.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00
Food Consumption 131.41 102.83 0.00 85.00 125.00 165.00 2000.00
Private Consumption 237.44 305.86 0.00 105.00 175.00 280.00 4950.00
Working Hours 42.12 11.76 2.00 38.00 40.00 48.00 90.00
Net Income 2131.60 762.41 0.00 1703.50 2000.00 2450.00 10000.00
Age 45.69 7.89 26.00 40.00 46.00 52.00 87.00
Education 3.96 1.32 1.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00
Food Consumption 130.76 105.26 0.00 82.50 120.00 160.00 2000.00
Public Consumption 1893.41 3008.40 0.00 1251.50 1732.50 2255.00 78796.00
Formal Childcare expenditure 97.12 254.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.75 2528.00
Public Food expenditure 428.43 302.76 0.00 300.00 400.00 550.00 6000.00
# of Children 2.02 0.80 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 6.00
Child Cons. (excl Food) (616y) 137.68 203.38 0.00 0.00 90.00 181.00 2480.00
Child Cons. (excl Food) (>16y) 27.70 116.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1720.00
Child Cons. (excl Food) 215.93 327.05 0.00 31.65 97.43 267.18 3687.02
Table 1.5: Wife, Husband and Household Descriptive Statistics (Raw)
Table 1.5 presents descriptive statistics of our dataset and is divided into three
blocks for wife, husband and household level quantities, respectively. It can be seen
that total private consumption (defined as the sum over all nine individual consump-
tion sub-categories plus the assigned share of public food expenditure) is relatively
low compared to what respondents report to be public consumption. The latter is also
defined as an aggregate over all twelve categories, minus formal childcare expenditure
and expenditure for food provided within the household. Looking at working hours,
we can see that many women work part time, resulting in an average amount of 25.37
working hours (excluding commuting), compared to 42.12 hours for men. The picture
is reversed for time spent on child care, where the women’s share exceeds the men’s
with 13.88 hours compared to 8.86 hours. A substantial part of what we define as
child consumption expenditure, namely child-related consumption (excluding food)
plus public food consumption assigned to children, can be attributed to the latter.
In our collective labour supply model, we define composite private consumption
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and leisure as a private goods which is common in the literature [Chiappori, 1992;
Fortin & Lacroix, 1997; Blundell et al., 2007; Cherchye et al., 2015]. Since we have
information about total private consumption and time spent on leisure in our dataset,
we can estimate private demands for all s ∈ IS = {h,w} by considering
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as the individual consumption problem with leisure consumption xs, corresponding
price ps which we define in terms of opportunity costs of labour supply (i.e. net hourly
wage) and composite consumption good cs whose price is normalized to one.
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s.t. x0 + x0c + ρ
w + ρh = wi
with composite public good x0 and child-related good consumption which is treated
as a public good x0c. We will assume that our structure (uh, uw, µ) satisfies Assumptions
1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 from Section 1.3 and Assumption 1.6 from Section 1.4. Unfortunately
we do not have price variation for child-related consumption and public consumption.
Hence we cannot identify substitution patterns with respect to price shocks other than
the individual wages. We will however be able to identify income elasticities and the
effects of distribution factors on both sharing and public good consumption.
In order to fit the structural model, we need to prepare our data by imposing some
of the underlying restrictions. For each individual private demand system we impose
the adding-up constraint by calculating individual endowment, represented by the
sharing rule, as the expenditure for leisure plus consumption expenditure related to
the private composite good. We define the maximum amount of labour by 126 hours
per week, which corresponds to 18 hours per day, 7 days a week. Similarly, we also
impose adding up for the first stage by calculating the household endowment w as the
sum of public good consumption, child-related consumption and the shares ρw and ρh.
We have two variables available which are often used as distribution factors, namely
the age difference of the spouses and the wage ratio (pw/ph) which is assumed to not
affect the budget contraint after controlling for total endowment.
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mean std min 25% 50% 75% max
Leisure: xw1 86.75 16.80 26.00 77.50 89.00 98.00 123.00
Wage rate: pw 11.25 10.62 0.00 7.70 10.16 12.91 190.53
Sharing Rule: ρw 1256.64 1064.42 0.00 853.28 1132.10 1455.65 17155.27
Leisure: xh1 75.02 14.07 5.00 68.00 76.00 84.00 122.00
Wage rate: ph 13.07 11.45 0.00 9.35 11.26 14.30 259.82
Sharing Rule: ρh 1274.89 1342.58 129.39 843.84 1076.19 1378.24 30578.38
Child cons. xc0 215.93 327.05 0.00 31.65 97.43 267.18 3687.02
Wage ratio: pw/ph 1.10 2.09 0.00 0.60 0.90 1.20 50.00
Endowment: w 4716.69 3562.59 876.54 3548.27 4318.21 5206.00 80720.14
Table 1.6: Wife, Husband and Household Descriptive Statistics (Model)
Table 1.6 shows descriptive statistics of the constructed variables that are used for
estimation. We can see that on average, after what is consumed publicly, remaining en-
dowment is very equally distributed among the spouses, with a slightly higher mean
for the husband which however mostly stems from very large observations. Looking
at the quartiles, we can see that for the rest of the distribution the wife actually gets a
slightly larger proportion of the household’s endowment. The wage-ratio, which we
use as distribution factor, is right-skewed with a median of 0.9 and a mean of 1.10,
meaning that more than 50% (precisely 60%) of the women are out-earned by man,
however we observe some households with very low male wage rates which are re-
sponsible for this long right tail.













































are monotone with respect to the un-
observed taste and bargaining shocks εhi , εwi and (ε0i , ε
µ
i ), respectively. Hence we can
consistently estimate conditional quantiles and their derivatives using our proposed
estimation procedure and calculate corresponding elasticities.
Note that for the public good and sharing rule, our specification involves the distri-
bution factor pw/ph instead of pw and ph as separate variables. Since one is generally
more interested in the effect of the distribution factor, rather than the wage-rates we
impose this structure by making use of a standard homogeneity assumption on µ. This
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is not to say, that the unrestricted specification cannot be estimated. In fact, we esti-
mated both models as a robustness check and it is comforting to report, that we found
very little qualitative difference between the two specifications. One could even apply
a formal test from which we will however abstract due to the fact that constructing
such a test based on a bootstrap is computationally not feasible because of the high di-
mensionality. Deriving an analytic test statistic based on our asymptotic results would
exceed the scope of this application, since to our knowledge a theory for uniform confi-
dence bands for local polynomial quantile regression only exist for univariate models
[Sabbah, 2014; Härdle & Song, 2009] such that one would have to develop a similar
theory for a multivariate setting.
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Figure 1.2: Surface plot: Elasticities ranging from −1.5 to +1.5 for τ ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}
Figure 1.2 shows a heatmap of the estimated elasticities of both private and pub-
lic demand systems. The surface color represents the estimate and ranges from dark
orange to dark blue which are set to correspond to elasticities of −1.5 and +1.5, re-
spectively. The major x-axis (3x2 columns) provides information about the exogenous
variable whose variation is considered, as well as the considered quantile (τ). The ma-
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jor y-axis (4 rows) shows the endogenous variable the elasticity refers to, as well as
the (minor) axis-labels for each graph in the grid. The interested reader can find tables
with detailed estimates for elasticities with respect to all dimensions including stan-
dard errors for τ ∈ {0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9} evaluated at a grid representing the marginal
quartiles of the exogenous variables in Appendix 1.B.
We will now briefly discuss some of the results. First, note that in general elasticities
are not constant with respect to the exogenous variables, which can be seen from the
color gradient of the respective graphs. While wage elasticities (columns 1,3 and 5)
seem to be fairly linear in prices and endowment, where the latter is represented by
the sharing rule, the influence of the sharing rule on private demands as well as the
one of total endowment and the distribution factor on public demands, appears to
be non-linear. We also note that elasticities are heterogeneous across the population,
i.e. they depend on the realization with respect to the distribution of both taste and
bargaining shocks which are indexed by τ. This heterogeneity mostly concerns the
magnitude of the estimates, while the qualitative interpretation is the same across the
population.
We start interpreting our results by looking at the wage elasticities for leisure xh
and xw. It can be seen that for both spouses’ (s ∈ {w,h}) demands they are negative,
decreasing in ps and increasing in ρs. While the negative sign of the elasticities is fairly
obvious, the negative dependence on wage could be explained by the fact that the
more an individual earns the more he or she can afford to adjust leisure (labour supply)
to wage shocks. Increasing bargaining power on the other hand is associated with a
smaller wage elasticity. One possible explanation for this is the associated higher share
of total endowment as a secondary individual income source. Private endowment
elasticities on the other hand are positive and only increasing with respect to wages,
implying that the higher wages individuals receive the more they will increase their
leisure when they face a positive endowment shock. Looking at different quantiles we
can conclude that the magnitude of wage elasticities increases, the more taste one has
for leisure, which seems intuitive.
Income elasticities on the other hand only increase for women, implying that the
higher women valuate their leisure, the more rapid they adjust the latter to endow-
ment shocks. Looking at the sharing rule, it is clear from the graph that the wife’s
share is significantly increasing with respect to the relative wage ratio. This finding
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is statistically and economically significant and in line with our expectations and with
what is generally assumed in the literature. The corresponding elasticities seem to be
constant with respect to both exogenous variables and bargaining shocks.
To disentangle husband’s and wife’s caring for children’s utility, we consider the
effect of the distribution factor (representing the wifes relative bargaining power) on
child-related consumption. Although statistically not significantly different from zero,
we find evidence which suggests that an increase in what we assume to have a pos-
itive effect on the wifes decision weight within the household actually decreases the
amount of child-related expenditure. Since it is reasonable to assume that children’s
utilities increase in child-related consumption this would provide evidence against the
hypothesis that is often made, stating that mothers care more for their children than
fathers [Thomas, 1990; Lundberg et al., 1997]. While this result might seem surprising,
it is consistent with what Cherchye et al. [2015] already found using the same dataset.
It should be noted that we do not find this effect for the left tail of the distribution
from which tastes for children are drawn. Finally we find that endowment elastici-
ties for both child-related consumption and the sharing rule are positive and relatively
constant with respect to relative wages and total endowment with values slightly de-
creasing in τ and ranging from 0.5 to 0.9, which is in line with what economic theory
would suggest.
Since our identification strategy allows not only estimating conditional quantile of
components of public and private demand systems, but also backing out unobserved
taste preferences in this labour supply setting (see refinement in Section 1.3) in form
of the distribution P characterizing the heterogeneous population, we can also answer
questions about individual welfare. For example, for a given cardinalization of utili-
ties, using a money-metric welfare measure we can estimate the distribution of a re-
sponse to a policy measure of the entire population. In addition to this, given that we
have conditional quantiles of sharing rules, one could construct Gini coefficients for
men and women separately and evaluate how they would be effected by certain poli-
cies. Such a welfare analysis is however outside the scope of this paper and we will
leave it for future research.
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Conclusion
We have shown that if we have information on intra-household allocation, paired
with the efficiency axiom in the collective household model that allows us to divide
the within-group allocation process into two stages, we can not only identify the level
of the sharing rule, a key ingredient of collective bargaining, but also introduce un-
observed heterogeneity to the model. We gave necessary and sufficient conditions,
which feature mostly separability restrictions between private and public goods in the
underlying individuals’ utility function, that allow us to exploit the two stage nature
of the model for the purpose of dealing with heterogeneous agents. For this we pro-
posed an estimation procedure, that allows to estimate a local average of the sharing
rule and public consumption and proved its consistency and asymptotic normality. In
the empirical part of the paper we conducted a Monte-Carlo analysis which provided
evidence that considering private taste shocks is not only important from a theoretical
point of view, but omitting them in the sharing rule and public good estimation leads
to a substantial bias. We concluded the paper by estimating a collective labour sup-
ply model using the Dutch LISS panel and found that both functions and elasticities
are highly non-linear in the exogenous variables. In addition to this, we came to the
conclusion that quantile planes are not parallel which implies that the behaviour of
individuals is heterogeneous across the population. Thus, it is clear that disregarding
unobserved heterogeneity might lead to wrong conclusions.
One could think of a range of applications and extensions for the theory we devel-
oped in this paper. First, from an empirical point of view it would be very interesting
to perform welfare analysis using conditional quantile estimates and the fact that we
can recover the private taste preferences under the monotonicity or triangularity as-
sumption, to predict how different parts of the population respond to policy measures
in terms of both welfare and labour supply. Further, one could develop uniform con-
fidence bounds for the estimated demands and derivatives to draw inference about
whether or not preferences are of certain forms that are often imposed within the col-
lective model (e.g. Browning et al. [2013]; Dunbar et al. [2013a]). One very special case
would be the Gorman polar form [Gorman, 1953, 1961] with parallel Engle curves for
each member, which would support the unitary model since individual preferences
could then be aggregated to household or group preferences. In addition to this, the
restrictions we derived might prove useful in approaches that estimate demands or re-
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cover the sharing rule implicitly such as Blundell et al. [2014] or Cherchye et al. [2015].
Auxiliary Results and Proofs
Lemma 1. The key economic restrictions implied by the first order conditions (1.6) of the second stage problem












= 0 . (1.7)
Similarly, the first stage restrictions (1.4)-(1.5) implicitly defining the optimal allocation of public goods and the
conditional sharing rule can be rewritten as the (L0 + S− 1)-dimensional nonlinear system of equations
Ξ0i (x0, ρ) :=Ωi(x0, ρ)µi − c :=








 = 0 . (1.8)
where vi = [v1i , . . . , vsi ]T , ρi = [ρ1i , . . . , ρsi ]T , µi = [1, µ2i /µ1i , . . . , µSi /µ1i ]T and (S− 1)× S-dimensional projection
J0 = δi,j+1 with δ being defined as the Kronecker delta.
Proof. The representation Ξs as defined in equation (1.7) is a standard result from individual utility
maximization and this part of the proof is therefore left to the reader.
As for Ξ0, let vi = [v1i , . . . , vsi ]T and µ̃ = [µ1, . . . , µS]. We write equation (1.5) in matrix notation
omitting subscript i ∈ IN for simplicity
∇x0vT µ̃−m0p0 = 0L0
and substitute the Lagrange multiplier m0 by µ1 ∂v
1
∂ρ1
without loss of generality using equation (1.4).









, 0, 0, . . .
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µ = 0L0 .
Hence, the first part of the vector Ξ0 representing L0 rows follows. We have used the first of the S
















− 1 = 0
11Subscript j refers to the jth row of a vector, and −j = {j}c to all rows except j
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µ− ιS−1 = 0S−1
with (S − 1) × S-dimensional projection J0 = δi,j+1 and δ being defined as the Kronecker delta. This
projection removes the first row of the Jacobian matrix, taking into account that we only consider s =
2, . . . , S as we have only S− 1 restrictions left. The term ιS−1 is a (constant) vector of ones, and as it does
not influence the derivative of Ξ0, which we will consider for our identification results, we will omit
this.
Theorem 1 (Identification). Let π = [π1, . . . , πS], Π0ε = [π0, π, ε] and τ ∈ (0,1). Under assumptions 1.1-1.5,
both levels Qτxsj |πs(π
s) and derivatives Q̇τxsj |πs(π
s) of the τth conditional quantile12 of each component j ∈ IL1−1 of







ε) of each component l ∈ IL0+S−1 of public demands and the sharing rule are also
identified.
Proof. Define Π0ε := (p0, w, p, z, zµ, ε), Πs := (ps, zs) and ε = [ε1, . . . , εS]. Let us begin with the individual














by Assumption 1.5. Using conventional properties of
the individual’s utility function (which have to hold for each εs), stated in Assumption 1.3.(i), for each
s ∈ IS we can write
∇εsxs(Πs, εs) = − [∇xsΞs(xs, εs)]−1∇εsΞs(xs, εs)
Monotonicity of each demand system xs(Πs, εs) with respect to εs requires this Jacobian matrix to have
full rank for all s ∈ IS. Given that the inverse on the right hand side has full rank, a necessary and
sufficient condition for this is that
rk (∇εsΞs(xs, εs)) = L1 − 1
which follows from Assumption 1.3.(i). For a detailed treatment of this question in the unitary setting,
which is equivalent to the second stage in the collective model, since we observe household sharing, see
Beckert & Blundell [2008].
A similar reasoning can be applied to the first stage problem. For now, we treat ε as given and
observed, and will later argue how to obtain an estimate for these individual taste shocks, using the first









= Ω(x0,ρ, Π0ε, ε
0)µ(Π0ε, ε
µ)
12The quantile of a r.v. Y conditional on X, with c.d.f. FY|X is defined as Qτy (x) :=
inf
{
y ∈ R : FY|X=x (y) > τ
}
.
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])]−1∇[ε0,εµ]Ξ0 ([x0, ρ] , Π0ε, [ε0, εµ]) .
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can be written as



















in the second equality, noting that





































































Using (1.11), we can now write Ψ as the block matrix








with Ψj2 := Ωj∇εµµ. Since dim(Ψ11) = L0 × L0 and dim(Ψ22) = (S− 1)× (S− 1), we can define the Schur
complement
Ψ/Ψ22 = Ψ11 − Ψ12Ψ
−1
22 Ψ21
42 COLLECTIVE HOUSEHOLDS WITH HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS | CHAPTER 1
and consider the following identity
rk (Ψ) = rk (Ψ22) + rk (Ψ/Ψ22) .
Regarding the rank of Ψ22, we can again exploit the diagonal nature of the derivative ∇εµµ and
note that post-multiplying Ω with this diagonal matrix is equivalent to multiplying each of its rows
componentwise with the same vector, namely, diag (∇εµµ)T And since Ω has rank S and ∇εµµ has rank
S− 1 it follows that rk (Ω∇εµµ) = S− 1, as long as ∂µ∂εµs 6= 0 for all s ∈ IS, which follows from Assumption










= 0 for all s, s ′ ∈ IS by construction of






= 0 for some s ′ ∈ IS

















the Schur complement reduces to Ψ/Ψ22 = Ψ11. To show that it has rank L0, note that for each s ∈ IS the
derivative ∇2
x0,ε0
vs has full rank by Assumption 1.3.(i) and is diagonally dominant by Assumption 1.4.
Thus, the derivative is positive semidefinite for each s ∈ IS and the linear combination as defined in Ψ11
has full rank as for any two (aligned) positive semidefinite matricesD1, D2 it holds that rk (D1 +D2) >=






= 0 for some s ′ ∈ IS is a sufficient one and can
be relaxed to ∇ρs′ ,ε0vs
′ not being a linear combination of the the columns of ∇x0,ε0vs
′ , from which we
could also conclude that rk (Ψ11) = L0.
It follows that Ψ = ∇[ε0,εµ]Ξ0 has full rank L0 + S − 1 since we have shown that rk (Ψ) = rk (Ψ11) +

















and is thus identified.
Lemma 5 (First stage Bahadur representation). Let K() be a symmetric Kernel with bounded support and



































Proof. Let γ0(π0) = Qτx|π(π0) and its derivative γ1(π0) = Q̇
τ
x|π(π0), with γ = (γ0, hγ1). In addition to
this, we define zi =
(
1, h−1(πi − π0)
T






















































which we use to define, slightly misusing notation denoting γ0 as the true parameter,














by the change of variables u = h−1(π − π0). The last equality follows from the normalization of the
kernel to have zero mean and variance one. We know that γ0 solves (1.12) and γ̂n solves (1.17). Thus,
0 = gn(γ̂n) = gn(γ̂n) − g(γ̂n) − gn(γ0) + g(γ0) + g(γ̂n) + gn(γ0)
= op(n
− 1
2 ) + ġT (γ0)(γ̂n − γ0) + (ġ
T (ξ) − ġT (γ0))(γ̂n − γ0) + gn(γ0) (1.13)
= op(n
− 1
2 ) +D0(π0)(γ̂n − γ0) + op(‖γ̂n − γ0‖2) + gn(γ0)
where equation (1.13) follows from stochastic equicontinuity of the class containing g, noting that the
kernel K has compact support and the class of directional derivatives ψ of the quantile loss function
ρτ is a VC subgraph class with envelope function 2max
i∈IN
|πi|, and thus Donsker [Kosorok, 2008; van der
Vaart & Wellner, 1996]. In addition to this we apply the mean value theorem to g(γ̂n) around some ξ ∈
[γ0, γ̂n] and use the Lipschitz assumption on fx|π, from which we have
∥∥(ġT (ξ) − ġT (γ0)∥∥ 6 C ‖ξ− γ0‖ 6
C ‖γ̂n − γ0‖. Hence we can write
√





from which, using the definition of gn, the result follows.
Lemma 2 (First stage asymptotic distribution). Let K() be a symmetric Kernel with bounded support and
















































Proof. We first consider the bias which is defined as:































































































We used the law of iterative expectations and the fact that τ = Fx|π(Qτx|π(πi)) in the first step. The
second step follows from the mean value theorem of both Fx|π terms around Qτx|π(π0), uniform bound-






























T Q̈τx|π(π0)(πi − π0).
For the last step, we again change variables u = h−1(πi − π0) and use the fact that uTAu = tr(AuuT )
for any square matrix A.












})2( 1 h−1(πi − π0)T
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from which the asymptotic distribution follows together with Lemma 5.
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with derivatives




















































and constants Γγ,0 = Γγ(θ0, γ0) and Γθ,0 = Γθ(θ0, γ0).




H0,N ‖g (θ, γ) − g (θ0, γ0) − gn (θ, γ) + gn (θ0, γ0)‖ = op (1) (1.14)
Proof. The function gn (θ, γ) is a combination of Type II and Type IV in the sense of Andrews [1994].
In other words, we are faced with a non-differentiable objection function due to the quantile regression
problem and in addition to this, our objective function for the second stage depends on the function we
estimated in the first stage. Stochastic equicontinuity for such function is a well established result in the
literature. For the i.i.d. case, Theorem 3 in Chen et al. [2003] establishes stochastic equicontinuity for a




logN(ε1/sj ,H, ‖‖H)dε < ∞ for j = 1, . . . , L0 +
SL1 + 1 and where H is a vector space of function endowed with pseudo-metric ‖‖H. Our demand
functions γ are members of this class of functions due to the smoothness assumption and van der Vaart






z̄i,j(γ) where z̄i,j(γ) = zi,j(γ)Ki((πi(γ) −










where Uδ := {(θ, γ) ∈ Θ× Γ : ‖θ− θ0‖ 6 δ, ‖γ− γ0‖H 6 δ}.
Hence, for any (θ, γ) ∈ Uδ we can write the part inside the supremum as
∣∣mτi,j(θ, γ) −mτi,j(θ0, γ0)∣∣
6 τ |z̄i,j(γ) − z̄i,j(γ0)|+
∣∣1{ρi 6 θTzi(γ)} z̄i,j(γ) − 1{ρi 6 θT0zi(γ0)} z̄i,j(γ0)∣∣
6 τ |z̄i,j(γ) − z̄i,j(γ0)|+
∣∣1{ρi 6 θTzi(γ)} z̄i,j(γ) − 1{ρi 6 θTzi(γ)} z̄i,j(γ0)∣∣
+
∣∣1{ρi 6 θTzi(γ)} z̄i,j(γ0) − 1{ρi 6 θT0zi(γ0)} z̄i,j(γ0)∣∣
6 τ |z̄i,j(γ) − z̄i,j(γ0)|+
∣∣1{ρi 6 θTzi(γ)}∣∣ |z̄i,j(γ) − z̄i,j(γ0)|
+
∣∣1{ρi 6 θTzi(γ)}− 1{ρi 6 θT0zi(γ0)}∣∣ |z̄i,j(γ0)|
6 2 |z̄i,j(γ) − z̄i,j(γ0)|+
∣∣1{ρi 6 θTzi(γ)}− 1{ρi 6 θT0zi(γ0)}∣∣ |z̄i,j(γ0)| .
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For r > 2 using monotonicity of ρ̄ 7→ 1 {ρi 6 ρ̄} we get for ‖γ− γ0‖H 6 δ,
E
∣∣mτi,j(θ, γ) −mτi,j(θ0, γ0)∣∣r

























where the second last equation follows from the law of iterative expectations and the last equation
from the fact that (γ, θ) ∈ Uδ, the moment conditions on zi (Assumption 1.6) and the kernel K() and
the smoothness assumption on Fρ|π0 which allows us to do a Taylor series expansion around (θ0, γ0)
and use the fact that the density is uniformly bounded by some constant M. The local linear nature
of our quantile regression function, and the construction of the "tick function" mi,j immediately imply
Hölder continuity, the "natural" bounds [0, xmax] for demands (for some finite constant xmax, implied
by strictly positive prices and finite endowment) and the finiteness of the corresponding derivatives by
Assumption 1.3.(i) imply compactness of the parameter space. Hence, all conditions in Chen et al. [2003]
are satisfied, and stochastic equicontinuity of the process
√
H0,N(g (, ) − gn (, )) as defined in equation
(1.14) follows.
Lemma 7 (Second stage consistency). Under Assumptions 1.1-1.6, as h0 → 0 andH0,N = NhL0+SL1+10 →∞,∥∥∥θ̂n − θ0∥∥∥ = Op (H− 120,N)
Proof. Note that g (θ, γ) is differentiable for any θ and γ. Thus, a first order Taylor series expansion of










Taking the L2-norm, a bound for the right hand side is obtained:
∥∥∥g(θ̂n, γ0)− g (θ0, γ0)∥∥∥ > λmin (Γθ,0) ∥∥∥(θ̂n − θ0)∥∥∥ ,
with λmin (Γθ,0) being the the smallest eigenvalue of Γθ,0. Since g (θ0, γ0) = 0, it is sufficient to show that∥∥∥g(θ̂n, γ0)∥∥∥ = Op (H− 120,N). Using the triangle inequality it follows that
∥∥∥g(θ̂n, γ0))∥∥∥ 6 ∥∥∥g(θ̂n, γ0)− g(θ̂n, γ̂n)∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥g(θ̂n, γ̂n)∥∥∥
6
∥∥∥g(θ̂n, γ0)− g(θ̂n, γ̂n)∥∥∥ (1.15)
+
∥∥∥g(θ̂n, γ̂n)− g (θ0, γ0) − gn (θ̂n, γ̂n)+ gn (θ0, γ0)∥∥∥ (1.16)
+
∥∥∥gn (θ̂n, γ̂n)∥∥∥ (1.17)
+ ‖gn (θ0, γ0)‖ , (1.18)
where g (θ0, γ0) = 0 was subtracted within the second norm (1.16). It is well established that the expres-







. The remaining equations (1.15), (1.16) and
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(1.17) can again be analyzed separately. Starting with the first term, again using the triangle inequality,
and changing the signs within the norm, equation (1.15) can be bounded by
∥∥∥g(θ̂n, γ0)− g(θ̂n, γ̂n)∥∥∥ 6 ∥∥∥g(θ̂n, γ̂n)− g(θ̂n, γ0)− Γγ (θ̂n, γ0) (γ̂n − γ0)∥∥∥ (1.19)
+
∥∥∥Γγ (θ̂n, γ0) (γ̂n − γ0) − Γγ (θ0, γ0) (γ̂n − γ0)∥∥∥ (1.20)
+ ‖Γγ (θ0, γ0) (γ̂n − γ0)‖









with respect to both parameters, this reduces to
∥∥∥g(θ̂n, γ0)− g(θ̂n, γ̂n)∥∥∥ 6 Op (‖γ̂n − γ0‖2)+ Op (‖γ̂n − γ0‖ ∥∥∥θ̂n − θ0∥∥∥)+ ‖Γγ,0 (γ̂n − γ0)‖ (1.21)







where the last equality follows from first stage consistency and the fact that H0,N < HN. The term (1.16)
is op(H
−1/2
0,N ) by Lemma 6. Thus, we have
λmin (Γθ,0)
∥∥∥(θ̂n − θ0)∥∥∥ 6 ∥∥∥g(θ̂n, γ0)∥∥∥ = Op (H− 120,N)
which completes the proof.
Lemma 3 (Bahadur representation 2nd stage). Let K() be a symmetric Kernel with bounded support and finite
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Taking norms, rearranging the terms on the right hand side, using the triangle inequality, the following
bound is obtained for:
∥∥∥gn (θ̂n, γ̂n)− (gn (θ0, γ0) + Γθ,0(θ̂n − θ0) + Γγ,0 (γ̂n − γ0))∥∥∥
6
∥∥∥gn (θ̂n, γ̂n)− gn (θ0, γ0) − (g(θ̂n, γ̂n)− g (θ0, γ0))∥∥∥
+
∥∥∥g(θ̂n, γ̂n)− g(θ̂n, γ0)− Γγ (θ̂n, γ0) (γ̂n − γ0)∥∥∥
+
∥∥∥g(θ̂n, γ0)− g (θ0, γ0) − Γθ,0 (θ̂n − θ0)∥∥∥
+
∥∥∥Γγ (θ̂n, γ0) (γ̂n − γ0) − Γγ,0 (γ̂n − γ0)∥∥∥ = op (H− 120,N) ,
using equations (1.19), (1.20), (1.21), (1.14), and
√
H0,N-consistency of θ̂n.













Since Γθ,0 has full rank, by premultiplying
√

















HN (γ̂n − γ0) + op(1)
which, using the definition of gn and the asymptotic distribution of the first stage gives us the Bahadur
representation.
Lemma 8 (Conditions for Thm 2.8.9 in van der Vaart & Wellner [1996]). Let ρP(f, g) = ‖(f− g) − P(f− g)‖P,2.






















SECTION 1 | AUXILIARY RESULTS AND PROOFS 49
Then we can write the distance between θ1 and θ2 according to the semi-metric defined above as
∣∣∣ρP̂n(θ1, θ2) − ρP0(θ1, θ2)∣∣∣ = |Var [θ1(âHN) − θ2(âHN)] − Var [θ1(a) − θ2(a)]|
=
∣∣(ιT2 ⊗ IK){Var [θ(âHN)]− Var [θ(a)]} (ι2 ⊗ IK)∣∣
=
∣∣∣(ιT2 ⊗ IK){Var [θ(a) + θ̇(a)(âHN − a)]− Var [θ(a)]} (ι2 ⊗ IK)∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣(ιT2 ⊗ IK){Var [(ιT2 ⊗ I2K)vec([θ(âHN), θ̇(a)(âHN − a))]− Var [θ(a)]} (ι2 ⊗ IK)∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣(ιT2 ⊗ IK)(ιT2 ⊗ I2K)








 (ι2 ⊗ I2K)(ι2 ⊗ IK)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣(ιT2 ⊗ IK)(ιT2 ⊗ I2K)











= 0 and ζ(a, âHN) = Cov
[
θ(a), θ̇(a)(âHN − a)
]
= 0 which follows from
consistency of the first stage.
For the second condition, recall that âHN = x− Q̂τx|π(π0). Thus, for positive prices and finite budgets
characterized by π0 we get a natural bound of |âHN | 6 xmax < ∞. The domain with respect to first
stage estimated taste shocks of the quantile functions characterizing public demands θ is thus compact.
Together with the fact that |∇εsxs| 6= 0 on that domain, smoothness of θ and finite moments of εs for
s ∈ IS, we get a finite envelope of the function space. Thus the entropy condition is satisfied. Since the
envelope is a constant, the Lindeberg condition given by Lemma 8.(i) is also satisfied.
Theorem 2 (Asymptotic distribution of local average conditional quantile). Let a∗i ∼ F̂â for i ∈ In and
H0,N = Nh
L0+SL1+1
0 where O(HN) = o(n). Then under Assumptions 1.1-1.6, as h0 → 0 and H0,N →∞,
√
H0,N
























dFa(a) and V(π00) defined in equations (1.24) and (1.25) at the end the
proof.
Proof. Let P̂n and P̂n be the sample and the true probability measure of â respectively. Similarly denote










































By Theorem 2.8.9 in van der Vaart & Wellner [1996] and Lemma 8 the distribution of Gn,Pnθ0 in equation
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where the constant Ca is defined by the derivative of θ with respect to γ, which is the only thing that
depends on a over which we take expectations. In the last equation we use the rate restriction on n and
relate it to H0,N and consistency of the first stage. Since demand functions θ are smooth in a, or more
precisely it holds that 2α > d where α is the order of the differential operator and d is the dimension of
a which is d = S(L1 − 1) in this case. Thus, the function space for both its true value θ0 and its estimates
θ̂n is P0-Donsker [van der Vaart & Wellner, 1996, Example 2.10.25, p.202] and as a result stochastic
equicontinuity for the second term in equation (1.23) holds (see van der Vaart & Wellner [1996, Section
2.1.2]).
For asymptotic normality we use the linearization as defined above and pick n such that o(n) =

































































0, a) = E
√
H0,N















(dimensionality, see Section 1.4), such that the second term in Lemma 3 vanishes. Thus, for given a, the
asymptotic distribution of θ̂N can be derived analog to Lemma 5:
√
H0,N







































and B01 as defined in Lemma 5, with dimensions K0 instead of K. Then it follows immediately
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from consistency and the law of large numbers that the expectation with respect to the taste shocks






















































where the last term is of small order due to our finite second moments assumption on εs for all
s ∈ IS and the regularity assumption on the individuals utilities (Assumption 1.3.(i)). The variance of
ν1N follows from the CLT and the delta rule
V11(π00) = E






























1 h−1(π0 − π00)
T























Writing ν1+νs = (ιT2 ⊗ IK0)
[
ν1, ν2
]T the asymptotic variance covariance matrix13 of the local average
structural derivative becomes





(IK0 ⊗ ι2). (1.25)














1, ε1)η(p1, p2, w, zµ, ε0, εµ)
p0µ(p1, p2, w, zµ, εµ)
)
(1.10)
which are functions of both private and public taste shocks where η = µη1 + (1 − µ)η2 + ε0 and b = µb1(ε1) +
(1− µ)b2(ε
2).
13Note that while the asymptotic variance covariance matrix depends on the second derivative of





i ) for given π00 with respect to a∗i ∼ F̂â
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Proof. In the first stage, the two member household we specified optimizes
max
x0,ρ
µ(w,p1, p2, zµ, εµ)
[
log ρ1 − loga1(p1)
b1(p1, ε1)





1− µ(w,p1, p2, zµ, εµ)
) [ log(ρ2,− loga2(p2)
b2(p2, ε2)




subject to w = ρ1 − p0x0
First order conditions with respect to x0 are ρ1 are, respectively,






1− µ(w,p1, p2, zµ, εµ)













where m0 represents the Lagrange multiplier arising from the budget constraint. Using the the two
equations in (1.27) together with the budget constraint we get
ρ1 = (w− ρ1 − p0x0)
µ(w,p1, p2, zµ, εµ)




which we can simplify to
ρ1 =
µ(w,p1, p2, zµ, εµ)b2(p
2, ε2)





Substituting the Lagrange multiplier m0 in equation (1.26) using the first equation in (1.27) we get






1− µ(w,p1, p2, zµ, εµ)
) (η2 + ε0)
x0
= p0
µ(w,p1, p2, zµ, εµ)
ρ1b1(p1, ε1)
.
By substituting ρ1 using equation (1.28) an defining for notational simplicity:
η(w,p1, p2, zµ, εµ, ε0) = µ(w,p1, p2, zµ, εµ)η1 + (1− µ(w,p
1, p2, zµ, εµ))η2 + ε
0
b(w,p1, p2, zµ, εµ) = µ(w,p1, p2, zµ, εµ)b1(ε
1) + (1− µ(w,p1, p2, zµ, εµ))b2(ε
2)




η(w,p1, p2, zµ, εµ, ε0) = p0x0
b(w,p1, p2, zµ, εµ)
b1(p1, ε1)b2(p2, ε2)




2, ε2)η(w,p1, p2, zµ, εµ, ε0)
b(w,p1, p2, zµ, εµ) + b1(p1, ε1)b2(p2, ε2)η(w,p1, p2, zµ, εµ, ε0)
w
p0
with parameter that is a combination of the members’ tastes for public goods and private goods,
where the latter enters through the trade-off between public and private goods. Similarly, by using
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equation (1.28) again, we get the sharing rule
ρ1 =
wµ(w,p1, p2, zµ, εµ)b2(p
2, ε2)
b(w,p1, p2, zµ, εµ) + b1(p1, ε1)b2(p2, ε2)η(w,p1, p2, zµ, εµ, ε0)
which is a (linear) function of the Pareto weight for the respective individual.
Further Application Results
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.9
(ph, ρh) ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε
( 7.7 , 853.3 ) -0.263 0.103 ** -0.344 0.078 *** -0.379 0.046 *** -0.409 0.052 *** -0.375 0.061 ***
( 7.7 , 1132.1 ) -0.212 0.049 *** -0.270 0.033 *** -0.309 0.113 *** -0.346 0.198 * -0.327 0.461
( 7.7 , 1455.6 ) -0.154 0.048 *** -0.196 0.058 *** -0.246 0.316 -0.290 444.389 -0.278 -
( 10.2 , 853.3 ) -0.421 0.296 -0.533 0.381 -0.599 0.136 *** -0.634 0.153 *** -0.573 0.048 ***
( 10.2 , 1132.1 ) -0.332 0.112 *** -0.427 0.062 *** -0.480 0.057 *** -0.525 0.094 *** -0.486 0.110 ***
( 10.2 , 1455.6 ) -0.256 0.054 *** -0.315 0.056 *** -0.377 0.168 ** -0.431 0.257 * -0.407 0.814
( 12.9 , 853.3 ) -0.655 0.969 -0.836 3.904 -0.943 1.630 -0.986 0.567 * -0.841 0.146 ***
( 12.9 , 1132.1 ) -0.517 0.469 -0.641 0.251 ** -0.733 0.209 *** -0.791 0.137 *** -0.707 0.064 ***
( 12.9 , 1455.6 ) -0.375 0.104 *** -0.501 0.058 *** -0.569 0.067 *** -0.637 0.132 *** -0.597 0.197 ***
Table 1.7: Elasticity of xh1 with respect to ph
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.9
(ph, ρh) ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε
( 7.7 , 853.3 ) 0.434 0.231 * 0.464 0.125 *** 0.469 0.059 *** 0.468 0.057 *** 0.410 0.063 ***
( 7.7 , 1132.1 ) 0.470 0.098 *** 0.486 0.052 *** 0.509 0.156 *** 0.525 0.271 * 0.474 0.630
( 7.7 , 1455.6 ) 0.458 0.099 *** 0.465 0.105 *** 0.524 0.557 0.567 781.123 0.518 -
( 10.2 , 853.3 ) 0.504 0.499 0.547 0.403 0.563 0.162 *** 0.553 0.143 *** 0.476 0.040 ***
( 10.2 , 1132.1 ) 0.537 0.198 *** 0.578 0.080 *** 0.597 0.065 *** 0.604 0.100 *** 0.534 0.115 ***
( 10.2 , 1455.6 ) 0.549 0.093 *** 0.559 0.080 *** 0.606 0.228 *** 0.639 0.344 * 0.579 1.089
( 12.9 , 853.3 ) 0.597 1.184 0.676 2.483 0.698 1.373 0.680 0.418 0.556 0.123 ***
( 12.9 , 1132.1 ) 0.630 0.483 0.687 0.305 ** 0.720 0.234 *** 0.722 0.122 *** 0.616 0.056 ***
( 12.9 , 1455.6 ) 0.621 0.153 *** 0.683 0.074 *** 0.716 0.077 *** 0.743 0.142 *** 0.666 0.208 ***
Table 1.8: Elasticity of xh1 with respect to ρh
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.9
(pw, ρw) ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε
( 9.4 , 843.8 ) -0.127 0.084 -0.197 0.058 *** -0.290 0.047 *** -0.356 0.060 *** -0.373 0.129 ***
( 9.4 , 1076.2 ) -0.096 0.096 -0.140 0.051 *** -0.225 0.076 *** -0.299 0.489 -0.329 0.571
( 9.4 , 1378.2 ) -0.054 0.112 -0.070 0.067 -0.144 0.169 -0.233 2.576 -0.284 2.950
( 11.3 , 843.8 ) -0.188 0.204 -0.299 0.228 -0.401 0.101 *** -0.479 0.084 *** -0.477 0.052 ***
( 11.3 , 1076.2 ) -0.143 0.106 -0.227 0.078 *** -0.327 0.069 *** -0.405 0.287 -0.423 0.440
( 11.3 , 1378.2 ) -0.095 0.094 -0.138 0.067 ** -0.234 0.152 -0.322 1.389 -0.370 3.041
( 14.3 , 843.8 ) -0.332 3.644 -0.493 0.510 -0.630 1.759 -0.717 0.537 -0.673 0.125 ***
( 14.3 , 1076.2 ) -0.251 0.241 -0.389 0.193 ** -0.519 0.146 *** -0.608 0.105 *** -0.590 0.082 ***
( 14.3 , 1378.2 ) -0.175 0.092 * -0.277 0.070 *** -0.403 0.104 *** -0.494 0.368 -0.512 1.617
Table 1.9: Elasticity of xw1 with respect to pw
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τ = 0.1 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.9
(pw, ρw) ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε
( 9.4 , 843.8 ) 0.301 0.198 0.324 0.145 ** 0.370 0.067 *** 0.414 0.054 *** 0.412 0.099 ***
( 9.4 , 1076.2 ) 0.327 0.171 * 0.336 0.070 *** 0.384 0.080 *** 0.448 0.473 0.459 0.545
( 9.4 , 1378.2 ) 0.339 0.193 * 0.321 0.096 *** 0.364 0.216 * 0.459 3.225 0.504 3.626
( 11.3 , 843.8 ) 0.330 0.701 0.375 0.404 0.416 0.140 *** 0.460 0.091 *** 0.445 0.049 ***
( 11.3 , 1076.2 ) 0.354 0.191 * 0.391 0.093 *** 0.442 0.067 *** 0.498 0.233 ** 0.496 0.350
( 11.3 , 1378.2 ) 0.369 0.154 ** 0.376 0.084 *** 0.435 0.166 *** 0.514 1.439 0.548 3.115
( 14.3 , 843.8 ) 0.392 6.177 0.455 0.818 0.507 0.983 0.540 0.413 0.509 0.115 ***
( 14.3 , 1076.2 ) 0.414 0.304 0.473 0.218 ** 0.536 0.110 *** 0.584 0.091 *** 0.558 0.057 ***
( 14.3 , 1378.2 ) 0.426 0.124 *** 0.469 0.080 *** 0.544 0.099 *** 0.610 0.304 ** 0.607 1.338
Table 1.10: Elasticity of xw1 with respect to ρw
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.9
(pw/ph, w) ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε
( 0.6 , 3564.1 ) 0.035 0.294 -0.026 0.070 -0.078 0.061 -0.044 0.043 -0.074 0.117
( 0.6 , 4337.1 ) 0.030 0.150 -0.021 0.059 -0.064 0.056 -0.036 0.053 -0.061 0.193
( 0.6 , 5225.5 ) 0.024 0.072 -0.017 0.056 -0.051 0.048 -0.030 0.101 -0.051 0.345
( 0.9 , 3564.1 ) 0.039 0.391 -0.038 0.093 -0.119 0.079 -0.064 0.056 -0.111 0.142
( 0.9 , 4337.1 ) 0.032 0.178 -0.030 0.073 -0.093 0.072 -0.053 0.063 -0.091 0.199
( 0.9 , 5225.5 ) 0.029 0.087 -0.023 0.071 -0.076 0.061 -0.043 0.130 -0.075 0.398
( 1.2 , 3564.1 ) 0.042 0.587 -0.054 0.140 -0.162 0.118 -0.085 0.080 -0.149 0.190
( 1.2 , 4337.1 ) 0.034 0.283 -0.042 0.107 -0.128 0.109 -0.068 0.101 -0.120 0.267
( 1.2 , 5225.5 ) 0.029 0.125 -0.033 0.103 -0.102 0.090 -0.056 0.217 -0.099 0.663
Table 1.11: Elasticity of c0c with respect to pw/ph
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.9
(pw/ph, w) ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε
( 0.6 , 3564.1 ) 1.499 1.324 1.031 0.348 *** 0.860 0.236 *** 0.910 0.217 *** 0.923 0.567
( 0.6 , 4337.1 ) 1.356 0.757 * 1.013 0.277 *** 0.895 0.211 *** 0.931 0.253 *** 0.939 0.531 *
( 0.6 , 5225.5 ) 1.272 0.511 ** 1.007 0.315 *** 0.905 0.251 *** 0.945 0.566 * 0.946 1.418
( 0.9 , 3564.1 ) 1.525 1.244 1.106 0.350 *** 0.916 0.251 *** 0.934 0.222 *** 0.963 0.600
( 0.9 , 4337.1 ) 1.355 0.638 ** 1.080 0.269 *** 0.926 0.224 *** 0.963 0.237 *** 0.980 0.448 **
( 0.9 , 5225.5 ) 1.281 0.448 *** 1.057 0.312 *** 0.946 0.246 *** 0.963 0.532 * 0.971 1.047
( 1.2 , 3564.1 ) 1.493 1.246 1.130 0.358 *** 0.967 0.266 *** 0.968 0.219 *** 1.001 0.749
( 1.2 , 4337.1 ) 1.360 0.662 ** 1.097 0.283 *** 0.974 0.238 *** 0.964 0.252 *** 1.001 0.453 **
( 1.2 , 5225.5 ) 1.294 0.437 *** 1.080 0.321 *** 0.966 0.256 *** 0.976 0.554 * 0.993 1.100
Table 1.12: Elasticity of c0c with respect to w
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τ = 0.1 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.9
(pw/ph, w) ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε
( 0.6 , 3564.1 ) 0.521 0.286 * 0.477 0.158 *** 0.462 0.095 *** 0.419 0.059 *** 0.374 0.043 ***
( 0.6 , 4337.1 ) 0.436 0.141 *** 0.404 0.083 *** 0.396 0.052 *** 0.363 0.059 *** 0.322 0.045 ***
( 0.6 , 5225.5 ) 0.369 0.077 *** 0.343 0.053 *** 0.343 0.060 *** 0.316 0.059 *** 0.277 0.081 ***
( 0.9 , 3564.1 ) 0.614 0.173 *** 0.564 0.103 *** 0.556 0.075 *** 0.512 0.076 *** 0.466 0.057 ***
( 0.9 , 4337.1 ) 0.534 0.102 *** 0.491 0.066 *** 0.491 0.064 *** 0.456 0.068 *** 0.412 0.076 ***
( 0.9 , 5225.5 ) 0.458 0.058 *** 0.428 0.048 *** 0.432 0.073 *** 0.403 0.094 *** 0.363 0.072 ***
( 1.2 , 3564.1 ) 0.679 0.157 *** 0.627 0.101 *** 0.618 0.086 *** 0.582 0.094 *** 0.531 0.089 ***
( 1.2 , 4337.1 ) 0.594 0.091 *** 0.556 0.068 *** 0.555 0.103 *** 0.520 0.119 *** 0.478 0.107 ***
( 1.2 , 5225.5 ) 0.521 0.060 *** 0.491 0.074 *** 0.500 0.111 *** 0.467 0.128 *** 0.426 0.160 ***
Table 1.13: Elasticity of ρw with respect to pw/ph
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.9
(pw/ph, w) ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε ε̂ σ̂ε
( 0.6 , 3564.1 ) 0.899 0.665 0.848 0.391 ** 0.780 0.273 *** 0.721 0.150 *** 0.730 0.082 ***
( 0.6 , 4337.1 ) 0.907 0.344 *** 0.869 0.257 *** 0.811 0.168 *** 0.757 0.121 *** 0.766 0.092 ***
( 0.6 , 5225.5 ) 0.918 0.267 *** 0.882 0.202 *** 0.843 0.175 *** 0.789 0.153 *** 0.796 0.242 ***
( 0.9 , 3564.1 ) 0.734 0.311 ** 0.693 0.236 *** 0.635 0.161 *** 0.614 0.109 *** 0.620 0.074 ***
( 0.9 , 4337.1 ) 0.774 0.208 *** 0.730 0.156 *** 0.681 0.123 *** 0.662 0.101 *** 0.665 0.114 ***
( 0.9 , 5225.5 ) 0.796 0.157 *** 0.762 0.146 *** 0.720 0.143 *** 0.701 0.182 *** 0.707 0.260 ***
( 1.2 , 3564.1 ) 0.638 0.212 *** 0.593 0.155 *** 0.537 0.114 *** 0.539 0.085 *** 0.541 0.079 ***
( 1.2 , 4337.1 ) 0.675 0.135 *** 0.635 0.111 *** 0.585 0.103 *** 0.586 0.110 *** 0.591 0.154 ***
( 1.2 , 5225.5 ) 0.703 0.113 *** 0.672 0.124 *** 0.633 0.145 *** 0.630 0.222 *** 0.636 0.412
Table 1.14: Elasticity of ρw with respect to w
Time-use and Consumption Categories
Public consumption
(i) mortgage: interest plus amortization (gross)
(ii) rent (NOT including costs of gas and electricity)
(iii) general utilities (heating, electricity, water, telephone, Internet, etc)
(iv) transport and means of transport (public transport; own car: gasoline/diesel and maintenance)
(v) insurances (home insurance, car insurance, health insurance, etc.)
(vi) children’s daycare (day care center, out-of-school supervision, guest parents, homework guid-
ance)
(vii) alimony and financial support for children not (or no longer) living at home
(viii) debts and loans (excluding mortgage)
(ix) daytrips and holidays with the whole family or part of the family (flight tickets, hotel, restaurant
bills for the family, etc.)
(x) expenditure on cleaning the house or maintaining the garden
(xi) eating at home (food, drinks, candy, etc.)
(xii) other
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Private consumption
(i) food and drinks outside the house (restaurant, cafe, company canteen, etc., but NO restaurant
bills for the family)
(ii) cigarettes and other tobacco products
(iii) clothing (clothes, shoes, jewelry, etc.)
(iv) personal care products and services (hair care, body care, hairdresser, manicure, etc.)
(v) medical care and health costs NOT covered by insurance (medicines, doctor, dentist, hospital
bills, maternity care, spectacles, hearing aids, etc.)
(vi) leisure time expenditure (film, theater, hobbies, sports activities, photography, books, CDs/D-
VDs, expenditure during daytrips or travel without family, etc.)
(vii) (further) schooling (expenditure on courses, enrolment fees, etc.)
(viii) gifts and presents (for family, friends, charity, etc.)
(ix) other
CHAPTER 2
The Collective Axiom in a Heterogeneous Population
Introduction
It is often argued that the traditional unitary household consumption model, which
assumes that a household consists of only one (aggregate) decision maker, is insuffi-
cient to describe household behaviour. In addition to this, many policy relevant ques-
tions concerning family economics, e.g. pooling of taxable income or to whom to pro-
vide childcare benefits, cannot be answered within a unitary setting. From an empirical
point of view some authors find evidence that the symmetry property of the Slutsky
substitution matrix implied by the unitary model should be rejected [Browning & Chi-
appori, 1998; Cherchye et al., 2009]. A widely accepted alternative to the unitary model
is known as the collective household consumption model [Chiappori, 1988, 1992], in
which household members bargain over their consumption choices and are assumed
to reach a Pareto efficient outcome. This model implies a Slutsky matrix that can be de-
composed into a regular negative semi-definite, symmetric term and a rank deficient
outer product which is commonly referred to as the SNR(S−1) condition and thus pro-
vides a theoretical foundation for the lacking symmetry property that is often found in
the data [Chiappori & Ekeland, 2006, 2009].
There are two strands in the literature of testing the collective household model ver-
sus an alternative one. The first type considers a continuous demand system, based on
which the Slutsky matrix is constructed and its rank is tested [Browning & Chiappori,
1998]. The second approach is fully non-parametric and based on revealed preference
restrictions [Cherchye et al., 2007, 2009]. While both these strands have their merits, the
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first one has the drawback that it is very difficult to allow for unobserved heterogene-
ity either with respect to preferences or with respect to household bargaining, even in
a fully parametric setting. The revealed preference approach on the other hand allows
for unobserved heterogeneity as long as panel data is available. Both these tests are
based on aggregate household consumption data which is feasible but, in the latter
case, comes with the drawback that it may not have enough power and will thus often
fail to reject the collective model since households are considered to be consistent with
the revealed preference axiom if there exists a hypothetical within-household demand
allocation satisfying the axiom. In order to test whether or not a household is actually
rational in a collective sense, researchers often use additional consumption data from
single households to [Browning et al., 2013; Dunbar et al., 2013b]. This however re-
quires the assumption of stable preferences, where stability is to be interpreted over
different household compositions. In other words, the transition from being single to
being in a couple does not affect individual consumption preferences.
In this paper we construct a test of the validity of this stable preference assumption
which is fully nonparametric and allows for a heterogeneous population, i.e. unob-
served heterogeneity both with respect to preferences and bargaining power. In order
to achieve this, we will construct discrete household types for both couples and sin-
gles. We will assume that we fully observe the marginal distribution of their respective
continuous consumption choices in at least three different price regimes, which we
will then map into the discrete choice space. For this we require panel data. The choice
space will be constructed in a way that ensures that two households for which the same
revealed preference inequalities hold form an equivalence class. In order to check ra-
tionality of a household in a first step we define hypothetical household types, which
are characterized by the discrete choice of a couple’s household and the choices of both
husband and wife within that household. Since the latter two are not observed we will
make use of the stable preference assumption and a separability restriction that allow
us to treat single individuals as if they were in a couple and obtain their preference
relations from single individuals. A household type is then characterized as the three-
tuple of a couple’s aggregate household choice, husband’s choice and wife’s choice.
The fully characterized type space is defined as all possible combinations thereof. In a
second step we will then link observed choices of both singles and couples to the space
of fully characterized household types. Since we do not observe the joint distribution
supported on the constructed hypothetical type space, but only marginal distributions
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of consumption choices for single females, single males and couples, respectively, we
will make use of a stochastic revealed preference setting [McFadden & Richter, 1991;
McFadden, 2005], which leads to a partial identification approach of the joint distri-
bution or copula. The inference of this test is then based on the ideas of Hoderlein &
Stoye [2014]; Kitamura & Stoye [2013]. Under the hypothesis of stable preferences, we
can then for each of these hypothetical types, not only determine whether or not for
a given type of household there exists a feasible consumption allocation which makes
this household rational, using the necessary conditions in Cherchye et al. [2007], but
also whether this is actually the case for this type using the preference relations ob-
tained from singles. The test is then constructed in a way that we consider households
that satisfy the necessary conditions as a baseline case, and then compare it with the
case in which we have added the information of singles. The difference between these
two sets are the households for which the stable preference assumption does not hold.
We will now briefly discuss the existing approaches known in the literature how
to test the validity of the collective model and how the contribution of this paper re-
lates to them. Testing the collective model using the Slutsky matrix requires estimating
household demands and derivatives thereof. Browning & Chiappori [1998] construct
a test of collective rationality based on a parametric almost ideal demand system with
additive (measurement) errors. While an almost ideal demand system provides a lo-
cally flexible functional parametric form of demands which can be readily tested for
the SNR(S − 1) condition, it is prone to potential misspecification error. In addition
to this, identification of continuous demand systems in the presence of general unob-
served heterogeneity is difficult due to the rather complex structure of the collective
model, which leads to demands that are non-separable with respect to the random
preference and bargaining parameters representing heterogeneous consumers. Using
observable intra-household allocation of consumption Hubner [2015] derives restric-
tions on utility functions and Pareto weights that ensure nonparametric identification
of vector-valued and continuous household demand functions using a global invert-
ibility argument, which could be used to non-parametrically test the SNR(S − 1) con-
dition in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. In the context of a continuous
demand setting, the use of single household data is not new, although it is usually
not used for testing but rather for the recovery of the so-called (conditional) sharing
rule, which determines the division of the endowment among the members within
the household. Such an approach was used for example in a collective labour supply
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setting by Barmby & Smith [2001] and Vermeulen et al. [2006], and introduced to a
collective consumption setting by Browning et al. [2013] who show how single data
can be used to identify equivalence scales in a homogeneous household setting. Dun-
bar et al. [2013b] extend this approach to a setting with unobserved heterogeneity by
considering completely random sharing rules and show that under certain preference
restrictions and the existence of a number of so-called distribution factors, the joint
distribution of sharing rule levels is identified.
To the knowledge of the author, the use of singles data in the context of the fully
non-parametric global way to model collective households using revealed preference
restrictions [Cherchye et al., 2007, 2009] is novel. The extensive use of the stable prefer-
ence assumption in the literature motivates a test of this hypothesis. A revealed pref-
erence based approach is desirable since it allows us to use a fully stochastic random
utility and random bargaining power version of the collective model, without requir-
ing assumptions on how unobserved heterogeneity enters the models’ primitives, and
thus circumvents the identification problems of the local, continuous approach. On
the other hand, the discrete nature of this approach makes it difficult to work with
single data, since the model in its most general form involves externalities modeled
by Lindahl prices which implies that budget planes are individual-specific in a het-
erogeneous population and thus a finite-dimensional classification of types would not
be feasible. Thus we consider a generalization of a Beckerian caring model [Becker,
1981]. This allows us to use the same choice space for both singles and couples. In
order to discretize choices for singles and couples, we make use of panel data and a
time-stability of preferences assumption. There exists a range of consumption datasets
that would be feasible for our approach including the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring
Survey (RLMS) and the Spanish Continuous Family Expenditure Survey (Encuesta Con-
tinua de Presupuestos Familiares, ECPF) which were used by Cherchye et al. [2011] and
Adams et al. [2014] for similar purposes. This allows us to characterize the marginal
distributions of consumption choices of both singles and couples.
In order to link the observed marginal distributions defined over choice types of
singles and couples, to the joint distribution fully characterizing household behaviour
we make use of the approaches by Hoderlein & Stoye [2014] and Kitamura & Stoye
[2013]. Hoderlein & Stoye [2014] consider the weak axiom of revealed preference in
the unitary model. In particular they use the fact that demands of a heterogeneous
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population observed in a given price regime can be characterized as random vari-
ables supported on a normalized budget set. Observing the same population in dif-
ferent price regimes (repeated cross-sections), one can then use copula techniques to
derive (Frechet–Hoeffding) bounds on the probability that the population behaves ir-
rationally, i.e. is not in line with the weak axiom. Kitamura & Stoye [2013] go one step
further and fully discretize budget sets using a partition containing all the information
that is relevant to test the strong axiom of revealed preference.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 specifies the collective model and
discusses stable preferences and separability assumptions that will be necessary for
our approach. Section 2.3 shows how the continuous consumption decision can be
discretized for a household and each of its individuals without losing relevant infor-
mation to test the collective axiom. Section 2.4 will discuss how we can construct a test
statistic using the constructed type space and deals with the question of computational
complexity. Section 2.5 provides simulation results using a three-good economy with
three price regimes.
Specification
In this section we specify the standard collective model with two-person house-
holds and consumption externalities and show how we can make use of single house-
holds under the stable preference assumption. Let households, price regimes and
goods be indexed by i ∈ IN, t ∈ IT , and l ∈ IL, respectively1. Further let x̃ci,t ∈ RLT+
be continuous household consumption, which household i ∈ IN chooses optimizing
its collective utility um(x̃m, x̃f) + µ(p)uf(x̃f, x̃m) subject to budget Bt = {x̃ | ptx̃ 6 1} and
x̃c = x̃f + x̃m, where x̃r is continuous individual private consumption of the respective
spouses r ∈ {m, f}. Total household endowment is normalized to one. As such the
expenditure on a given good category l ∈ IL denoted by pt,lx̃ci,t,l (e.g. food, transporta-
tion or electronics) represents its budget share, i.e. the fraction of the budget of a given
period t ∈ IT that is allocated to purchase this good by household i ∈ IN.
The collective model as defined above imposes restrictions on how both household
and individual demands must change with respect to relative price changes. For self-
sufficiency of this paper we state the axiom consisting of a set of necessary conditions
below. A more detailed explanation and proof can be found in Cherchye et al. [2007].
1The set IJ = {1, . . . , J} refers to the index set running from 1 to J.
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Definition 2.1 (Collective Axiom of Revealed Preference, Cherchye et al. [2007]). Sup-
pose that there exists a pair of utility functions uf and um that provide a collective
rationalization of the set of observations
{
(pt; x̃ct , x̃ft, x̃mt ) : x̃ct = x̃ft + x̃mt , t ∈ IT
}
. Then
there exist preference relations2 Rr0 and Rr for each r ∈ {c,m, f} such that:
(i) if x̃sRc0x̃t, then x̃sRf0x̃t or x̃sRm0 x̃t
(ii) if x̃sRr0x̃s1 , x̃s1Rr0x̃s2 , . . ., x̃sSRr0x̃t then x̃sRrx̃t for r ∈ {m, f}
(iii) if x̃sRc0x̃t and x̃tRrx̃s, then x̃sRr
′
0 x̃t for r 6= r ′ where r, r ′ ∈ {m, f}
(iv) if x̃sRc0 (x̃t1 + x̃t2) and x̃t1Rrx̃s then x̃sRr
′
0 x̃t2 for r 6= r
′ where r, r ′ ∈ {m, f}.
(v) if x̃s1Rfx̃t and x̃s2Rmx̃t then ¬ (x̃tRc0 (x̃s1 + x̃s2))
(vi) if x̃sRfx̃t and x̃sRmx̃t, then ¬ (x̃tRc0x̃s)
where Rr is defined as x̃sRr0x̃t whenever psx̃rs > psx̃rt and Rr is the transitive closure of
Rr0 [Afriat, 1967; Varian, 1982].
As the weak, strong and generalized axiom in the unitary model, the collective ax-
iom considers demands in different price regimes. In addition to individual rationality
of each spouse the collective model also requires Pareto efficiency, which together with
monotonicity of preferences implies that every solution x̃ci,t must lie on the budget set
Bt for each t ∈ IT . In a heterogeneous population, demands in each price regime are
thus scattered on the respective budget planes. Since empirically not every household
will have the same endowment, we will project heterogeneous demands onto normal-
ized budget planes instead. This will be discussed in more detail in the empirical
section below.
Demands of each spouse are in general not observable and thus the preference re-
lations Rf and Rm are not identified directly from couples data. In the original ap-
proach [Cherchye et al., 2007, 2011] a household is considered rational if there exists
a feasible consumption allocation between the spouses, or in other words a pair of
hypothetical preference relations Rf and Rm, that is consistent with the collection ax-
iom. Only households for which there does not exist such a pair of individual prefer-
ence relations are considered irrational, which reduces the power of this test and may
thus often accept the hypothesis that households behave according to the collective
2Note that Rc0 is just notation and not actually a preference relation, since household consumption is
only a result of individual preferences.
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model when it is not true3. Thus, we will take a different route here by exploiting
information of single households in order to identify the preference relations Rf and
Rm. For this let us consider a single household who chooses an optimal consumption
bundle for a given period t ∈ IT by maximizing ur(x̃r, x̃r
′
) subject to the constraint
x̃r ∈ Bt. Obviously, for single individuals the spouse’s consumption x̃r
′ will be zero.
Thus, in order to be able to model singles in a way that makes them informative for a
spouses consumption behaviour we have to make a separability assumption. Let the
(L − 1)-dimensional vector of marginal rates of substitutions for r ∈ {m, f} be denoted





for l = 1, . . . , L − 1. Then
for r 6= r ′ we assume ∂MRSr(xr, xr ′)/∂xr ′ = 0L−1,L−1 or in other words the marginal
rates of substitution for own good consumption does not depend on the spouse’s con-
sumption. A sufficient condition for this would be for example separability of the form
us(xr, xr
′
) = G(g(xr), xr
′
) for any two differentiable, increasing, real-valued functions G
and g. While this assumption allows for positive consumption externalities, it restricts
the way behaviour of a person is modified when entering or exiting a relationship.
For example it rules out non-cooperative strategic behaviour of individuals within a
couple. However, this assumption is still compatible with popular specifications such
as the Beckerian caring model with altruistic preferences [Becker, 1981], in which util-
ities of one spouse are defined in terms of own-good consumption and the utility of
the spouse, i.e. ur(xr, xr ′) = W(Ur(xr), Ur ′(xr ′)) where Uf and Um are real-valued sub-
utility functions with the usual properties and W is a strictly increasing, differentiable
real-valued function. In addition to this separability assumption, in order to learn from
single individuals we have to make the assumption that preferences of individuals do
not change with respect to household composition, i.e. if they transition from being
single to being in a couple or vice versa. We call this a stable preference assumption (see
Dunbar et al. [2013a] and Vermeulen et al. [2006] for a detailed discussion). In what
follows we will discuss how we can test this assumption non-parametrically.
The following observation will prove to be very useful in our approach. In order to
check revealed preferences it is not necessary to consider the continuous distribution
of consumption choices supported on the respective budget set. Rather is it sufficient
to discretize the choice space by splitting the budget sets into regions which contain
sufficient information to check revealed preference statements. The benefits of such
3This adds to the general observation that revealed preference restrictions often do not have much
power to reject optimizing behaviour of individuals [Beatty & Crawford, 2011].
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a discrete choice set are two-fold. First, it allows us to construct hypothetical house-
hold types, even if we only observe households with different compositions, i.e. single
households and households consisting of two spouses. Secondly, it naturally intro-
duces a notion of unobserved heterogeneity in which stochastic preference parameters
of infinite dimensionality, representing a heterogeneous household, are mapped to an
element of a finite-dimensional discrete choice space characterizing choices within and
across different price regimes.
We will now discuss why it is sufficient to conclude about rationality of the pop-
ulation while only observing marginal distributions of choices for households with
different compositions. Let the choice spaces for single males, single females and cou-
ples be denoted by Xm = Xf and Xc, respectively4. Each element of the choice space
includes a sequence of choices in at least three periods, which we require to test the
collective model. Let the probability that option ξj is chosen within a household of a
given household composition r be denoted as π(ξj|Xr). We call this a stochastic choice
in situation Xr and will often refer to it as the marginal distribution of choices under
a given household composition. In order to identify these conditional probabilities we
require panel data in which we observe choices of singles of both genders and couples.
In addition to this, we require a time-homogeneity assumption of preferences such that
we can treat different periods as different price regimes. To be more precise we have
to assume that preferences do not change over time, such that we can treat the hetero-
geneity of choices between periods t ∈ IT to be a consequence of facing different prices
pt rather than a change in preferences over time5.
To fully characterize households, we consider the product space X = Xc × Xm × Xf
representing all possible combinations of choices for different household compositions.
Each element contains all relevant information to construct the three-tuple (Rc, Rm, Rf),
due to our separability and preference stability assumption, which ensures that sin-
gle male and single female households are informative for the respective spouses’ be-
haviour within a couple. A natural way to view this fully characterized type space is
4We will discuss how these choice spaces are constructed and how we can encode observed choices
under different household compositions in detail in the next section.
5Note that this assumption can likely be relaxed to continuous demands of the form x̃it = x̃(pt, εi) +
εit, where εi is an element of a general probability space capturing unobserved heterogeneity and εit is
a period specific idiosyncratic taste shock, when projecting observed demands onto budgets of periods
t. Identification of such a specification is treated in Evdokimov [2010].
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via a clustered graph6 where the nodes represent discrete consumption decisions and
the partitioning is such that there are three disjoint classes each representing the set of
discrete decisions under a given household composition – single female, single male
and couple. By construction each node within a class is then connected to exactly one
node of every other class. A hypothetical household composition is than characterized
by a path of nodes connecting all three classes. Each of these paths can be classified
based on its compatibility with the collective axiom. We denote the exhaustive set of
paths that are collectively rational by X0 but will be more precise about the exact par-
titioning later this section. The links between the nodes are not directly observed from
data and thus neither are the paths.
However, using the principle of stochastic preferences [McFadden & Richter, 1991]
we can ask the question whether there exists a probability measure ν over these paths
supported on the space of fully characterized rational household preference relations
X0 that rationalizes the observed stochastic choices π(ξj|Xr) for r ∈ {c,m, f}. With this
construction the (heterogeneous) choice function X 7→ Ξ(X) determining a decision rule




rather than one of price regimes as in Kitamura & Stoye [2013]. We say that the stochas-
tic choice π is stochastically rational if for all household compositions Xr for r ∈ {c,m, f}
it holds that π(ξj|Xr) = ν(
{
Ξ ∈ X0 : ξj = Ξ(Xr)
}
. Intuitively if the choices in different
states of the world can be rationalized by a probability distribution over a set of ratio-
nal households, we can say that the population is rational with respect to the decision
rule Ξ.
To fix ideas for the testing procedure we propose in this paper we will now dis-
cuss which decision rule Ξ is appropriate. For this, we partition the universe of types
X = Xcollective ∪ Xalternative, where the set Xcollective contains all hypothetical household
types for which there exists a feasible consumption allocation which is consistent with
the collective axiom as in Cherchye et al. [2007]. By also taking the actual respective
preference relations of both spouses for each of these hypothetical types into account
we can check whether a type is actually consistent with the collective axiom and denote
this subset as X0 = Xcollective \ X1, where X1 is the complement of X0 and consists of the
cases which satisfy the necessary conditions of collective rationality but are not con-
sistent with the collective axiom if preference relations from singles are added. Using
6Technically a k-partite graph with k = 3 which is a graph whose vertices can be partitioned into k
disjoint sets, with none of the elements within each set being adjacent.
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this particular partition, one could think of three different tests. Firstly, one could test
Xcollective against Xalternative. In fact, this is what Cherchye et al. [2007] do which does not
require single data since such a test can be based on aggregate consumption only and
the whole joint distribution of such choices is directly identified from data. Secondly,
adding single data and assuming separable and stable preferences one could test X0
against X1 ∪ Xalternative to obtain a stronger test of the collective model compared to the
previous one. While this test has more power, it comes with the drawback of only ap-
plying to a separable caring-type model. Finally, one could drop all cases that are not
collectively rational and consider X0 and X1 to answer the question whether the stable
preference assumption holds. The latter two questions can both be answered using the
tools we develop in this paper. In the empirical section of this paper we will however
only focus on the very last one. If we find that among the collectively rational paths
it is not possible to rationalize observed choice probabilities using the types belonging
to the set X0, then we can conclude that the hypothesis of stable preferences does not
hold, since both X0 and X1 are disjoint subsets of the collectively rational types satis-
fying Xcollective = X0 ∪ X1. Before we will discuss how our inference can be based on
finding a probability measure ν which rationalizes the observed choices probabilities
π in Section 2.4, we will have to define the type space and show how we can formalize
the decision rules in the next section.
Encoding
In order to characterize types, note that the Collective Axiom restricts not only ag-
gregate household consumption characterized by the vector x̃ct , but also individual
consumption of each spouse, denoted by x̃ft and x̃mt . We start by defining and encod-
ing the choice space of a given continuous consumption outcome x̃rt for r ∈ {c,m, f} in
a given period t ∈ IT . For this, take a family Xt of Jt disjoint non-empty sets denoted










of x̃ri,t itself. To keep the dimension of this discrete choice space as small as possible,
we should make sure that we pick the coarsest partition that contains all the required
information to verify the collective axiom. It turns out that in order to answer revealed
preference statements it is sufficient to recursively split a budget set Bt where it inter-
sects with other budget sets Bt′ for all t 6= t′.
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Example. Although the notation and treatment is general we will mostly focus on
the simplest possible setting, which still allows us to distinguish the collective model
from the unitary model, namely the one with three goods and three price regimes.
Figure 2.1 shows an example of such a three-good economy with three price-regimes
characterizing budgets Bred, Bblue, Bgreen.
Figure 2.1: Three intersecting budget sets Bred, Bblue, Bgreen with three goods
If all budgets intersect as in this example we get Jt = 4 possible discrete consumption
choices for each budget set Bt where t ∈ {blue, red, green} = IT . In the figure on the
right hand side the green and blue budgets are removed and only the lines in which
they intersect with the remaining red budget are plotted, showing that there are four
quadrants which we will xNW|red, xNE|red, xSE|red and xSW|red. We will repeatedly come
back to this example setting to demonstrate our approach.
For each budget set t ∈ IT , following Kitamura & Stoye [2013] we encode the con-
sumption choice indexed by j ∈ Jt, which is geometrically represented by a polyhe-
dron, or in other words by an IT -dimensional vector of inequalities
xj|t =

+1 if ptx̃j > 1
0 if ptx̃j = 1
−1 if ptx̃j 6 1
for t ∈ IT
and denote the choice xj|t by patch j in period t. Let the operator which encodes a
given x̃ as an element of X, the space of (L − 1)-dimensional polyhedra, be denoted as
D : RL−1 → X, where D stands for discretization.
Example (cont.). In our example the encoding of the choice set for the red budget,
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shown on the right hand side of Figure 2.1 is
Xred = {xNW|red, xNE|red, xSE|red, xSW|red}
=
{
xred, below blue, above green, xred, below blue, below green, xred, above blue, above green, xred, above blue, below green
}
= {(0,−1,+1), (0,−1,−1), (0,+1,+1), (0,+1,−1)} .
The choice sets Xblue and Xgreen can be defined in a similar matter.
We will now extend this choice characterization of Kitamura & Stoye [2013] and de-
note a choice under a given household composition as a choice path which is defined as
the Cartesian product over choices per budget Bt for t ∈ IT . We start with single house-
holds which will later be used to represent a member within a household. An element
of the set of choice paths for Xr, which fully characterizes the preference relations Rr
for r ∈ {m, f}, can be defined as:












Note again that in order to characterize this choice we need panel data and a time
homogeneity assumption of preferences.
For aggregate demands, which we will only observe in couples, it can easily be
seen that if we only discretized demands for a given period, some relevant informa-
tion, namely on the sum of pairs of demands to make statements about items (iv) and
(v) of the axiom, would be lost. In order to check these two parts of the axiom we
therefore additionally have to store with each decision D(x̃ci,t) at time t 6= t′ 6= t′′ the
discretizations D(x̃t′ + x̃t′′). Note that due to the fact that the discretization operator
we defined is not linear, we cannot simply add up consumptions of two periods since
the quantities are encodings of discrete choices rather than continuous quantities and
thus D(x̃ct + x̃ct ′) 6= Dx̃ct +Dx̃ct ′ . Thus, we will treat them as additional discretized con-
sumption outcomes. In a three period setting, this would be one additional encoded
consumption vector, the encoding of which is treated in the example below. For four
periods, we would have to compare consumption of period twith the sum of period t′
and t′′, the sum of period t′′ and t′′′, as well as the sum of periods t′ and t′′′. Thus we
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where Xt represents the space of all κ = 12(T−1)(T−2) encodings of double-sums, which
for the sake of the exposition will not be made explicit but will become apparent for
the case of three goods and three budgets in the following example.
In the final step, the question that remains to be addressed is whether and how we
can construct a household choice space that includes aggregate household consump-
tion choice as well as individual male and female consumption. In other words we
want to construct hypothetical types based on the sets of choices per household com-
position which fully characterizes couple preference relations and which we can then
check against the conditions the collective axiom imposes on them. Such a hypothetical




Example (cont.). In our three good, three budget economy an example of a path would







(xred, below blue, above green, xabove red, blue, above green, xbelow red, above blue, green,
xred, above blue+green, xblue, below red+green, xgreen, above red+blue),
(xred, below blue, above green, xabove red, blue, below green, xabove red, above blue, green),




( ( 0,−1,+1), ( +1, 0,+1), ( −1,+1, 0),
(1, 0, 0), ( 0,−1, 0) ( 0, 0,+1))
( ( 0,−1,+1), (+1, 0,−1), (+1,+1, 0)),
( ( 0,+1,−1), (−1, 0,+1), (+1,+1, 0) )

Example. Using the definition of the discretization operator we can go back to the set of
inequalities characterizing revealed preference relations of a hypothetical household:
pbxr 6 1, pgxr > 1, pr(xb + xg) > 1 pbxmr 6 1, pgx
m
r > 1, pbx
f
r > 1, pgx
f
r 6 1
prxb > 1, pgxb > 1, pb(xr + xg) 6 1 prxmb > 1, pgx
m
b 6 1, prx
f
b 6 1, pgx
f
b > 1
prxg 6 1, pbxg > 1, pg(xr + xb) > 1 prxmg > 1, pbx
m
g > 1, prx
f




This set of inequalities contains all the necessary information to check whether or not
this choice is consistent with the Collective Axiom of Revealed Preference.
Using the necessary conditions from the Collective Axiom we can now readily
check the consistency of each type Ξ ∈ X. Since we use necessary conditions for collec-
tive rationality, we consider a hypothetical household composition Ξ to be not consis-
tent with the collective model and the stable preference assumption if Ξ 6∈ X0 and not
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consistent with the collective model at all if Ξ 6∈ X0 ∪X1. This can be checked using the
encoded inequalities for hypothetical household type. Once we have classified these
paths we obtain every possible type in the heterogeneous population of households.
Computation and Inference
In Section 2.3 we discussed the characterization of choices and constructed the type
space. In what follows, we will discuss how to check rationality of each type and how
to relate this type characterization to observed choice probabilities in each period and
construct a test statistic, which allows us to test the stable preference assumption or
to empirically distinguish the collective model under the stable preference assumption
from a non-collective alternative or an irrational population.
Since with increasing periods, the complexity of checking the axiom increases ex-
ponentially (order O(2N)) due to the necessity of pair-wise comparison of all periods
we implement a tree crawling algorithm that takes all combinations of choices in an
expanding window of periods (levels). Intuitively if after checking the e.g. first two
periods we already find a path to be irrational, there is no need to check all the child
branches of the subtree. For a given level of the tree, we construct a graph representing
preference relations which we immediately get from our encoded patches for which
we have (xrspt = −1 ⇐⇒ xrspt 6 xrtpt = 1) ⇒ xtRr0xs. Given this preference relation
Rr0 for each r = {c,m, f}, we can construct transitive closures Rf and Rm by applying the
Warshall algorithm, of which our Haskell implementation can be found in Appendix
2.A.
Example (cont.). Graphs for the all required preference relations
R0 =
0 1 00 0 0
1 0 0
 Rm0 =
0 1 00 0 1
0 0 0
 Rf0 =





0 1 10 0 1
0 0 0
 Rf =
0 0 11 0 0
0 0 0
 .
In this example we are dealing with a preference relation Rm0 of a person who prefers
good one over good two and good two over good three. Thus he must also prefer
good one over good three, for which there is not contradicting revelation of prefer-
ences. Thus this person is rational. The preference relation of Rf0 also represents a
rational person, who prefers good one over good three and good two over good one.
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Note that this implies that both individuals prefer good one over good three, but aggre-
gate household consumption represented by Rc0 revealed that that the household chose
good three over good one; a violation of the collective axiom of revealed preferences.
Using a graph representation of the preference relations, the CARP can be checked
by directly applying standard boolean logic on the elements of the preference rela-
tion. Once we have classified each possible type as rational under the stable preference
assumption or rational using only the necessary conditions imposed on aggregate con-
sumption, or not collectively rational at all we can encode every household of the het-
erogeneous population as one of the |X| types.
Example. In our three-good economy we have |X0| = 2,996 fully characterized house-
hold types who are collectively rational under the stable preference assumption. |X1| =
475,136 are consistent with the collective axiom based on the necessary conditions us-
ing only aggregate household consumption data. In total we have |X| = 2,097,152 types.
This leaves us with about 22.7% collectively rational types. From this we should not
necessarily conclude a restrictive nature of the collective model, since for a given range
of budget planes only a subset of the total choice set would actually be feasible (e.g.
have positive demands).
In order to link our hypothetical types to actual observed data we use the result
of McFadden & Richter [1991]; McFadden [2005] who show that the question of ra-
tionality of a heterogeneous population boils down to whether or not we can find a
convex combination of rational choice types characterized by columns of a matrix A
that rationalizes observed choice probabilities π in the following way:
Definition 2.2. Collectively rational heterogeneous population
A population is rational if there exists a vector ν ∈ ∆|X0| which satisfies Aν = π
where ∆M is the M-dimensional probability simplex.
In order to construct such a matrix representation A, based on which we can con-
duct statistical inference, we consider a matrix with
∑
r∈{c,m,f} |X
r| rows and |X0| columns,
where |Xr| is the number of choices a household can make under a given composition.
Now we split all columns A,m withm ∈ I|X0| of the matrix A into 3 blocks of respective
length |Xc|, |Xm| and |Xf| and denote each block by A
r,,m. If household type m ∈ I|X0|
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picks option j under composition r ∈ {c,m, f} then Ar,j,m = 1 and zero otherwise. In
the graph interpretation of the type space which was discussed in Section 2.2, a block
represents a class or cluster in the graph. For a given class and a given path where the
latter is represented by a column of the matrix A, a row value of 1 indicates the active
node within that path.
The second ingredient is a vector of observed choice probabilities which we observe
by mapping observed continuous consumption onto the defined type space for each
household i ∈ IN. Thus we can define the vector π with
∑
r∈{c,m,f} |X
r| rows in which
we collect observed choice probabilities. Partitioning π the same way as a column Am,




ξ∈Xr 1 {ξi = ξ} where Xr is the households’ choice space under
composition r ∈ {c,m, f} as defined above and ξi is the encoded observed choice of
household i ∈ IN, which can be either single or couple.
Example (cont.). In our example the cardinality of Xr is |Xr| =
∏
t∈IT Jt = 4 ∗ 4 ∗ 4 = 64
for r ∈ {m, f} representing single males and single females, respectively. For couples we
have to store double-sums for which we have JT+κ = 23 different possibilities with κ =
1
2
(T−1)(T−2) = 1which results in
∏
t∈IT+κ Jt = 4∗4∗4∗8 = 512 choices. Hence we obtain
a matrix Awith 512+ 64+ 64 = 640 rows and 2,996 columns representing rational types
under the stable preference assumption. The vector π is a vector of choice probabilities
of the population of the same dimension: 640. While this might seem high-dimensional
we note that this matrix is very sparse. In fact it only has 3|X0| = 3∗2,996 non-zero items.
The way the matrix A is constructed ν is not point-identified since A is far from
full column rank since |X0| >>
∑
r∈{c,m,f} |X
r|. However, we can base our test upon
distances from the observed choice probabilities to the choice set representing the null
hypothesis using McFadden & Richter [1991]; McFadden [2005] who provide a very
useful equivalent formulation of the problem, namely:
∃ν ∈ ∆|X0| s.t. Aν = π ⇐⇒ JN := N min
η∈{Aν|ν>0}
(π− η)TΩ(π− η) = 0
where Ω is a square weighting matrix. This is a quadratic problem with first-order
cone constraint and its solution will be zero if and only if a ν rationalizes observed
choice probabilities of a heterogeneous population. To see why ν > 0 is sufficient for it
to be on the probability simplex, note that for any solution of the quadratic problem we
have η = π and since J = ιTπ = ιTAν = JιTν by construction, we get ιTν = 1. The factor
N on the right hand side is a normalization used to construct a test-statistic based
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on the solution JN, which is unique and thus identified. In other words, we project
observed choice probabilities π onto the linear cone represented by the constraint C =
{Aν : ν > 0}, and use the distance given by the projection residuals as a basis for our
statistical inference in which we obtain the critical value based on a bootstrap. As such,
the projection residuals are calculated very often and it will prove useful to rewrite JN
as the solution of a non-negative least squares problem and implement a fast algorithm
for solving it.
It is easy to show that JN can be expressed as the solution of the non-negative least
squares problem (NNLS) such that
min
η∈{Aν|ν>ν}




where Ã = LTA, b̃ = LT (π − Aν) and L is a lower diagonal matrix from the Cholesky
decomposition Ω = LLT .
There exist a range of approaches to solve such a program, including the widely-
used7 Lawson & Hanson [1995] algorithm, Landwebers gradient descent method [Jo-
hansson et al., 2006] and sequential coordinate-wise optimization [Franc et al., 2005].
The latter two are more efficient than the general sequential quadratic programming
approach, requiring only O(k) computations instead of O(k3), where k = |X0| is the
number of variables (rational types) in the NNLS problem. Due to the high dimension-
ality of the problem we use the Landweber method which we implement manually, in
order to leverage the sparsity of the matrix A.
Since ν is not point-identified we have to follow a partial identification approach for
inference. We will use the τN-tightened bootstrap estimator proposed by Kitamura &
Stoye [2013]. Tightening is required since many of the inequality constraints describing
the cone will be binding and it is well known that the bootstrap is not valid if the
parameter is on the boundary of the parameter space [Andrews, 2000]. The estimation
procedure can be summarized as follows. First we estimate η by projecting observed
choice probabilities onto a τN-tightened linear cone constraint by minimizing
η̂τN = arg min
η∈{Aν|ν>ιτN}
(π̂− η)TΩ(π̂− η)
and denoting the value of the quadratic function of at η̂τN as Ĵ
τN
N .
The solution is then used to calculate for each bootstrapped π̂b, where b ∈ IB and
B is the number of bootstrap repetitions, the centered choice probabilities π̂bτN = π̂
b −
7This algorithm is used by Matlab (lsqnonneg) and SciPy (optimize.nnls).
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π̂ − η̂τN which we then use to approximate the empirical distribution FJN of J
τN
N by





Then under some weak regularity conditions [Kitamura & Stoye, 2013] the boot-













= 1− α. (2.1)
It should be noted, that we chose a slightly different tightening sequence than the




where N = Nf ∧Nm ∧Nc
is the minimum number of available observations per household composition Nr for
r ∈ {c,m, f} in the sample. This differs from the original proposition by the factor 1
H
.
To see why one might otherwise run into problems for finite samples, note that τN is
constrained to satisfy
√
NτN → ∞. In addition to this if ν > ιτN, by construction we
have J = ιTAν > ιTAτN = JιT ιτN = JHτN. Thus, combining these two conditions we
get 1
H
> τN > 1√N , which is not always feasible for a given sample size and number of




but holds by construction if we divide it by H.
Simulations
In this section we investigate the properties of our proposed test in a simulation
setting. In particular we are interested in how much power it has to detect a violation
of the stable preference assumption and whether or not it has a reasonable frequency
of false positives.
Since specifying a parametric continuous demand system requires at least five goods
to impose the SNR(S-1) condition on the Slutsky matrix and distinguish the collective
model from the unitary model, we will not sample continuous demands as functions
of prices and individual budget constraints, but rather draw our sample directly from
the discrete choice space8. This should be interpreted as a continuous uniform distri-
bution of choices on different budget planes, where the relative prices are such that
the partitions of the budget planes are of equal size. Recall that we test this against
the set of households which are consistent with the necessary conditions of the col-
lective axioms based on aggregate consumption but not consistent when single data
8A revealed preference based setting allows us to test the restrictions of the model with only three
goods [Cherchye et al., 2007], whereas Browning & Chiappori [1998] need five goods.
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and the stable preference assumption is added. This set is denoted by X1 and we
have Xcollective = X0 ∪ X1. If we reject the null hypothesis that both the collective
axiom and the stable preference assumption holds, by excluding all irrational paths
X \ Xcollective, we must conclude that the stable preference assumption does not hold.
To control the proportion of households for whom this is the case (our data generating
process) we introduce the parameter p which specifies the probability9 that a partic-
ular choice is both collectively rational and satisfies the stable preference assumption
p := P(x ∈ X0). By only considering collectively rational choices in our simulations we
thus have 1− p = P(x 6∈ X0) = P(x ∈ X1) by construction.
Our simulation setting is as follows. We consider S = 100 samples of size N ∈
{500, 1000, 2000} where N = Nf = Nm = Nc such that N = 3N in a minimal setting of
T = 3 periods which we construct by drawing bNpc indices from the space of collec-
tively rational choice paths X0 for which the stable preference assumption holds and
dN(1 − p)e indices from the space of collectively rational types X1 which does not sat-
isfy the assumption. Based on a sample of choice paths, we then calculate the choice
probabilities π̂ accordingly. For estimation we only use the marginal distribution of
choices of each sample of household compositions and draw B = 100 samples from the
respective empirical distributions (i.e. with replacement) to calculate πbτN and estimate
the empirical distribution of the test statistic JτNN,b. These simulations are repeated for
p ∈ {0.75, 0.85, 0.9, 0.95, 0.975, 0.99, 1.00}.
Figure 2.2 shows the power of our test against the the non-stable preference alter-
native as a function of p, with sample-size N = 500 for the left hand side graph, and
N = 1000 for the right hand side graph, respectively. We use monotone cubic splines
to interpolate between the actual simulation results, which are marked as solid dots.
To be more precise, the respective functions refer to sample rejection frequencies using
the rejection rule J 7→ 1
{
J > F̂−1JN (1− α)
}
for α ∈ {0.01, 0.05, 0.10}. In addition to this, we
also observe that as N increases the power of our test improves and is able to correctly
reject the hypothesis of a collectively rational population already at small proportions
p.
The intercepts of these functions should be interpreted as the proportion of false
positives (type I errors), since they correspond to the case where everyone is ratio-
9This rationality parameter is similar as for example λ in Dette et al. [2016] which specifies the popu-
lation’s deviation from Slutsky symmetry.

































Figure 2.2: Power function for N = 1,500 (l.h.s) and N = 3,000 (r.h.s.)
nal. One might expect that for a correctly sized test the empirical rejection frequencies
should tend to α. However, given our partial identification procedure we have a com-
posite null hypothesis, i.e. the probability of a type I error should be at most α as
defined in equation (2.1). To see this note that every vector of "true" choice frequencies
denoted by π0 that is in the interior of the cone will have projection residuals of length
zero. Bootstrapping out of π̂ which tends to π0 using the usual regularity properties
could then lead to a confidence interval which is always entirely in the interior of the
cone and we would never wrongly reject the null hypothesis. This also implies that in
such a case our bootstrap distribution is degenerate and has mass one at point zero.
In our Monte Carlo setting in the case where p = 1.0we randomly select types from
the type-space X0, satisfying collective rationality. Thus the "true" parameter vector ν0
is assumed to have a uniform distribution over the probability simplex and the worst
case – namely to get a ν such that π0 = Aν is on the boundary of the cone with respect
to any of its dimensions – occurs with measure zero.
Thus, in order to evaluate whether the size of our test is correct under the test’s
minimax strategy, we have to construct a worst case. For this, note that the test is con-
structed in a way that considers hypothetical types by taking combinations of possible
household choice behaviour per price regime over a range of price regimes. To fix no-
tation, we will call two collectively rational choice paths similar if there is at least one
element in the product space spanned by these two paths which is an element of the
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space of collectively rational paths that do not satisfy the stable preference hypothesis.
We will then construct worst cases by specifying a distribution over n0 such similar
paths. To make sure that our π0 is on the boundary of the cone in all dimensions, i.e.
on the cusp, we shift the cone by manually controlling the tightening parameter τN
according to this distribution. Figure 2.3 shows simulation results for two such worst























Figure 2.3: Type I error for n0 = 5 (l.h.s) and n0 = 2 (r.h.s.) worst-case paths
While both are asymptotically valid from a theoretical point of view, it is not sur-
prising that for finite samples the size for the case with a larger number of worst case
paths behaves worse than the case in which there are fewer worst case paths. Since the
properties of the test are based on an asymptotic argument, we should see the empir-
ical frequency of false positives tending to the respective α which define the rejection
rules and are plotted on the x-axis. The results are what one would expect, with all
sample sizes being reasonably accurate. Since in a well-behaved test false-positives are
by definition rather rare events, in order to minimize simulation uncertainty, we in-
creased the number of Monte Carlo repetitions to S = 500 and the number of bootstrap
repetitions to B = 200, which greatly increased computational complexity due to the
high dimensionality of the testing problem.
Conclusion
In this paper we use tools from both the discrete non-parametric collective con-
sumption literature and the one from stochastic random utility modeling to construct
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a test of the stable preference assumption which is often used in collective model, stat-
ing that consumption preferences do not change as individuals transition between re-
lationship states. For this we constructed hypothetical household types that satisfy
revealed preferences restrictions the collective model imposes on observed household
demands and showed how we can exploit information from single households in or-
der to non-parametrically test the stable preference hypothesis. We provided simula-
tion evidence that our test has power against the alternative hypothesis of non-stable
preferences. In addition to this, we discussed worst cases and showed that the size of
the test is correct under such scenarios. A natural extension of this paper would be to
impose the single preference assumption and use it to identify primitives of the collec-
tive model such as the sharing rule. In addition to this, we think that the assumption
of time-stability of preferences can be relaxed in this context when projecting observed
continuous demands of households of different compositions onto the common bud-
get planes using panel data, by allowing for additive idiosyncratic and period-specific
errors in the structural demand functions for which general identification results exist
in the literature [Evdokimov, 2010].
Algorithms
type PrefRel = [[Bool]]
warshall :: Int -> Int -> PrefRel -> Bool
warshall start end graph = adjacent (start, end, length graph) graph
adjacent :: (Int, Int, Int) -> PrefRel -> Bool
adjacent (i, j, 0) g = g !! (i-1) !! (j-1)
adjacent (i, j, k) g = adjacent (i, j, k-1) g || (adjacent (i, k, k-1) g && adjacent (k, j, k-1) g)
transitiveClosure :: PrefRel -> PrefRel
transitiveClosure adj = toLists $ uncurry matrix dim (\ (i, j) -> warshall i j adj)
where dim = (length adj, head (map length adj)
Algorithm 2.1: Warshall Algorithm
CHAPTER 3
Smooth Transition GARCH Models
Introduction
With increasing regulatory efforts and new standards for determining capital re-
quirements for financial institutions, methods for estimating conditional quantiles and
conditional volatilities have been getting significantly more attention. While a vast
amount of models for conditional variance has been developed with Engle [1982] and
Bollerslev [1986] leading the way, only very few models exist for directly estimat-
ing conditional quantiles, the main ones being the conditional quantile ARCH model
[Koenker & Zhao, 1996] and the Conditional Autogregressive Value at Risk (CAViaR)
model by Engle & Manganelli [2004] which can be interpreted as the conditional quan-
tile analogue of the GARCH model. For a comprehensive discussion of different value
at risk estimators and their respective merits see Xiao et al. [2015]. Although there is a
direct link between the two approaches, calculating the τth conditional quantile from a
conditional variance estimate usually requires making a distributional assumption on
the error terms. A wrong choice of distribution can influence the estimates and their
interpretation to a large extent, which is particularly harmful for tail estimation such as
the Value at Risk. On the other hand, it is often seen in financial time series that dynam-
ics with respect to positive and negative news are different, which can be theoretically
justified by the leverage effect and volatility feedbacks [Andersen & Bollerslev, 2006]
or behavioural factors such as loss aversion [McQueen & Vorkink, 2004]. In addition
to this, time series may be subject to cyclical behaviour or time-dependent frequencies
which are not captured by a linear model [Tong & Lim, 1980]. Thus it is beneficial and
will improve the accuracy of our forecasts if we allow for such asymmetric dynamic
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behaviour. A very general approach to model asymmetric responses to past shocks is
the smooth transition approach of Terasvirta [1992], which includes a threshold model
[Tong & Lim, 1980] as a limit case.
In this paper, we introduce a smooth transition general autoregressive conditional
quantile model in which we allow conditional quantiles to follow an autoregressive
process that also depends on past conditional volatilities as in Engle & Manganelli
[2004]. We allow for asymmetric responses by specifying two regimes, each repre-
sented by its own parameter vector. The active regime is determined by a transition
function characterized by the location and scale parameters and a transition variable
that can be both a lag of the dependent variable or an exogenous variable. Our pa-
per is related to Xiao & Koenker [2009] who provide a method to estimate the CAViaR
model without regime-switching by employing a three-stage procedure, first estimat-
ing an ARCH approximation of the model, followed by a minimum-distance estima-
tion step to calculate conditional volatilities, which are then in a final step used for
the estimation of the CAViaR model’s parameters. The model and estimation proce-
dure we propose can be seen as an extension of this to a regime switching-framework.
In addition to this, we deviate from the original one as we merge the author’s first
and second steps using composite quantile regression [Zou & Yuan, 2008], which al-
lows us to eliminate the second step by directly estimating global parameters defining
conditional volatilities. Conditional upon the latter, we can then estimate the CAViaR
parameters by using standard quantile regression techniques as in Koenker & Bassett
[1978].
The idea of regime switching models in its most general form is well established
in the context of conditional variance estimation, see Li & Li [1996], Gonzales-Rivera
[1998], and Anderson et al. [1999] who use a self-exciting threshold, a smooth transi-
tion, and an asymmetric non-linear smooth transition specification, respectively. While
some empirical research has been done on the topic of modelling regime-switching
conditional quantiles, such as White et al. [2008] and Huang et al. [2009] who allow for
asymmetric responses of autoregressive conditional quantiles, but who do not provide
any theory, it seems that, compared to its conditional variance counterpart, the possi-
bilities to model asymmetric responses of time series to positive and negative shocks
are rather limited in the quantile regression framework. Although Engle & Man-
ganelli [2004] propose an asymmetric version of the CAViaR model, namely a Glosten-
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Jagannathan-Runkle (GJR) specification [Glosten et al., 1993], this only accounts for
the case where the regime-switch is a threshold located at zero and also disregards any
asymmetric impacts of past conditional quantiles, for which e.g. Nam et al. [2001] have
found empirical evidence in economic and financial time series. An extension of this
threshold model which also allows for two regimes with respect to past conditional
quantiles is Gerlach et al. [2011], who use Bayesian estimation techniques to estimate
the Value at Risk. Cai & Xu [2009] on the other hand take a somewhat different route
and propose a nonparametric estimator which allows for a time-varying coefficient for
Value at Risk estimation.
Compared to the threshold model a smooth-transition approach, as employed here,
facilitates a higher degree of flexibility, allowing both the location and scale of the tran-
sition function to be model parameters. In addition to this, using a continuous tran-
sition function allows for an arbitrary combination of two regimes, which can also be
interpreted as a range of regimes and can therefore not only account for different im-
pacts below or above a certain changepoint, but also for different magnitudes around
it. Further, compared to modelling conditional variances, quantile regression has the
benefit of not requiring a distributional assumption about the innovations of the time
series. While there exists a quantile regression estimation procedure for a quadratic
form of conditional variance [Lee & Noh, 2013] we will assume a linear structure of
conditional volatility instead [Taylor, 1986; Schwert, 1990]. This has proven to be less
sensitive to outliers as shocks enter the conditional volatility in an absolute rather than
in a squared form. It is well established that in GARCH models the latter leads to an
over-prediction of future volatility levels [Klaassen, 2002]. Another benefit of such a
linear specification is that, instead of requiring the existence of the 6th moment in the
case of a regime-switching model with a quadratic form, we only require the (4 + δ)th
finite moment for our innovation distribution. A further advantage of quantile regres-
sion over conditional variance estimation results from the fact that maximum likeli-
hood estimation of these highly non-linear models is avoided. For regime-switching
conditional variance models, maximum likelihood estimation often faces serious con-
vergence issues, especially if outliers are present, such that convergence is sensitive
to the initial parameter value and the choice of the transition function. Some of these
issues are investigated in Section 3.5. For a rigorous discussion thereof we refer the
reader to Chan & McAleer [2003] and references therein.
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Finally it should be clarified that the goal of this paper is to model asymmetries
within time series, rather than structural breaks. These two approaches share a lot of
similarities since they both allow for multiple parameter regimes. In structural break
models however a transition from one regime to another usually occurs only once,
whereas in self-exciting models the active parameter regime constantly switches de-
pending on the transition variable. While technically the time index could be used as
an exogenous transition variable in our approach and as such nest a break point model
as a special case, it is not the purpose of this paper to detect structural breaks in time
series.
This paper is structured into two main parts. The first part starts by specifying the
regime-switching CAViaR model in Section 3.2, followed by a description of the pro-
posed estimation procedure in Section 3.3 and its asymptotic properties in Section 3.4.
This is followed by a computational part consisting of a comprehensive Monte Carlo
study in Section 3.5 and an empirical application in Section 3.6 which demonstrates
how the method can be used for empirical research.
Model Specification
Let ut be a stochastic process defined on the real line, where the stationary sample
process {ut}
n
t=1 is observed and follows the standard conditional scale model
ut = σt (zt,θ0) εt, (3.1)
where {ε}t are i.i.d. distributed with mean zero and finite variance according to a right-
continuous distribution function Fε (x) = P (εt 6 x) and σt : Ft−1 × Θ2 −→ R+ with
Ft−1 denoting the σ-algebra generated by the process {us}
t−1
s=−∞ up to time t− 1 and Θ2
as the parameter space. We will denote past observations up to t − 1 by zt, which are
assumed to be independent of εt.
A specific structural assumption for σt(zt,θ) is, for example, the standard quadratic
GARCH(p,q) specification with zt = (σ2t−1, . . . , σ2t−p, u2t−1, . . . , u2t−q) and parameters
















In the conditional quantile model we propose, it will prove useful to specify the fol-
lowing absolute value alternative of the GARCH(p,q) model using
zt = z
pq
t := (σt−1, . . . , σt−p, |ut−1|, . . . , |ut−q|)
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and θ as defined above






γj |ut−j| . (3.3)
In order to introduce regime-dependency, it is assumed that the true conditional


















in which each regime is allowed to have different dynamics characterized by regime-
specific parameter vectors θI and θII, respectively. The function G : R2 × R+ −→ R ⊆
[0,1] represents the transition function that depends on the transition variable modeled
as a known function of past observations ξ : Ft−1 −→ R and is parametrized by loca-
tion parameter ζ ∈ R and scale parameter η ∈ R+ determining the active regime. For
notational convenience we will stack the transition parameters to the vector ζ = [ζ, η].
We restrict the function ξ to be time-homogeneous and will refer to it as a transition
variable ξt := ξ(zt) even though any scalar deterministic function of past data zt ∈ Ft−1
can be specified. One example, in case of daily data, would be the last week’s average
returns ξ(zt) = 15
∑5
j=1 ut−j. In the standard quadratic asymmetric non-linear smooth
transition GARCH model (which we will denote by ANST-GARCH) [Anderson et al.,
1999] σt(zt,θr) takes the form (3.2). For the model and estimation procedure we pro-
pose, we will however assume that the conditional volatility process for each regime
follows the absolute value form defined in (3.3).
Assumption 3.1. The transition function must satisfy the following properties:
lim
ξ→−∞G(ξ, ζ, η)→ 0 and limξ→+∞G(ξ, ζ, η)→ 1
is monotone, measurable and Lipschitz. Further ∂dG/∂(ζ, η)d exists almost everywhere
for d = 1,2, is bounded and Lipschitz with respect to ζ and η. In addition to this ∂G
∂(ζ,η)
is monotone or Lipschitz in ξ.
Standard choices for the transition function include:
(i) the logistic distribution function as used in Terasvirta [1992] for the Logistic Smooth
Transition Autoregressive (LSTAR) model
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(ii) the scale-invariant indicator function which reduces the model to the threshold
version as in Li & Li [1996]
Gthreshold : R2 −→ {0, 1} : (ξ, ζ) 7−→ 1 {ξ > ζ} ,
(iii) and a bounded linear function with location centered between two cut-off points
Glinear : R2 ×R+ −→ [0,1] :























ξ ∈ [ζ+ 1
2
η,∞)} .
Our theoretical results are based on the class of transition functions defined by the
restrictions in Assumption 3.1. While there is no doubt that other functions also satisfy
Assumption 3.1, for the empirical part of the study we will restrict the set of transition




. In addition to this we will empirically evaluate what
happens if the DGP follows the limit case with Gthreshold. We will sometimes abbreviate
the transition function as Gt(ζ) = G(ξt, ζ, η).
Having defined the ANST-GARCH model, the shift to the quantile specification is
straightforward. First, note that the τth conditional quantile of ut is defined by
Qut (τ|Ft−1) := inf
{
x ∈ R : Fut|Ft−1 (x) > τ
}
,
with Fut|Ft−1 : R −→ [0,1] being the conditional distribution function of ut given all past
observations such that Fut|Ft−1 (x) = P (ut 6 x|Ft−1). It follows for the model defined in
equation (3.1) that







Using this result and multiplying the ANST-GARCH model from equation (3.4) by
F−1ε (τ), the final asymmetric non-linear smooth transition generalized autoregressive
conditional quantile model (ANST-GACQ) is obtained for r ∈ {I, II}:























where the parameters βr0(τ) := βr0F−1ε (τ) and γrj(τ) := γrjF−1ε (τ) are local in a sense that
they are dependent on τ and βri are global coefficients operating on the latent past
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conditional quantiles for all1 i ∈ I1,p, j ∈ I1,q and r ∈ {I, II}. The transition parameters
ζ are global as well. This model can be seen as a generalization of the symmetric
absolute value CAViaR specification in Engle & Manganelli [2004]. The main difference
of CAViaR type models compared to GARCH type models is the direct estimation of
the conditional quantilesQut(τ|Ft−1). In what will be discussed in the next session, we




∈ Θτ2, with Θ
τ
2 being a compact












To sum up, asymmetric dynamic behaviour is the result of different parameter
regimes rather than a different error distribution in each regime. Since quantiles of
the latter are subject to estimation, any symmetric or asymmetric distribution function
of ε is permitted for our approach, as long as it satisfies certain regularity properties. A
different error disribution would in general be feasible for the threshold model since in
this model only one regime at a time is "active". With the smooth transition approach
we follow here, identification of an additional error distribution governing a second
regime is less clear since the quantile of a linear combination of two innovations is not
necessarily the linear combination of the respective quantiles. We will thus leave this
for future research.
Estimation Procedure
It is difficult to estimate the CAViaR model, as specified in the previous section,
due to the dependence on past conditional quantiles. In this section, we will propose
a two-step estimation procedure that is related to the three-stage sieve approximation
idea of Xiao & Koenker [2009]. In contrast to their single regime model, we are however
faced with the additional complication of estimating parameters from two regimes and
the corresponding parametrized (location and scale) transition function. The idea of
the estimation procedure is to first approximate the conditional volatility process as
defined in equation (3.3) by an ARCH(∞)-approximation and then use the structure
of our model defined in equation (3.5) to estimate the CAViaR parameters and the
transition parameters in a second stage. While it is assumed that the transition function
G ∈ G is known a priori, it is not always the case that our objective function is convex
in its parameters. In order to estimate the parameters of the model as described above,
we therefore employ both quantile regression techniques and an exhaustive machine
1For notational convenience the general index set running from a ∈ N to b ∈ N shall be defined as
Ia,b := (a, . . . , b) ⊆ N.
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search.
















with zpqt (θ) = (σt−1(θ), . . . , σt−p(θ), |ut−1|, . . . , |ut−q|) ∈ Ft−1, where σt(θ) has the struc-
ture defined in (3.3).
The estimation of conditional quantiles would be a linear programming exercise,
if it were not for the dependence on the latent conditional volatility process σt, which
in turn dynamically depends on the parameters θ that have to be estimated. To tackle
this issue, we make use of a two-step procedure.
In a first step, each regime’s GARCH(p,q) process in equation (3.4) is inverted to
ARCH(∞) and estimated using an ARCH(m) representation, where m ∈ N, in order











i, where L is the lag-operator such that ut−1 = Lut
for any t ∈ I1,n.
Assumption 3.2. The polynomials Ar(L) and Br(L) have no common factors and their
roots lie outside the unit disc of the complex plane: for r ∈ {I, II} and |φ| 6 1, it holds
that Ar(φ) 6= 0 and Br(φ) 6= 0.
Hence both GARCH(p,q) regimes defined in equation (3.3) can be inverted sepa-
rately:
Ar(L)σrt = B
r(L) |ut| ⇐⇒ σrt = Ar−1(L)Br(L) |ut| = αr0 +
∞∑
j=1
αrj |ut−j−1| , (3.8)
where the coefficients αj for j ∈ I1,m decrease at a geometric rate. Thus there exists con-
stants b < 1 and c such that |αj| < cbj. Consequently each conditional volatility regime
defined in equation (3.8) can be approximated by a finite dimensional ARCH(m) pro-
















with αrj(τ) := αrjF−1ε (τ) for all j ∈ I0,m and r ∈ {I, II} and where the approximation is up
to a tight sequence of order bm as specified above. In order to estimate the conditional
volatility process σt, we need to identify and estimate αr = [αr1, . . . , αrm]T separately
from F−1ε (τ). For this reason, we will not only estimate single conditional quantiles
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but exploit information from a range of quantiles2 (τ1, . . . , τK) and employ composite





















with zmt = (1, |ut−1| , . . . , |ut−m|)
T , αr = (αr0, . . . , αrm)
T for r ∈ {I, II}, q = [q1, . . . , qK]T







]T ∈ Θ1, which is assumed to




























and we can estimate the CAViaR model according to equation (3.6) and (3.7) for a single
quantile by minimizing






















]T ∈Θτ2, t0 = [(m+p)∨q] + 1 and zpq as defined above.
For given location and scale parameters, this transformation allows estimation using
standard quantile autoregression techniques [Koenker & Zhao, 1996]. Note that, we do
not make use of the estimated quantiles q̂n from the first stage, and also re-estimate, the
location and scale parameters, which we denote by ζ(τ) in the second stage to indicate
the estimation jointly with the local parameters.
Neither of the objective functions (3.9) and (3.11) are convex in the scale parame-
ter. In addition to this, the quantile loss function is not differentiable which further
complicates our analysis. For this reason we have to use a grid search over the space
of feasible scale parameters in the first stage in which we use a smoothed version of
the objective function ρ which we define as ρ∗(u) = ρ(u) if |u| > δ and u2/δ otherwise,
with smoothing parameter δ. This approach is commonly used in the literature (see
e.g. Huber [1964]; Zheng [2011]) and allows us to estimate the parameters for a given
gridpoint using gradient based methods. For the second stage we use the standard
quantile loss function ρ combined with a grid search over all feasible location/scale
pairs. We define feasible pairs to satisfy the assumption that we do in fact observe
2Xiao & Koenker [2009] solve this by first estimating the parameters for each τ and then exploit their




ε (τ) in additional minimum distance estimation step.
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two regimes in our sample and will informally denote this subspace as Z, which will
be made explicit in the empirical section. The reason that we use a two dimensional
grid in the second stage, as opposed to the one dimensional grid in the first stage is
that we exploit the fact that for a given location/scale pair we have a linear quantile
regression problem which we can estimate directly by employing a standard interior






n, ζ̂n, η̂n)← (∞, 0, 0, 0, 0)
for all η ∈
{
η1, . . . , ηkη
}
do
Define G(ξt, ζ, η) using ξt ← ξ(zt) for given scale η as a function of ζ
Estimate α̂In,kη , α̂
II
n,kη
, q̂kη , ζ̂kη and obtain loss l1kη according to (3.9) by smoothed
CRQ







n, ζ̂n, η̂n)← (l1kη , α̂
I
n,kη
, α̂IIn,kη , ζ̂kη , η)
end if
end for
Calculate σ̂t according to equation (3.10) using α̂n





n, ζ̂n, η̂n)← (∞, 0, 0, 0, 0)
for all (ζ, η) ∈
{




η1, . . . , ηkη
}
∩ Z do
Calculate G(ξt, ζ, η) using ξt ← ξ(zt) for given location ζ and scale η
Estimate θ̂In,kζ,η , θ̂
II
n,kζ,η
and obtain loss l2kζ,η according to (3.11) by linear RQ







n, ζ̂n, η̂n)← (l2kζ,η , θ̂
I
n,kζ,η
, θ̂IIn,kζ,η , ζ, η)
end if
end for
Algorithm 3.1: Two-stage estimation procedure
What remains to be addressed is the selection ofK and the specification of (τ1, . . . , τK).
Here we face a trade-off. On the one hand, we would like to learn from as many quan-
tiles of the distribution of ut|Ft−1 as possible. On the other hand, the global parame-
ters θj for j ∈ I1,2(p+q+1) are not identified at the median due to the model structure
θj(τ) = F
−1
ε (τ)θj. For finite samples we will thus introduce extra noise if we include
quantiles around τ = 0.5, due to this "weak" identification problem. While a data-
driven optimal selection of a vector of τ’s would be feasible, this goes beyond the scope
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of this paper. We refer the interested reader to Zhao & Xiao [2014]. In the Monte Carlo
section we will however present the results of experiments with different choices of δ,
where δ is the width of the window in the vector of τ’s around the median that is left
out for estimation.
Asymptotic Results
In this section, the two-stage estimation procedure is shown to yield consistent and
asymptotically normal estimates for the proposed ANST-GACQ model. Throughout
this section it is assumed that in addition to the previously defined assumptions the
following statements hold:
Assumption 3.3. The errors εt are i.i.d. distributed with zero mean and finite variance
σ2 = Var(εt) < +∞. Its distribution function Fε(x) ∈ C1(R) has strictly positive density
fε(x) at F−1ε (τk) for all k ∈ I1,K, which is uniformly bounded by a finite constant M and
Lipschitz continuous.
Assumption 3.4. The conditional distribution function Fut|Ft−1(x) ∈ C1(R) has strictly
positive density fut|Ft−1(x) at F
−1
ut|Ft−1
(τk) for all k ∈ I1,K, which is uniformly bounded
with finite constant M and Lipschitz continuous.
Assumption 3.5. There exists a small positive constant δ > 0 such that E |utGt(ζ0)|2+δ <
+∞, E |ut|2+δ < +∞ and E ∣∣∣ut ∂Gt(ζ0)∂ζ ∣∣∣2+δ < +∞. In addition to this, ut is β-mixing with








2/δ < +∞where βs = β0s−(2+δ).















evaluated at a0 has minimum and maximum eigenvalues denoted by λn,min and λn,max
satisfying lim
n→∞ inf λn,min > 0 and limn→∞ sup λn,max < +∞. In addition to this we assume
that E[Gt(ζ) zmt , (1 − Gt(ζ))zmt , zmt (Gt(ζ) − Gt(ζ0))]T [Gt(ζ) zmt , (1 − Gt(ζ))zmt , zmt (Gt(ζ) −
Gt(ζ0))] has full rank for any ζ 6= ζ0.
Assumption 3.7. The number of lags for the ARCH(m)-approximation satisfies both
log(n)/m→ 0 and mn− 12 → 0.
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Assumption 3.2-3.5 and the fact that the transition function has range R ⊆ [0,1] en-
sure that the process ut is stationary and weakly dependent. The moment assumptions
on ut, utGt(ζ0) and ut∂Gt(ζ)/∂ζ are required for a weakly dependent central limit the-
orems. We assume with out loss of generality that the median of ε is normalized to
zero such that F−1ε (1/2) = 0. A detailed discussion of mixing-requirements of regime
switching models can be found in Carrasco & Chen [2002]; Meitz & Saikkonen [2008]
and references therein. Note that a sufficient condition for the existence of the finite
(2 + δ) moment of the term ut∂Gt(ζ)/∂ζ is the existence of (4 + δ) moments for ut and
E |∂Gt(ζ)/∂ζ| < ∞. If we have exogenous switching, i.e. if ξt is a different time series,
the existence of (2 + δ) finite moments of ut suffices. Assumption 3.6 is an identifica-
tion assumption which ensures that the two regimes have different conditional volatil-
ity processes, that the data in the two both regimes are not perfectly correlated and
that for the linear transition function, which has slope zero on subsets of its domain,
that with positive probability there is data in both regimes. Assumption 3.7 restricts
the rate of the ARCH(m) approximation, ensuring that we have a sufficient number
of lags, which controls the approximation error. In our empirical application we will
chosem = cn1/4 for some positive constant c > 0. Finally, Assumption 3.8 is a technical
regularity condition that is needed for the sieve estimation in the first stage.
We will now show the asymptotic properties of our proposed estimation proce-
dure. First, we will show that the sieve approximation of both regimes’ underlying
GARCH processes holds and the approximation error due to the mth-order truncation
is bounded in probability.
Theorem 3.1 (Identification and First Stage Consistency). Let aT = [αI,T,αII,T,qT , ζT ]T .
Under Assumptions 3.1-3.8, it holds for n→∞





The following asymptotic normality result of the first stage estimator provides a
preliminary result for the asymptotic characteristics of the interim volatility estimator
and the second stage quantile estimator.
Corollary 3.1 (First Stage Bahadur Representation). Let sk = fε(F−1ε (τk)), sT = [s1, . . . , sK],
qT = [q1, . . . , qK]. Also let α∆ = αI −αII and ᾱ(ζ) = Gt(ζ)αI +(1−Gt(ζ))αII. Then under
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 Gt(ζ0)2 Gt(ζ0) (1−Gt(ζ0))
Gt(ζ0) (1−Gt(ζ0)) (1−Gt(ζ0))
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This completes the first step sieve estimation, concerning the estimates for α, de-
termining the latent process σt defined according to equation (3.10) which we need for
the second step of the estimation. In addition to this we get an asymptotic distribution




t = (1, σ̂t−1, . . . , σ̂t−p−1, |ut−1|, . . . , |ut−q−1|)
we can then estimate the CAViaR parameters θ(τ). The asymptotic theory for the sec-
ond stage involves a non-differentiable objective function and the dependence of the
second stage on the first stage parameters (combination of a Type II an Type IV empiri-
cal process problems in Andrews [1994]). The following two theorems provide consis-
tency and asymptotic normality results of the final ANST-GACQ estimator using the
preliminary results from the first stage.
Theorem 3.2 (Second Stage Consistency). Under Assumptions 3.1-3.8, the second-stage
estimator is
√
n-consistent, that is, for n→∞ and τ ∈ (0,1)∥∥∥θ̂n(τ) − θ0(τ)∥∥∥ = Op(n− 12 ).
Theorem 3.3 (Second Stage Asymptotic Normality). If Assumptions 3.1-3.8 hold, the
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2 if i 6 p+ q+ 1 and j 6 p+ q+ 1




ε (τj))] if i > p+ q+ 1 and j > p+ q+ 1




ε (τ))] otherwise (i > j w.l.o.g).
.
(3.13)
Having shown the necessary theoretical properties of the estimation procedure, the
model is now confronted with data in order to see how it works empirically compared
to its single-regime VaR and regime-switching conditional variance counterparts.
Monte-Carlo Simulations
The following Monte Carlo study is divided into two main parts. First, our pro-
posed asymmetric non-linear smooth transition generalized conditional quantile (ANST-
GACQ) procedure will be analyzed with respect to different specifications and estima-
tion parameters, i.e. different sample sizes, the amount of lags used to approximate
the first stage ARCH(∞) model or the width δ around the median that is excluded
from the composite quantile estimation due to non-identification of the central ten-
dency of the process. Results are then contrasted to the regime switching GARCH
model of Anderson et al. [1999] for a range of error distributions in a second step.
After this, the consequences of misspecifying the transition function are shown, and
finally, the robustness with respect to outliers of these two models is investigated. All
experiments are conducted using Ox [Doornik, 2009] with extensions written in C for
the computationally more intensive parts. The length of the considered time series
is set to n = 1,000, the number of simulations per experiment is s = 100, we esti-
mate a range of k = 9 quantiles with δ = 0.25 and (τ1, τK) = (0.05, 0.95), the trunca-




4 e and the grid size to
SECTION 5 | MONTE-CARLO SIMULATIONS 93
(kζ, kη) = (30, 30). This is kept constant for all subsequent experiments, unless explic-
itly defined otherwise. The true global parameter vector for both processes is chosen to
be θ0 = (βI0, βI1, γI1, βII0 , βII1 , γII1)0 = (0.50, 0.15, 0.60, 0.25, 0.30, 0.15) and the location/scale
parameter pair equals ζ0 = (ζ, η)0 = (0.00, 0.2). This implies that the regimes’ uncon-
ditional variances defined by βr0/(1 − βr1 − γr1) for r ∈ {I, II} are given by 2 and 0.45,
respectively. In addition to this, the parameters are chosen such that they satisfy the
invertibility conditions of both regimes’ GARCH processes. Figure 3.1 shows all three
considered transition functions, evaluated at their true parameters, on the domain of a





















The second part of the experiment focuses on the comparison of the new procedure
with respect to previously established models. The main measure of performance will
rather be the (absolute) prediction error as averaged over the sample and the cover-
age ratio of the estimated 5% value at risk, reported as M(A)PE and coverage, respec-
tively. The coverage ratio is the proportion of observations that falls below the esti-
mated value at risk. By definition, this ratio should be close to τ, for the τ% value at
risk.
In what follows we restrict the grid for both location and scale in the following
way. The location must satisfy ζ ∈ [ζ, ζ̄] with unconditional sample quantiles ζ =
F̂−1ut (0.1) and ζ̄ = F̂
−1
ut
(0.9) for all transition functions. The scale is restricted to η ∈
[η, η̄(ζ, ζ̄)] with fixed η = 10−3 and η̄(ζ, ζ̄) = ζ̄ − ζ for the linear transition function and
η̄(ζ, ζ̄) =
[
log(0.1−1 − 1)(0.5ζ̄− 0.5ζ)
]−1 for the logistic transition function. The former
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restriction for the linear transition function ensures that the cut-off points for its lower
and upper bounds coincide with the minimum and maximum location, respectively,
when the location is centered. The latter represents the inverse of the logistic function
with respect to the scale evaluated at 0.1 and location half-way between the 10th and
90th unconditional quantile i.e. the center of the considered location grid. As opposed
to the linear one, the logistic density is non-zero on the whole domain R. Thus the
condition has to be relaxed such that only those scales are considered which are small
enough to ensure that at most 10% of the observations are below ζ. In addition to this,
the following triangular joint restriction must hold: 2η̄(ζ, ζ̄)(ζ̄ − ζ)−1(ζ̄ − ζ) 6 0 and
2η̄(ζ, ζ̄)(ζ̄− ζ)−1(ζ− ζ) > 0. This ensures that, as the location gets close to its minimum
or maximum, respectively, the scales must become smaller as well, in order to avoid
location/scale pairs that would suggest that there is only one regime. The whole set of
restrictions can be summarized by defining the constraint set
Z :=
{
(η, ζ) ∈ R×R+ : ζ ∈ [ζ, ζ̄], η ∈ [η, η̄(ζ, ζ̄)],
2η̄(ζ, ζ̄)(ζ̄− ζ)−1(ζ̄− ζ) 6 0,
2η̄(ζ, ζ̄)(ζ̄− ζ)−1(ζ− ζ) > 0
}
.
As a first experiment we consider how our estimates improve with the sample size.
We estimate the model with N = 1000, N = 2000 and N = 4000 observations, respec-
tively. Table 3.1 summarizes the result.
It is reassuring that the RSME’s of the parameter estimates decrease as the sam-
ple gets larger. Note that even while the estimates for the paramters β1 have larger
RMSE’s, which is not surprising due to the fact that the conditional volatility process
is predicted in the first stage, they are decreasing with respect to sample size as well.
Although the second-stage transition parameters are estimated more precisely as the
sample size increases, RMSE’s seem to go down slower than expected. This might be
due to the fact that they enter the model non-linearly through the transition function,
and are thus difficult to estimate from a numerical point of view, particularly in the
first stage where we use a smooth approximation of the quantile loss function, which
is often flat around the true parameters3. Finally, mean absolute prediction errors are
decreasing and, unsurprisingly, coverage ratios are perfectly accurate by definition due
3We experience occasional issues with no line-search improvement depending on the amount of
smoothing.
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N = 1000 N = 2000 N = 4000
Bias RMSE Bias RMSE Bias RMSE
βI0 0.1797 0.4120 0.1223 0.2489 0.0749 0.2123
βI1 -0.0129 0.3559 0.0065 0.2779 -0.0068 0.1179
γI1 -0.1196 0.3270 -0.0653 0.2276 -0.0228 0.1404
βII0 0.0319 0.1650 0.0337 0.1231 0.0236 0.1006
βII1 0.0263 0.2274 0.0272 0.1701 0.0187 0.1021
γII1 0.0050 0.1310 0.0011 0.0984 0.0150 0.0891
ζ 0.3798 0.4923 0.3252 0.4703 0.4595 0.5632
ζ(τ) 0.1063 0.3730 0.1149 0.3138 0.0541 0.2547
η 0.0870 0.1341 0.0627 0.1170 0.0743 0.1229
η(τ) -0.0622 0.0867 -0.0327 0.0807 -0.0353 0.0826
MPE 0.0082 0.0482 0.0027 0.0447 0.0032 0.0203
MAPE 0.1259 0.1310 0.0974 0.1004 0.0682 0.0700
coverage 0.0008 0.0013 0.0004 0.0007 0.0001 0.0003
Table 3.1: Sample Size
to the way the quantile regression estimator is constructed4.
In order to study the influence of the amount of lags in the ARCH(m) approxima-
tion, in a next experiment we consider different multiples of n 14 , which is the order of
the rate that needs to be satisfied according to the theory. The results are reported in in
Table 3.2. We can see that the results are fairly constant with respect to our approxima-
tion parameter, although there is a slight U-shape with the optimum in terms of mean
absolute prediction errors between c = 1.0 and c = 2.0 which corresponds to 6 and 12
lags in our N = 1000 sample, respectively. We have thus no reason to deviate from the
proposed c = 1.5 in Xiao & Koenker [2009].
Table 3.3 displays results for different values of δ, which is the width of the window
left out around the median, in our first stage estimation. While according to theory δ
should tend towards zero as the sample size increases, for finite samples we face the
trade-off of introducing noise to our estimates that stems from the non-identification
of the global parameters around the median, and on the other hand not considering
most of the observations that naturally occur around the median, which also increases
our variance.
As we can see, the precision of the estimates seems to be rather stable with respect
4The reason we report the coverage ratio, is to allow for a direct comparison to the ANST-GARCH
models in the second part of the experiment, for which this property does not necessarily hold.
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c = 1.0 c = 2.0 c = 3.0 c = 3.5
Bias RMSE Bias RMSE Bias RMSE Bias RMSE
βI0 0.1444 0.4107 0.1472 0.4023 0.1487 0.4076 0.2107 0.4580
βI1 0.0402 0.4108 0.0254 0.3986 0.0454 0.4821 0.0643 0.4523
γI1 -0.1186 0.3157 -0.1184 0.3085 -0.1138 0.3685 -0.1816 0.3700
βII0 0.0033 0.1714 0.0187 0.1695 0.0308 0.1688 0.0353 0.1644
βII1 0.0250 0.2224 0.0227 0.2242 0.0232 0.2383 0.0205 0.2216
γII1 0.0167 0.1466 0.0011 0.1384 -0.0032 0.1383 -0.0008 0.1340
ζ 0.2025 0.5823 0.2447 0.6022 0.3327 0.5587 0.4220 0.6611
ζ(τ) 0.1062 0.3853 0.0955 0.3861 0.1439 0.4052 0.1829 0.3983
η 0.0682 0.1502 0.0419 0.1381 0.0084 0.1203 0.0458 0.1427
η(τ) -0.0565 0.0851 -0.0659 0.0834 -0.0559 0.0839 -0.0561 0.0871
MPE 0.0103 0.0512 0.0118 0.0523 0.0054 0.0638 0.0068 0.0515
MAPE 0.1245 0.1298 0.1245 0.1294 0.1356 0.1435 0.1317 0.1373
coverage 0.0006 0.0014 0.0006 0.0012 0.0008 0.0014 0.0009 0.0014
Table 3.2: Order of Approximation: m = dcn1/4e
δ = 0.15 δ = 0.20 δ = 0.30 δ = 0.50
Bias RMSE Bias RMSE Bias RMSE Bias RMSE
βI0 0.1689 0.4320 0.1830 0.4597 0.1099 0.3801 0.1641 0.4591
βI1 0.0367 0.4247 -0.0181 0.4362 0.0481 0.4456 0.0298 0.4371
γI1 -0.1364 0.3431 -0.1167 0.3195 -0.1036 0.2806 -0.1239 0.3428
βII0 0.0129 0.1879 0.0247 0.1586 0.0259 0.1891 0.0266 0.1698
βII1 0.0412 0.2289 0.0280 0.2134 0.0302 0.2492 0.0563 0.2574
γII1 -0.0006 0.1298 -0.0022 0.1199 -0.0048 0.1406 -0.0183 0.1148
ζ 0.1913 0.5503 0.2884 0.5895 0.2226 0.5715 0.2324 0.5871
ζ(τ) 0.1362 0.4059 0.1326 0.3895 0.1142 0.3804 0.1597 0.3872
η 0.0537 0.1453 0.0476 0.1396 0.0519 0.1370 0.0623 0.1463
η(τ) -0.0611 0.0879 -0.0630 0.0857 -0.0624 0.0855 -0.0597 0.0845
MPE 0.0104 0.0514 0.0152 0.0521 0.0115 0.0533 0.0092 0.0521
MAPE 0.1276 0.1329 0.1242 0.1301 0.1244 0.1292 0.1268 0.1329
coverage 0.0008 0.0014 0.0008 0.0013 0.0006 0.0012 0.0008 0.0012
Table 3.3: δ ∈ (0,1) where central 0.5± δ
2
quantiles are not estimated
to different values of δ as well. For the remainder of the simulations and the empirical
application we choose δ = 0.25, which concludes the first part of the Monte Carlo study.
In the following sequence of experiments we compare estimates of conditional
quantiles with the traditional approach of using GARCH estimates for conditional
variances from which the value at risk is calculated using the quantile of the speci-
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fied innovation distribution. We consider smooth transition GARCH models specified
with both Normal and Student’s t error as a reference and contrast it to our smooth
transition GACQ estimator. Note that the first two models are estimated using max-
imum likelihood, with location and scale parameters estimated jointly with the other
parameters such that local and global location and scale estimates, respectively, are
equal by definition whereas the GACQ estimator re-estimates them in a second stage.
Variances are normalized to one for all distributions, such that we can immediately
compare the estimates.
We start with a data generating process that exhibits standard normal innovations.
GARCH-N refers to the correctly specified GARCH model with normal errors and
GARCH-t to the misspecified GARCH model assuming Student errors. As opposed
to these models, our proposed GACQ estimator does not require a distributional as-
sumption.
GACQ GARCH-N GARCH-t
Bias RMSE Bias RMSE Bias RMSE
βI0 0.1444 0.4107 0.0343 0.0986 -0.1489 0.2789
βI1 0.0402 0.4108 -0.1351 0.1410 -0.1020 0.1405
γI1 -0.1186 0.3157 -0.1507 0.1752 -0.0145 0.2500
βII0 0.0033 0.1714 -0.0820 0.1007 0.0180 0.2037
βII1 0.0250 0.2224 -0.0190 0.0991 -0.0938 0.1928
γII1 0.0167 0.1466 -0.0571 0.1094 0.1146 0.2908
ζ 0.2025 0.5823 0.1248 0.3144 0.4136 0.6883
ζ(τ) 0.1062 0.3853 0.1248 0.3144 0.4136 0.6883
η 0.0682 0.1502 -0.1478 0.1593 73247 248720
η(τ) -0.0565 0.0851 -0.1478 0.1593 73247 248720
MPE 0.0103 0.0512 0.0771 0.0861 -0.2142 0.3402
MAPE 0.1245 0.1298 0.1461 0.1568 0.3320 0.3877
coverage 0.0006 0.0014 0.0071 0.0094 -0.0150 0.0219
Table 3.4: Model comparison: GACQ and GARCH with Normal errors
It comes with no surprise that the correctly specified GARCH maximum likelihood
estimator yields the best parameter estimates for this DGP. In terms of parameter esti-
mates, the GARCH-t model is also performing rather well. However, when it comes
to calculating the conditional quantiles, the wrong assumption about the innovation
distribution has serious negative consequences on the prediction errors, as can be seen
looking at the GARCH-t estimates in Table 3.4. It can also be seen that the maximum
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likelihood estimates for the scale are severely biased which likely stems from the fact
that the estimation procedure is numerically rather unstable. Of course our distribu-
tion agnostic GACQ model comes with the price of an efficiency loss in the parameter
estimates, however due to more precise location and scale estimate it performs rather
well compared to the correctly specified GARCH-N model in terms of prediction er-
rors.
GACQ GARCH-N GARCH-t
Bias RMSE Bias RMSE Bias RMSE
βI0 0.1936 0.6391 0.0209 0.1717 0.0298 0.1314
βI1 0.0817 0.8266 -0.0723 0.1494 -0.1037 0.1293
γI1 -0.1550 0.4665 -0.2043 0.2504 -0.1763 0.2143
βII0 0.0391 0.2259 -0.0824 0.1638 -0.1066 0.1271
βII1 0.0288 0.3015 -0.0279 0.1677 -0.0270 0.1181
γII1 -0.0007 0.1604 -0.0749 0.1085 -0.0753 0.0939
ζ 0.0993 0.4880 0.1240 0.3008 0.1386 0.2587
ζ(τ) 0.2110 0.4645 0.1240 0.3008 0.1386 0.2587
η 0.0108 0.1051 -0.1453 0.1657 -0.1267 0.1560
η(τ) -0.0859 0.0935 -0.1453 0.1657 -0.1267 0.1560
MPE 0.0037 0.0634 -0.0325 0.0676 -0.3239 0.3368
MAPE 0.1537 0.1607 0.1409 0.1517 0.3271 0.3397
coverage 0.0008 0.0014 -0.0044 0.0081 -0.0254 0.0259
Table 3.5: Model comparison: GACQ and GARCH with Student’s t(4) errors
The picture is very similar if we consider a DGP with Student errors with four
degrees of freedom, multiplied by 1/
√
2 in order to normalize the variances. This
indicates that for fatter tails the maximum likelihood estimation becomes more dif-
ficult for the GARCH model, resulting in increasing prediction errors. Interestingly,
the GARCH-N estimator performs somewhat better in terms of predictions then the
GARCH-t estimator, even with Student errors. This likely stems from the known over-
prediction of conditional volatilities in conditional variance models [Klaassen, 2002],
which is however compensated by multiplying the latter with the quantile of the Nor-
mal distribution instead of the corresponding one of the t(4) distribution, which is
larger in magnitude.
Table 3.6 shows simulation results using a Gumbel distribution which belongs to
the class of asymmetric distributions and has both positive skewness and excess-kurtosis.
The Gumbel distribution is parametrized with location parameter µG = 0 and scale pa-
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rameter βG =
√
6/π which normalizes the variance to one, ensuring comparability of
the results. The distribution is then re-centered by subtracting βge1 from each realiza-
tion, such that ε has mean zero. Skewness and excess-kurtosis are constant with respect
to the distribution’s parameters. Given that we are interested in the 95% value at risk
and thus estimate τ = 0.05, we mirror the distribution by flipping the signs of the inno-
vations, to evaluate the performance of the longer and heavier tail of the distribution
which is then below zero. It can be seen, that the proposed conditional quantile model
performs equally well as in most cases with symmetric errors and comparable excess
kurtosis. This should come with no surprise, as the quantiles of the error distribution
are subject to estimation. It should also be mentioned that the GARCH-N model with
two regimes works again surprisingly well in this case, but is outperformed by our
conditional quantile estimation procedure.
GACQ GARCH-N GARCH-t
Bias RMSE Bias RMSE Bias RMSE
βI0 0.1362 0.2624 -0.0115 0.0416 -0.0152 0.0393
βI1 -0.0287 0.2080 -0.1480 0.2171 -0.1289 0.2224
γI1 -0.0841 0.1920 0.0269 0.1300 0.0088 0.0929
βII0 0.0614 0.1237 0.0845 0.1996 0.1250 0.1850
βII1 -0.0360 0.1253 -0.1387 0.1872 -0.1610 0.2076
γII1 -0.0032 0.1146 0.0844 0.1766 0.0610 0.1311
ζ 0.2723 0.4382 0.0058 0.6362 0.1175 1.2585
ζ(τ) 0.1346 0.2927 0.0058 0.6362 0.1175 1.2585
η 0.0575 0.0967 -0.0720 0.1070 -0.0580 0.1053
η(τ) -0.0425 0.0750 -0.0720 0.1070 -0.0580 0.1053
MPE 0.0108 0.0277 0.0419 0.0541 -0.2928 0.3118
MAPE 0.0727 0.0749 0.1213 0.1322 0.2997 0.3172
coverage 0.0007 0.0015 0.0038 0.0090 -0.0268 0.0274
Table 3.6: Model Comparison for re-centered, mirrored Gumbel errors
Next we consider outliers in our innovations. To ensure stability of the series we
will introduce them on ut instead of εt in the following way. Let r ∼ U[0,1]n, then for
each ut(θ0) = σt(zt,θ0)εt the new series {u ′}
n
t=1 is defined as
u ′t := ut + 1{rt60.025}sgn(εt)3σε
with σε = 1, due to our normalization. Note that this might be considered a very
small contamination, however we report estimates for the 95th quantile. Thus these
contaminated values make up for a large proportion of the data used for estimation.
100 SMOOTH TRANSITION GARCH MODELS | CHAPTER 3
We only compare our estimator with the correctly specified GARCH estimators for
Normal and Student errors.
GACQ: ε ∼ N GARCH-N: ε ∼ N GACQ: ε ∼ t(4) GARCH-t: ε ∼ t(4)
Bias RMSE Bias RMSE Bias RMSE Bias RMSE
βI0 0.2656 0.6630 -0.3962 0.4538 0.2758 0.7464 -0.0975 0.2817
βI1 0.0358 0.4642 0.0647 0.3166 0.1187 0.6819 -0.0614 0.1429
γI1 -0.0749 0.2867 0.0804 0.3435 -0.0615 0.3810 -0.0911 0.2344
βII0 0.0668 0.2337 0.4326 0.4719 0.1801 0.5841 0.1139 0.2651
βII1 0.0315 0.2780 -0.0313 0.2028 0.0659 0.5414 -0.0089 0.1635
γII1 -0.0010 0.1379 -0.1096 0.1308 -0.0290 0.1701 -0.0689 0.0972
ζ 0.1545 0.5263 1.0059 1.0553 0.1686 0.5461 0.3365 0.5907
ζ(τ) 0.1832 0.5171 1.0059 1.0553 0.1599 0.5316 0.3365 0.5907
η 0.0678 0.1588 -0.1480 0.3122 0.0262 0.1183 -0.0419 0.5081
η(τ) -0.0445 0.0929 -0.1480 0.3122 -0.0805 0.0939 -0.0419 0.5081
MPE -0.1023 0.1291 -175.09 1008.6 -0.1528 0.1940 -0.9166 0.9684
MAPE 0.2180 0.2311 175.22 1008.6 0.2749 0.2933 0.9182 0.9696
coverage 0.0007 0.0013 -0.0144 0.0164 0.0009 0.0014 -0.0269 0.0273
Table 3.7: Outliers
It comes with no surprise that the prediction errors somewhat deteriorate compared
to the non-outlier case even for the GACQ model. While the GARCH-t specification
seems to handle outliers rather well by under-estimating the degrees of freedom pa-
rameter (3.0535with RMSE of 0.97429), the GARCH-N specification breaks down com-
pletely in terms of average prediction errors. Note that the coverage ratio in the condi-
tional variance models are on average off by 1.4 and 2.7 percentage points, respectively,
which is a rather significant deviation given that we consider the 5% value at risk.
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CQ: (Glog, Gthr) CH: (Glog, Gthr) CQ: (Glog, Glin) CH: (Glog, Glin)
Bias RMSE Bias RMSE Bias RMSE Bias RMSE
βI0 0.1548 0.3590 0.0375 0.1184 0.1325 0.3504 0.0367 0.1366
βI1 0.0153 0.3660 -0.1296 0.1367 0.0325 0.3548 -0.1361 0.1401
γI1 -0.0997 0.2446 -0.1588 0.1938 -0.1000 0.2890 -0.1506 0.1950
βII0 -0.0415 0.1553 -0.1215 0.1420 -0.0105 0.1587 -0.0870 0.1319
βII1 0.0661 0.2205 -0.0141 0.1041 0.0335 0.2357 -0.0040 0.1232
γII1 0.0241 0.1145 -0.0212 0.1195 0.0164 0.1259 -0.0528 0.1070
ζ 0.1535 0.3663 0.0329 0.2752 0.1757 0.4881 0.0950 0.3580
ζ(τ) 0.0684 0.2526 0.0329 0.2752 0.0563 0.3104 0.0950 0.3580
η 0.0145 0.1390 -0.1663 0.1712 0.0388 0.1388 -0.0555 0.8775
η(τ) -0.0548 0.0846 -0.1663 0.1712 -0.0523 0.0849 -0.0555 0.8775
MPE 0.0060 0.0528 0.0750 0.0887 0.0143 0.0535 0.0750 0.0887
MAPE 0.1290 0.1336 0.1693 0.1825 0.1201 0.1241 0.1624 0.1757
coverage 0.0006 0.0014 0.0074 0.0107 0.0008 0.0014 0.0074 0.0103
Table 3.8: Misspecified transition functions: (G,G0) for GACQ and GARCH-N
Since in all our models we assume the transition function to be known a priori, in
our last experiment we consider the consequences of mis-specifying the model. For
this we use two different DGP’s, the threshold and the linear transition function. We
estimate them using a logistic specification for both GACQ and GARCH-N. The inno-
vation distribution is assumed to be standard normal again.
The elements of the tuple (G,G0) refer to the transition functions specified for es-
timation G and the transition function used for the data generating process G0. It is
comforting to report that both models are very robust with respect to misspecified
transition functions, at least within the set of parametrized transition functions we
consider.
Empirical Application
The following empirical study, in which we again report results for both the pro-
posed ANST-GACQ model and its conditional variance counterparts, is not only sup-
posed to demonstrate how the estimation works with real data, but is also used to eval-
uate out-of-sample forecasts. The data considered in this application is the GBP/USD
exchange rate and the German equity index (DAX) which both are available on a daily
basis from 1999 to 2016. The main interest lies in the modelling of the 5% value at risk of
the time-series’ daily log-returns. We will select a sample of the most recent n = 3,000
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observations each, which corresponds to 12 years, assuming about 250 trading days
per year. Model selection is based on a qualitative assessment of the model improve-
ment, when including additional lags, rather than applying formal selection criteria.
The specification that is ultimately reported corresponds the widely used specification
with p = q = 1 lags and a logistic transition function, although estimation turned out
to be very robust with respect to the choice of G ∈ G. As a transition variable ξt we use
the lagged dependent variable ut−1. In principal a model selection approach evaluat-
ing different legs would be feasible, however since we have financial time series data
which is known to react to news very quickly, we have reason to believe that the regime
is determined by the previous observation. Parameter estimates of the series are re-
ported in Table 3.9. Recall that these parameters have the structure θ̂j(τ) = θ̂jF−1ε (τ) for
j ∈ I0,2(p+q+1) and are thus local with respect to the estimated quantile and are in there-
fore in general negative for lower quantiles. Note however, that the usual parameter
restrictions of the GARCH model apply only to the linear combination of both regimes’
parameters with weight given by the transition function Gt(ζ).
With 0.14% the location parameter for USD/GBP is rather close to zero, whereas the
one for the German equity index is −0.96%, implying that the dynamic behaviour of the
time series changes only after substantial daily declines. These locations correspond
to the 68th and the 17th unconditional quantile of the respective log-return time series.
The scale estimate for the suggests that there is a rapid transition from one regime to
the other, around the origin of the transition variable ξt = ut−1 for both time series.
Regarding the GARCH coefficients for USD/GBP, it should be mentioned that there
are relatively large standard errors of ζ̂n the constants in both regimes are not signif-
icantly different from zero. However, this does not necessarily indicate that there are
not two regimes in this series. In contrast, looking at the estimates for the DAX, we
see that the second regime has higher variance than the first one, which indicates that
after a turbulent trading day with high losses, we are likely to see a more calm next
day driven also by the mean-reverting nature of the first regime, captured by the sign
of the γ̂In estimate.
Figure 3.2 shows the last 400 observations of the returns of the German equity index
(DAX) and its estimated 5% and 95% conditional quantiles. It can be seen that the
symmetry restriction of the conditional variance based ANST-GARCH models, that
have been investigated in the previous sections, does not hold.
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USD/GBP DAX
Regime I Regime II Regime I Regime II
coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
β0 0.3346 * 0.1742 -0.1540 0.1547 -0.7163 *** 0.1543 -1.1583 *** 0.1918
β1 -1.5553 ** 0.6695 -1.0954 *** 0.3558 -1.3977 *** 0.1468 -0.5477 *** 0.1772
γ1 0.3333 ** 0.1356 -0.8111 *** 0.0656 0.1364 * 0.0785 -0.3192 *** 0.0665
ζ 0.1469 0.4404 -0.9636 0.2421
η 0.1000 0.2799 0.1207 0.2804













Figure 3.2: DAX returns in % and its corresponding 5% and 95% ANST-GACQ esti-
mates
Since the conditional quantile estimation is an in-sample concept meaning that the
coverage ratio holds by construction, in this final step the out-of-sample forecasting is
evaluated. For this procedure a subsample consisting of the 1,100 most recent obser-
vations of the series is selected. Starting with the estimation of the index-subset IT0,T
consisting of the first T − T0 = 1,000 observations, a forecast Q̂uT+1(τ|FT ) is calculated.
Using the true uT+1 we calculate a boolean value, which is true if the realization is
below the specified quantile. This is repeated for n = 100 times by offsetting T0 by
one each time, shifting the window which is considered for estimation. The resulting




with t ∈ I0,n is the basis for calculat-
ing test statistics and the out-of-sample coverage ratio which is easily observed by
averaging over t, such that hoos := n−1
∑n
t=1 It. As is common in the literature about
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evaluating value at risk models, two tests are considered to show that the proportion
of forecasts exceeding the estimated quantile is not significantly different from τ. We
follow the common notion denote such an occurrence as a "hit". First a likelihood ratio
test as proposed by Kupiec [1995], which assumes the Bernoulli process to be an i.i.d.
sequence, is applied. The probability of having exactly x hits is given by the binomial
probability mass function






Using x = nhoos, the likelihood ratio is given by
Ln = −2
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which is chi-squared distributed with one degree of freedom Ln ∼ χ21 such that the
10%, 5% and 1% critical values are given by 2.7055, 3.8415, and 6.6349, respectively. In
addition to this, another formal test is used to support the claim that the out-of-sample
forecast does in fact represent the τth quantile. This test exploits the fact that It+1 − τ
is a martingale difference sequence with zero mean and variance nτ(1− τ) and thus its
cumulative sum converges to a normal distribution. Formally, the following statistic
of the, now two-sided, test can be defined as





(It+1 − τ) N(0, 1) as n→∞
with critical values for its absolute value given by 1.6449, 1.9600 and 2.5758, respec-
tively.
The results of this testing procedures are reported in Table 3.10 together with in-
sample and out-of-sample coverage ratios. The experiments were repeated for the 5th,
10th and 25th quantile. Looking at the test statistics, it can indeed be concluded, that
for our ANST-GACQ model there is no evidence that the null hypothesis, stating that
the forecast represents the true quantile, has to be rejected for any of the confidence
levels. The situation is different for both standard quadratic ANST-GARCH-N and
ANST-GARCH-t models. They both perform poorly for the USD/GBP exchange rate,
especially for tail estimates. Although they improve as more centered quantiles are
considered, the estimates are significantly different from the true values estimating the
10th quantile in the ANST-GARCH-N model and for the 5th, 10th and 25 th quantile
in the ANST-GARCH-t model, considering a 90% confidence interval. On the other
hand, log-returns of the DAX equity index seem to be well-represented by a ANST-
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USD/GBP Exchange rate
GACQ GARCH-N GARCH-t
5% 10% 25% 5% 10% 25% 5% 10% 25%
hIS 0.0520 0.1009 0.2488 0.0228 0.0337 0.1292 0.0118 0.0282 0.1119
hOOS 0.0300 0.0700 0.2500 0.0200 0.0500 0.2100 0.0100 0.0400 0.1800
Zn -0.9177 -1.0000 0.0000 -1.3765 -1.6667* -0.9238 -1.8353* -2.0000* -1.6161
Ln 0.9769 1.1055 0.0000 2.4286 3.3413* 0.8868 4.9472** 5.0611** 2.8078*
DAX Equity Index
CQ GARCH-N GARCH-t
5% 10% 25% 5% 10% 25% 5% 10% 25%
hIS 0.0500 0.0999 0.2498 0.1410 0.1747 0.2767 0.1383 0.1705 0.2757
hOOS 0.0600 0.1000 0.2500 0.0500 0.1200 0.2300 0.0800 0.1500 0.2400
Zn 0.4589 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6667 -0.4619 1.3765 1.6667* -0.2309
Ln 0.1984 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4205 0.2173 1.6158 2.4470 0.0538
Table 3.10: Coverage and Test statistics: Comparison to GARCH
GARCH-N(1,1) process as well, as it yields rather precise forecasts for all considered
quantiles. From these very mixed results about the performance of the conditional
variance models it can be concluded, that each of the considered time series exhibits
a distinct dynamic behaviour. This provides a very strong argument for the ANST-
GACQ model, as it is robust with respect to these individual time series characteristics
and performs equally well in both cases.
To actually compare our ANST-GACQ model with the single regime GACQ model
we report separate out-of-sample forecasts for the latter in Table 3.11, instead of devel-
oping a formal test for the regime-switching model against the linear model (see e.g.
Luukkonen et al. [1988] for the smooth transition autogregressive model).
USD/GBP DAX Equity Index
hIS hOOS Zn Ln hIS hOOS Zn Ln
25% 0.24875 0.24 -0.2309 0.0538 0.24880 0.26 0.2309 0.0529
10% 0.09890 0.05 -1.6667 * 3.3413 * 0.09890 0.14 1.3333 1.6017
5% 0.04995 0.01 -1.8353 * 4.9472 ** 0.04995 0.06 0.4588 0.1984
Table 3.11: Coverage and Test statistics: Comparison to single regime
One can see that in this experiment with only one regime, we find that for the
USD/GBP time series we would reject the hypothesis that the proportion of hits equals
the specified value at risk in our out-of-sample forecast procedure, at least for quantiles
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further out in the tail. This was not the case for the two-regime model, which is a strong
indication that there is indeed a second regime in this time-series. We do not find this
for the German equity index. Nevertheless, from this we cannot necessarily conclude
that there might not be a second regime present also in this time series. It merely
means that out-of-sample forecasting works satisfactorily if only regime is considered,
although the two-regime model provides slightly better forecasts, especially at the 10%
level. Considering the location we find in our two-regime model, we found that there
are only 17% of the observation in the first regime. Thus the time series is mostly driven
by the second regime which might be the reason for the relatively good performance












































Ln statistic, Kupiec LR
Figure 3.3: DAX: Convergence for Coverage Tests, 5% (l.h.s) and 25% (r.h.s.)
Figure 3.3 shows for the two-regime specification the convergence of the coverage
ratio and the corresponding test statistics for the 5th and 25th quantile of USD/GBP,
respectively, to demonstrate how fast these statistics actually converge to a value close
to zero.
Conclusion and Outlook
In the preceding analysis a time-series model of conditional quantiles has been
proposed allowing for two parameter regimes with smooth transition between them.
Compared to asymmetric non-linear smooth transition GARCH models, in which con-
ditional variance is estimated to calculate conditional quantiles, by imposing a dis-
tributional restriction, modelling conditional quantiles directly has the advantage of
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not relying on such an assumption. Furthermore, it has been shown that the estima-
tion procedure has the advantage of being robust with respect to large innovations.
In contrast to the one-regime conditional quantile GARCH model and even the asym-
metric CAViaR specification, the proposed generalized asymmetric non-linear smooth
transition model allows for additional flexibility especially with respect to asymmetric
dynamic responses to past quantiles. In addition to this, it has been shown that out-
of-sample forecasts are very accurate and superior to the ones of both the one-regime
case and the smooth transition conditional variance model, considering common pro-
portion of failure tests. However, the estimation procedure does come with some lim-
itations. While it is possible to use any function of past observations as transition vari-
able, the latter is only allowed to have a one-dimensional range. Higher dimensional
transition variables would be feasible and easy to incorporate from a theoretical point
of view, however from a computational point of view this would be very expensive,
due to the exhaustive search algorithm used to identify them. A possible extension of
the model would be to allow the transition variable to be a function of past scales or
quantiles, as it is done for conditional variance in Lanne [2005].
Auxiliary Results and Proofs
Within the following derivations, let Pn be the empirical distribution that puts mass dPn = n−1 to





f(ut) for any measurable function
f. Also let the vector zmt = [|ut−1|, . . . , |ut−m|]T , and zt(ζ)T = [Gt(ζ) zmt , (1−Gt(ζ))zmt ], where the latter
is defined as a function of ζ to highlight the dependence on the transition function. Further let the data
considered in the second stage be zpqt = zt(α) = [1, |ut−1|, . . . , |ut−p|, σt−1(α), . . . , σt−q(α)]T which is a
function of αT := [αI,T,αII,T, ζT ]T where ζ refers to the location and scale parameters entering the first
stage. Similarly, we define zt(α, ζ)T = [Gt(ζ) zt(α), (1−Gt(ζ))zt(α)], to be the vector that stacks both
regimes weighted data. Further let aT = [αI,T,αII,T,qT , ζT ]T . The right-side derivative of the check-
function ρτk(u) = u(τk − 1 {u 6 0}) is given by ψτk,t(u) := (τk − 1 {u 6 0}) such that the directional
derivative of the objective function defined in equation (3.9) is given as
gn(α





1 {k = 1} [αI,αII]Tzt(ζ)
...
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Similarly, without making any statements about convergence yet, the corresponding population equiv-
alent can be written as





1 {k = 1} [αI,αII]Tzt(ζ)
...








by applying the law of iterated expectations. In addition to this we will frequently make use of the iden-
tity ∂Fut|Ft−1(x)/∂x = σt
−1∂Fε(x)/∂x = σ
−1






since both Fut|Ft−1 and Fε are monotone and differentiable by Assumption 3.3 and 3.4, the expression
follows by applying the inverse function theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (Identification and First Stage Consistency). Let aT = [αI,T,αII,T,qT , ζT ]T . Under Assump-
tions 3.1-3.8, it holds for n→∞





Proof. We split up the identification and consistency argument into two parts. First we show that for






is in fact the minimum of the objective function Eρτ(u).




,1), from which the composite quantile result follows.
To see this let m(α(τ), ζ) = Eρτ(ut − αT (τ)zt(ζ)). Then we have global identification if and only if
m(α(τ), ζ) −m(α0(τ), ζ0) > 0 for any
[
αT (τ), ζT
]T 6= [αT0 (τ), ζT0 ]T .
Let α(τ)∆ = αI(τ) − αII(τ) and also let vt be the probability measure of ut conditional upon the
filtration Ft−1. Then we have to prove
inf
α(τ) : ‖α(τ) −α0(τ)‖ > δ










where we can split up the part inside the expectation into two cases. First consider α0(τ)Tzt(ζ0) >









































































τ− vt(−∞, F−1ut|Ft−1(τ)]] , (3.16)
where we use the fact that vt(−∞, F−1ut|Ft−1(τ)]+vt(F−1ut|Ft−1(τ),+∞) = 1, since vt is a probability measure,























































Then, by the definition of the τth quantile we have have that vt(−∞, F−1ut|Ft−1(τ)] 6 τ such that the final
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expressions in both equation (3.16) and equation (3.17) are non-negative. Thus the expectation with
































if and only if α = α0 and ζ = ζ0. To ensure this we require the global identification assumption stating
that E[Gt(ζ) zmt , (1 − Gt(ζ))zmt , zmt (Gt(ζ) − Gt(ζ0))]T [Gt(ζ) zmt , (1 − Gt(ζ))zmt , zmt (Gt(ζ) − Gt(ζ0))] has full
rank for any ζ which holds by Assumption 3.6. Thus α(τ) = αF−1ε (τ) is identified for an arbitrary




,1). Note that the result does not hold for τ = 1
2
for which F−1ε (τ) is zero.
Given this identification result, for consistency we need to show that the sample objective function,
which is continuous, converges uniformly in probability to the population counterpart, which we dis-





the parameter space Θτ1 is a compact subset of R2(m+1)+2 and denote m = ρτ ◦ ωt, where we let
ωt : (α
I(τ),αII(τ), ζ) 7→ zm,Tt αII(τ)+(αI(τ)−αII(τ))Tzmt G(ξt, ζ, η), α(τ) = [αI(τ, T),αII,T(τ)]T and ζ = [ζ, η]T .
For consistency we can apply Theorem 1 in Chen & Shen [1998, p. 297], for which we have to check con-
ditions A.1-A.4 therein. First, for condition A.4 we show that the function m = ρτ ◦ ωt is Lipschitz.
By Assumption 3.1 the transition function Gt(ζ) is Lipschitz in ζ and by construction so is ωt in α and
G(). Thus ωt is Lipschitz in α and ζ since the property is preserved under function composition5. The
piece-wise linear function ρτ is Lipschitz as well, and hence so is m = ρτ ◦ ωt. Further, note that we
actually have a special case of s = 1 in the Hölder condition A.4, which by Chen & Shen [1998, Remark
1(c)] implies their condition A.2. In addition to this, condition A.1 holds by Assumption 3.5 which states
that ut is β-mixing with decay rate satisfying βs 6 β0s−(2+δ) for δ > 0. Finally, we note that by Chen
[2008, p. 5595] it holds for Lipschitz functions that logN[](εs,Fn, ‖‖2) 6 logN(ε,Θτ1, ‖‖) 6 Cm log( 1ε )
for some constant C > 0, where m is the dimension of the sieve parameter space, which implies their
condition A.3. Thus, we can apply Theorem 1 in Chen & Shen [1998] and conclude that our first stage
sieve estimator is consistent.
Next, we have to show that the directional derivative of the non-differentiable gn around the true








). Then we have to show that
















> 1− ε. (3.18)










)∣∣∣Ft−1]−PnλTE [ϕt (a0)| Ft−1] as well as PnλTϕt (a0),
5If both f and g are Lipschitz so is f◦g since (f◦g)(x)−(f◦g)(x0) = f(g(x))−f(g(x0)) 6 Cf(g(x)−g(x0)) 6
CfCg(x− x0) for finite constants Cf and Cg.
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)∣∣∣∣Ft−1]− PnλTE [ϕt (a0)| Ft−1]} . (3.22)
This can now be analyzed term by term. Term (3.21) will turn out to be stochastically negligible
whereas term (3.20) and (3.22) can be made explicit. This can be seen by writing (3.22) in the following
























































































































ιTK(s q q)ν(ζ)ν(ζ)T ⊗ ztzTt zTt ᾱ(ζ)(ν(ζ)⊗ zt)⊗ (s q)T ιTK(s q q)α∆zt(ν(ζ)⊗ zt) ∂G∂ζT
diag(s)(ᾱTzt)2 ᾱTzt(ζ)α∆zt(s q) ∂G∂ζT




where ν(ζ) = [Gt(ζ) , 1−Gt(ζ)]T and  is the Hadamard product.
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The considered process is a martingale difference sequence. The next step is to divide the ball defined
as
{






in equation (3.18) into cubes Cj ⊂ R2(m+1)+K+2 centered at νj and
with side-length m 12n− 52 . The resulting cardinality for 2(m + 1) + K + 2 dimensions is then N(n) :=
‖{Cj}‖ = (2n)2(m+1)+K+2. Now then for each k ∈ I1,K the term ηt(ν) can be bounded by
ηt(ν) 6 ηt(νj) + bk,t(νj)xt,k(a0)
and similarly
ηt(ν) > ηt(νj) + (bk,t(νj) − dk,t(νj)) xt,k(a0),
with bk,t(νj)xt,k(a0) and dk,t(νj)xt,k(a0) being the process ηt evaluated at the maximum possible dis-
tance on each axis from the center to the boundary of the cube and the maximum possible distance on
each axis between the boundaries of the cube Cj, respectively:
bk,t(νj) = 1
{
















































Taking expectations of the latter and subtracting it from the first one, implies that for all ν ∈ Cj, for all t,
and for all k it holds that
(ηt(ν) − E [ηt(ν)| Ft−1]) 6 (η(νj) − E [ηt(νj)| Ft−1])






∣∣PnλT (ηt(ν) − E [ηt(ν)| Ft−1])∣∣
6 max
j∈I1,N(n)
∣∣Pn ∥∥λTxt,k(a0)∥∥ (bk,t(νj) − E [bk,t(νj)| Ft−1])∣∣ (3.23)
+ max
j∈I1,N(n)
∣∣Pn ∥∥λTxt,k(a0)∥∥E [dk,t(νt)| Ft−1]∣∣ (3.24)
+ max
j∈I1,N(n)
∣∣PnλT (η(νj) − E [ηt(νj)| Ft−1])∣∣ . (3.25)
Expressions (3.23) and (3.24) are similar to Theorem 3.1 in Welsh [1989] who show that they are of negli-
gible stochastic order for a general class of M-estimators and linear specifications, whereas xt,k(a) here
is non-linear, however it is evaluated at the true parameter a0. Since our problem is piece-wise lin-
ear with a bounded transition function, second moments of the conditional volatility process and by
Assumption 3.6 strictly positive and finite eigenvalues of D1,m,n, their results apply to our setting. Ex-
pression (3.25) is identical to Xiao & Koenker [2009], equation (A.5). The latter requires the exponential
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bound Assumption 3.8 to be of negligible stochastic order. For further details, we refer the reader to
these citations.






















Whenever the right hand side of this equation exceeds zero, it is implied that so does the left hand














noting that PnλTϕt (a0) = Op(
√
m/n) and λn,min > 0 as n→∞ and B→∞.
Corollary 3.1 (First Stage Bahadur Representation). Let sk = fε(F−1ε (τk)), sT = [s1, . . . , sK], qT = [q1, . . . , qK].































































 Gt(ζ0)2 Gt(ζ0) (1−Gt(ζ0))
Gt(ζ0) (1−Gt(ζ0)) (1−Gt(ζ0))
2



























2 λ by this sequence in equation (3.26) to get







By construction, the moment function on the left hand side is zero the estimate ân. Thus, we have for
the right hand side for all λ ∈ Rm satisfying ‖λ‖ = 1:
λT
[
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and thus the expression inside the bracket must be zero. We premultiply the latter by
√
n and get the
Bahadur representation for
√
n(ân−a0), as well as the one for
√
n(α̂n−α0) by only considering the first
2(m+ 1) and the last 2 rows.




have for any linear combination of the components of the (2(m+ 1) + 2)-dimensional Bahadur represen-
tation:
√














where µ ∈ R2(m+1)+2. For this we require the moment and mixing conditions stated in Assumption





For the second stage, the directional derivative of the objective function as in equation (3.11) is re-defined
as
gn (θ,α) = gn
(









(τ− 1{ut 6 [θI, θII]Tzt(α, ζ)})
and the one for the population, using the law of iterative expectations, as
g (θ,α) = g
(










(τ− Fu|Ft−1 ([θI, θII]Tzt(α, ζ)))
 .
Note that we re-estimate ζ and as such consider only the moments for the ζ parameter as a part of
θ. Whenever we consider the parameter ζ related to the first stage (as part of α), it will be explicitly
mentioned. Due to Assumption 3.3, the latter is differentiable such that the partial derivatives with









































[L1, . . . , Lq]T ⊗ zmt

ιTq[L
1, . . . , Lq]T ⊗ zmTt α∆ ∂G∂ζ
dµ,
where L is the lag operator. The expectations Γθ,0 = Γθ(θ0,α0;P), Γα,0 := Γα(θ0,α0;P) well-defined and
exist by Assumptions 3.1-3.5. In addition to this we have that Γθ,0 is positive definite and has full rank
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which follows from the fact that our GARCH process is invertible by Assumption 3.2 and Assumption
3.6 which implies that Γθ =
∞∑
m=1
Ψ(α)TDn,mΨ(α) has full rank as well, where Ψ is a matrix that constructs
z
pq
t from zmt . In addition to this let Γθ,n(θ,α) = Γθ(θ,α;Pn) and Γα,n(θ,α) := Γα(θ,α;Pn) be their sample
analogues.
Theorem 3.2 (Second Stage Consistency). Under Assumptions 3.1-3.8, the second-stage estimator is
√
n-consistent, that is, for n→∞ and τ ∈ (0,1)
∥∥∥θ̂n(τ) − θ0(τ)∥∥∥ = Op(n− 12 ).
Proof. It needs to be shown that
∥∥∥θ̂n(τ) − θ0(τ)∥∥∥ = Op (n− 12 ). For this, note that g (θ,α) is differentiable










Taking norms, a bound for the right hand side is obtained:
∥∥∥g(θ̂n(τ),α0)− g (θ0(τ),α0)∥∥∥ > λmin (Γθ,0) ∥∥∥(θ̂n(τ) − θ0(τ))∥∥∥ ,
with λmin (Γθ,0) being the the smallest eigenvalue of Γθ,0 which is strictly positive as argued above. Since
g (θ0(τ),α0) = 0, it is sufficient to show that
∥∥∥g(θ̂n(τ),α0)∥∥∥ = Op (n− 12 ). Using the triangle inequality
it follows that
∥∥∥g(θ̂n(τ),α0))∥∥∥ 6 ∥∥∥g(θ̂n(τ),α0)− g(θ̂n(τ), α̂n)∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥g(θ̂n(τ), α̂n)∥∥∥ (3.29)
6
∥∥∥g(θ̂n(τ),α0)− g(θ̂n(τ), α̂n)∥∥∥ (3.30)
+
∥∥∥g(θ̂n(τ), α̂n)− g (θ0(τ),α0) − gn (θ̂n(τ), α̂n)+ gn (θ0(τ),α0)∥∥∥ (3.31)
+
∥∥∥gn (θ̂n(τ), α̂n)∥∥∥ (3.32)
+ ‖gn (θ0(τ),α0)‖ , (3.33)
where g (θ0(τ),α0) = 0 was subtracted within the second norm (3.31). By the central limit theorem
[Ibragimov & Linnik, 1971, Theorem 18.5.3], the existence of the (2 + δ) moment of zmt , zmt Gt(ζ0) and
zmt ∂Gt(ζ)ζ, respectively, the boundedness of both Gt(ζ0) and
∂Gt(ζ0)
∂ζ
the expression (3.33) is tight and






. The remaining equations (3.30), (3.31) and (3.32) can again be
analyzed separately. Starting with the first term, again using the triangle inequality, and changing the
signs within the norm, equation (3.30) can be bounded by
∥∥∥g(θ̂n(τ),α0)− g(θ̂n(τ), α̂n)∥∥∥ 6 ∥∥∥g(θ̂n(τ), α̂n)− g(θ̂n(τ),α0)− Γα,n (θ̂n(τ),α0) (α̂n − α0)∥∥∥ (3.34)
+
∥∥∥Γα,n (θ̂n(τ),α0) (α̂n − α0) − Γα,n (θ0(τ),α0) (α̂n − α0)∥∥∥ (3.35)
+ ‖Γα,n (θ0(τ),α0) (α̂n − α0)‖




around α0 in equation (3.34) and using the fact
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that Γα,n is Lipschitz in α due to the fact that ∂Gt(ζ0)∂ζ is Lipschitz and σt is bounded due to the fact
that it is invertible to an ARCH model by Assumption 3.2 and the boundedness of ut by Assumption




is Lipschitz in θ0(τ), which has bounded
parameter space. Thus, this reduces to
∥∥∥g(θ̂n(τ),α0)− g(θ̂n(τ), α̂n)∥∥∥ 6 Op (‖α̂n − α0‖2)+ Op (‖α̂n − α0‖ ∥∥∥θ̂n(τ) − θ0(τ)∥∥∥)+ ‖Γα,0 (α̂n − α0)‖
(3.36)
= ‖Γα,0 (α̂n − α0)‖ (1+ op (1)), (3.37)
where the the last term follows from the fact that Γα,n → Γα,0 in probability by law of large numbers, for
which we need the existence of the moments in Assumption 3.5, and Slutsky’s lemma. In a next step,
we analyze the remaining terms (3.31) and (3.32), for which we have to check the conditions for Lemma








(τ− 1{ut 6 [θI, θII]Tzt(α, ζ)}) (3.38)
such that gn (θ,α) = Pnmτ(zt(α),θ,α) and g (θ,α) = Emτ(zt,θ,α). Then if zt is stationary which is
true by Assumption 3.2 and 3.3, has β-mixing decay rate as in Assumption 3.5 (see e.g. Carrasco & Chen
[2002], Meitz & Saikkonen [2008]),Θτ2 is a compact subset of R2(p+q+1)+2 andΘ1 one of R2(m+1)×R×R+











for some sj which is bound by the degree of smoothness of Gt(ζ), some constant Kj > 0 and for r = 2+ δ,
satisfying the restriction in Assumption 3.5 to claim that:
sup
(θ′,α′)∈Uδ(θ0(τ),α0)
∥∥g (θ′,α′)− g (θ0(τ),α0) − gn (θ′,α′)+ gn (θ0(τ),α0)∥∥ = op (n− 12 ) .
with Uδ := {(θ,α) ∈Θτ2 ×Θ1 : ‖θ− θ0(τ)‖ 6 δ, ‖α− α0‖ 6 δ} by Lemma 4.2 in Chen [2008]. As discussed
in Chen [2008] we need mτ,j to be a member of the function class with bracketing number that satisfies∞∫
0
√
logN(ε1/sj ,H, ‖‖H)dε < ∞ where the degree of smoothness sastisfies d > 2/(2sj) with sj = 1.
Alternatively we can make use of the class of monotone functions which is sufficient for the former
condition. A detailed discussion of this can be found in Chen [2008]. This implies that we either need
continuity of ∂Gt(ζ)
∂ζ
[van der Vaart & Wellner, 1996, Theorem 2.7.1] or monotonicity [van der Vaart &
Wellner, 1996, Theorem 2.7.5] of ∂Gt(ζ)
∂ζ
with respect to ξt. Assumption 3.1 ensures that the transition
function belongs to one of these classes. Note that, the continuity condition holds for the derivative
of the logistic transition function but not for the linear one, whereas monotonicity only holds for the
derivative of the linear one.
The uniform boundedness relative to the Lr-norm of the distance between (3.38) evaluated at any
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two parameter values within a neighborhood of the true parameters can be shown as follows.
By definition we have
zt,j(θ
′′, ζ′′,α′, ζ′) =

G(ζ′′)zt,j(α
′, ζ′) if 0 < j 6 p+ q+ 1
(1−G(ζ′′))zt,j−(p+q+1)(α










if j = 2(p+ q+ 1) + 2
.
In addition to this we have,
∣∣mτ,j(zt,θ′′, ζ′′,α′, ζ′) −mτ,j(zt,θ0, ζ0,α0, ζ0)∣∣r
6 τ
∣∣zt,j(θ′′, ζ′′,α′, ζ′) − zt,j(θ′′, ζ′′,α′, ζ′)∣∣r (3.39)
+
∣∣zt,j(θ′′, ζ′′,α′, ζ′)1{ut 6 θ′′Tzt(α′, ζ′, ζ′′)}− zt,j(θ0, ζ0,α0, ζ0)1{ut 6 θT0zt(α0, ζ0, ζ0)}∣∣r . (3.40)
We start by expanding equation (3.39) and bounding each term individually:
τE
∣∣zt,j(θ′′, ζ′′,α′, ζ′) − zt,j(θ0, ζ0,α0, ζ0)∣∣r 6 τE ∣∣zt,j(θ′′, ζ′′,α′, ζ′) − zt,j(θ0, ζ′′,α′, ζ′)∣∣r
+ τE
∣∣zt,j(θ0, ζ′′,α′, ζ′) − zt,j(θ0, ζ′′,α0, ζ′)∣∣r
+ τE
∣∣zt,j(θ0, ζ′′,α0, ζ′) − zt,j(θ0, ζ0,α0, ζ′)∣∣r
+ τE
∣∣zt,j(θ0, ζ0,α0, ζ′) − zt,j(θ0, ζ0,α0, ζ0)∣∣r .
Given that
∥∥θ′′ − θ∥∥ 6 δ, a bound for the first term can be obtained by noting that we have finite (2 + δ)
moments of ut (for all t) and finite derivatives of the transition function G by Assumptions 3.1 and
3.6. such that τrE
∣∣∣(θ′′∆ − θ∆0 )Tzt,j(α′, ζ′)∂G(ζ′′,η′′)∂ ∣∣∣r 6 K1,1,jδr. For ‖α′ − α‖ 6 δ, a bound – denoted by
K1,2,jδ
r – follows immediately from the linearity of zt,j(θ′′, ζ′′,α′, ζ′) with respect to α and finite second
moments of ut. For the transition parameters
∥∥ζ′′ − ζ∥∥ 6 δ and ∥∥ζ′ − ζ∥∥ 6 δ, we additionally need
differentiability of G and the Lipschitz continuity and boundedness of ∂G
∂ζ
, to get upper bounds denoted
by K1,3,j and K1,4,j, respectively.




∣∣zt,j(θ′′, ζ′′α′, ζ′) − zt,j(θ0,α0, ζ0, ζ0)∣∣r 6 K1,jδr. (3.41)
For the second term (3.40) we note that
∣∣zt,j(θ′′, ζ′′,α′, ζ′)1{ut 6 θ′′Tzt(α′, ζ′, ζ′′)}− zt,j(θ0, ζ0,α0, ζ0)1{ut 6 θT0zt(α0, ζ0, ζ0)}∣∣r
6
∣∣zt,j(θ′′, ζ′′,α′, ζ′) (1{ut 6 θ′′Tzt(α′, ζ′, ζ′′)}− 1{ut 6 θT0zt(α0, ζ0, ζ0)})∣∣r (3.42)
+
∣∣(zt,j(θ′′, ζ′′,α′, ζ′) − zt,j(θ0, ζ0,α0, ζ0))1{ut 6 θT0zt(α0, ζ0, ζ0)}∣∣r . (3.43)
Whereas the bound of the expectation of term (3.43) follows from (3.41), we need to take care of equation
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(3.42). Let z′t,j = zt,j(θ









∣∣z′t,j∣∣r (1{ut 6 θ′′Tzt(α′, ζ′, ζ′′)}− 1{ut 6 θT0zt(α′, ζ′, ζ′′)})
+E
∣∣z′t,j∣∣r (1{ut 6 θT0zt(α′, ζ′, ζ′′)}− 1{ut 6 θT0zt(α0, ζ′, ζ′′)})
+2E
∣∣z′t,j∣∣r (1{ut 6 θT0zt(α0, ζ′, ζ′′)}− 1{ut 6 θT0zt(α0, ζ′, ζ0)})
+ 2E
∣∣z′t,j∣∣r (1{ut 6 θT0zt(α0, ζ′, ζ0)}− 1{ut 6 θT0zt(α0, ζ0, ζ0)})}
where the inequality follows from the triangle inequality and the fact that ω 7→ 1 {ut 6 ω} is monotone
in ω and which is in turn linear in θ and α, an in addition to this 1 ◦ G monotone in the first parameter
(location) of ζ, namely ζ and piece-wise monotone – increasing over half of the domain and decreasing
over the other half – in its second parameter η (scale).
We then obtain another upper bound for the right hand side of equation (3.44) by applying the law






















T (α′ − α0)
+ 2























The variables φ̃j for j ∈ I1,4 refer to the elements of small neighborhoods of the respective parameters
around which we applied the mean value theorem, for which we require the density fut|Ft−1 to exist
and to be bounded which holds by Assumption 3.4. For the last term we require the bound on ∂Gt(ζ)
∂ζ
.
We also use the fact that zt,j has finite (2+ δ) moments by Assumption 3.5. Thus, for any (θ′′, ζ′′,α′, ζ) in
a neighborhood of their true counterparts, there exists a K2,j > 0 such that the original equation (3.40)
can be bounded by
E
∣∣zt,j(θ′′, ζ′′,α′, ζ′)1{ut 6 θ′′Tzt(α′, ζ′, ζ′′)}− zt,j(θ0, ζ0,α0, ζ0)1{ut 6 θT0zt(α0, ζ0, ζ0)}∣∣r 6 K2,jδr
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n ‖g (θ,α) − g (θ0(τ),α0) − gn (θ,α) + gn (θ0(τ),α0)‖
1+
√













∥∥∥g(θ̂n(τ), α̂n)∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥gn (θ̂n(τ), α̂n)∥∥∥)
6 o(1) + op (1)
(∥∥∥g(θ̂n(τ),α0)∥∥∥ (1+ op (1)) + ∥∥∥gn (θ̂n(τ), α̂n)]∥∥∥) ,
where the last step follows from equations (3.36) and (3.37). Thus, by applying inequalities (3.36) and
(3.45) to the original inequality (3.29) the following bound is obtained:
∥∥∥g(θ̂n(τ),α0))∥∥∥ 6 Op (‖α̂n − α0‖2)+ Op (‖α̂n − α0‖∥∥∥θ̂n(τ) − θ0(τ)∥∥∥)+ ‖Γα,0 (α̂n − α0)‖
+
∥∥∥gn (θ̂n(τ), α̂n)∥∥∥+ op (1) ∥∥∥g(θ̂n(τ),α0)∥∥∥+ op (1) ∥∥∥gn (θ̂n(τ), α̂n)∥∥∥ .
This can be rearranged and reduced to
(1− op (1))
∥∥∥g(θ̂n(τ),α0))∥∥∥ 6 (1+ op (1)) ∥∥∥gn (θ̂n(τ), α̂n)∥∥∥+ Op (n− 12 )
where the first term on right hand side is the inf
θ∈Θτ2








‖gn (θ, α̂n)‖ 6 ‖g (θ, α̂n) − g (θ0(τ),α0) + gn (θ, α̂n) − gn (θ0(τ),α0)‖
+ ‖g (θ, α̂n) − g (θ,α0)‖+ ‖g (θ,α0)‖+ ‖gn (θ0(τ),α0)‖







where the last inequality follows from equation (3.45) and Corollary 3.1. Thus,













for which equation (3.37) is used. Consequently, this is implies for the respective infima
‖gn (θ, α̂n)‖ 6 ‖g (θ,α0)‖+ (1+ op (1)) ‖Γα,0 (α̂n − α0)‖
and, using the fact that Γα,0(α̂n − α0) = Op(n−
1
2 ) by equation (3.27), we have:
λmin (Γθ,0)
∥∥∥(θ̂n(τ) − θ0(τ))∥∥∥ 6 ∥∥∥g(θ̂n(τ),α0)∥∥∥ = Op (n− 12 ) ,
which completes the proof.
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Corollary 3.2. Under Assumptions 3.1-3.8, the following linearization holds:







Proof. By adding and subtracting, equation (3.46) can be rewritten as:
gn (θ, α̂n) − gn (θ0(τ),α0) − Γθ,0(θ− θ0(τ)) − Γα,0 (α̂n − α0)
= gn (θ, α̂n) − gn (θ0(τ),α0) − Γθ,0(θ− θ0(τ)) − Γα,0 (α̂n − α0)
+ g (θ, α̂n) − g (θ, α̂n) + g (θ0(τ),α0) − g (θ0(τ),α0)
+ g (θ,α0) − g (θ,α0) + Γα,n (θ,α0) (α̂n − α0) − Γα,n (θ,α0) (α̂n − α0)
Again taking norms, rearranging the terms on the right hand side, using the triangle inequality, the
following bound is obtained for θ = θ̂n(τ):
∥∥∥gn (θ̂n, α̂n)− gn (θ0(τ),α0) − Γθ,0(θ̂n − θ0(τ)) − Γα,0 (α̂n − α0)∥∥∥
6
∥∥∥gn (θ̂n(τ), α̂n)− gn (θ0(τ),α0) − (g(θ̂n(τ), α̂n)− g (θ0(τ),α0))∥∥∥
+
∥∥∥g(θ̂n(τ), α̂n)− g(θ̂n(τ),α0))− Γα,n (θ̂n(τ),α0) (α̂n − α0)∥∥∥
+
∥∥∥g(θ̂n(τ),α0)− g (θ0(τ),α0) − Γθ,0 (θ̂n(τ) − θ0(τ))∥∥∥
+
∥∥∥Γα,n (θ̂n(τ),α0) (α̂n − α0) − Γα,0 (α̂n − α0)∥∥∥ = op (n− 12 ) ,
where we use stochastic equicontinuity for the first term and reason along the lines of (3.34), (3.35),




Theorem 3.3 (Second Stage Asymptotic Normality). If Assumptions 3.1-3.8 hold, the second-stage esti-

















































2 if i 6 p+ q+ 1 and j 6 p+ q+ 1




ε (τj))] if i > p+ q+ 1 and j > p+ q+ 1




ε (τ))] otherwise (i > j w.l.o.g).
. (3.13)
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using the linearization from Corollary 3.2. Since Γθ,0 has full rank, by premultiplying
√
n, an asymptotic








ngn (θ0(τ),α0)) + Γα,0
√
n (α̂n − α0)
]
+ op(1).
where we use Assumption 3.5 and the α-mixing central limit theorem [Ibragimov & Linnik, 1971, Theo-





















































































where we use independence of the innovations εt and zmt and zt(α0), respectively. The matrices Ξ
τ,Mt,
and Γθ,0 are defined in equations (3.13), (3.12) and (3.28).
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